Between the wheels: Quest for streetcar unionism in the Carolina Piedmont, 1919--1922 by Leatherwood, Jeffrey M.
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2009 
Between the wheels: Quest for streetcar unionism in the Carolina 
Piedmont, 1919--1922 
Jeffrey M. Leatherwood 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Leatherwood, Jeffrey M., "Between the wheels: Quest for streetcar unionism in the Carolina Piedmont, 
1919--1922" (2009). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 4489. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4489 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
 
 
Between the Wheels:   
Quest for Streetcar Unionism 










Dissertation submitted to the 
Eberly College of Arts and Sciences 
at West Virginia University 
in partial fulfillment of requirements 










Kenneth Fones-Wolf, Ph.D., Chair 
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Ph.D. 
Michal McMahon, Ph.D. 
Peter Carmichael, Ph.D. 
Gerald Schwartz, Ph.D. 
 














Between the Wheels:   
Quest for Streetcar Unionism 
in the Carolina Piedmont, 1919-1922 
 
Jeffrey M. Leatherwood 
 
 
Between the Wheels examines three Carolina Piedmont streetcar strikes in 1919-22.  
These years were marked by the aspirations of workers for industrial democracy, corporate anti-
labor backlash and by the first Red Scare.  Inevitably, these trends swept through the Carolina 
Piedmont, long viewed as isolated and resistant toward progress.  But scholars should now re-
examine the New South in light of broader American context.  Three case studies in Spartanburg 
and Columbia, South Carolina, and Charlotte, North Carolina, highlight the struggles of New 
South labor reformers against union-busting monopolists, exemplified by James B. Duke. 
During World War I, many Carolina Piedmont entrepreneurs viewed labor unionism as a 
direct threat to their well-entrenched system of exploitation and paternalism.  Mill owners and 
their investors feared that successful streetcar unions could lead to renewed efforts to organize 
their textile mills.  While Piedmont streetcar workers represented mere hundreds of skilled 
employees, regional textile mills employed thousands more unskilled workers, who were usually 
low-paid and poorly-treated by their employers and foremen.  After World War I, Carolina 
streetcar employees and textile workers forged an informal alliance in opposition to Southern 
Power and other corporate interests.  
The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees (AASERE) met 
with resistance when its organizers sought to unionize the Piedmont‟s urban streetcar workers.  
In Charlotte, Southern Public Utilities Inc. employed armed strikebreakers, in defiance of the 
city‟s compromise solution.  On the evening of August 25, 1919, Charlotte police officers and 
strikebreakers fired into a crowd of angry demonstrators, killing five men and wounding over 
twenty others.  National Guardsmen quickly restored order in North Charlotte.   
Charlotte‟s debacle resulted in setbacks for the struggling labor movement in the Carolina 
Piedmont.  Over the next three years, textile mills crushed similar unionization efforts, while 
embryonic streetcar unions withered on the vine in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Durham, 
North Carolina.  By 1922, this pattern of regression profoundly affected South Carolina, 
dislodging streetcar unions in Spartanburg and Columbia, where previous labor gains had 
resulted in partial or full recognition.  By the 1930s, these New South streetcar lines faced 
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 Between the Wheels began in 2003 as my first graduate research paper on the 
Charlotte Streetcar Strike of 1919, supervised and nurtured by Dr. Gerald Schwartz at 
Western Carolina University.  By the time I matriculated at West Virginia University for 
my doctoral program in 2004, my expanded term paper had been presented at 
conferences, not to mention an appearance in Western Carolina University‟s Tuskasegee 
Valley Historical Review.  Little did I know how much more familiar I would become 
with its subject matter over the next five years! 
 At West Virginia University, Dr. Kenneth Fones-Wolf took an avid professional 
interest in my streetcar labor research.  He guided my initial prospectus, encouraged my 
new angles of inquiry into Spartanburg and Columbia, South Carolina, and coached me 
on how to develop my dissertation chapters for possible publication.  I also received 
generous support from the WVU Robbins Fellowship endowment in 2008, the same year 
my chapter on Spartanburg achieved publication in the South Carolina Historical 
Association journal.  These two developments were confidence boosters, spurring me to 
complete my principal writing in less than two years. 
 I would like to thank my dissertation board, including Ken Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth 
Fones-Wolf, Michal McMahon, Peter Carmichael, and especially Gerry Schwartz for 
supporting this project from its inception.  West Virginia University‟s History 
Department has been a source of inspiration and support, and I would also like to single 
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out Chuck Dusch and Michael Buseman for being such great colleagues and friends 
throughout my graduate career in Morgantown. 
 Primary documents are essential to historical research, and this work would not 
exist without the generous assistance rendered by these institutions and personages:  
WVU‟s Wise Library and its West Virginia History & Regional History Collection; 
University of South Carolina‟s Caroliniana Library at the “Horseshoe” in Columbia; the 
South Carolina Archives located on Parkland Road; Sheila Christopher and the Duke 
Energy Library in Charlotte; the Downtown Charlotte Public Library for making 
available their extensive newspaper archives; UNC at Chapel Hill‟s Louis Round Wilson 
Library for providing Allen Tullos‟s three interviews with Southern Public Utilities 
workers; University of Wisconsin at Madison for their kind inter-library loans of 
Motorman & Conductor magazines on microfilm; lastly, the National Archives and 
Records Administration in Washington D.C. for providing valuable Department of Labor 
documents pertaining to Charlotte.  If I have omitted any persons or institutions that 
rendered assistance to this dissertation, then I apologize to them in advance.   
 I would also like to show appreciation to two individuals who served as living 
connections to the principal actors and events of the Charlotte Streetcar Strike, almost 
ninety years after it took place.  Ann Ritch Brantley and Samuel S. McNinch III shared 
personal reminiscences of their respective family members. Marvin Lee Ritch and Frank 
Ramsey McNinch remain two of the Piedmont‟s most fascinating historical figures, and 
each merits a biographer who can do their careers justice. 
 During the spring of 2007, my father passed away in Waynesville, North 
Carolina.  Grady D. Leatherwood was a native son of Western North Carolina, with 
vii 
 
family members spread across the Blue Ridge Mountains as well as the Carolina 
Piedmont.  This dissertation is hereby dedicated to my father‟s memory.  I also express 
deep gratitude to my mother-in-law, Elaine Sherrill Rohr, for her archival knowledge and 
belief in my scholarly potential.  Lastly, my wife, Jennifer E. Beck, deserves a special 
recognition for her longstanding emotional and intellectual support.      
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Chapter 1:  Between the Wheels 
 
In late June 1919, Albert Essex Jones, special organizer for the streetcar workers‟ 
union, arrived in Spartanburg, South Carolina.  His arrival heralded the American 
Federation of Labor‟s most ambitious campaign in a region long perceived as hostile 
toward unionism.  For nearly a decade, the Amalgamated Association of Street and 
Electric Railway Employees (AASERE) had sought, without much success, to organize 
the Carolina Piedmont.  In early July, Spartanburg‟s streetcar workers declared a strike.  
Partly owned by James B. Duke‟s Southern Power, South Carolina Light, Power, and 
Railway (SCLP&R) supplied both power and transportation for local textile mills.  
Manager Franklin H. Knox engaged strikebreakers, but South Carolina‟s governor, 
Robert A. Cooper, interceded before serious violence overwhelmed Spartanburg.  
Arbitrators secured Knox‟s agreement for better wages and schedules – albeit without 
union recognition.   
Despite this setback, Jones glimpsed a greater opportunity to unionize three major 
Piedmont cities – Charlotte and Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Greenville, South 
Carolina -- served by Southern Public Utilities (SPU), a major branch of Southern Power.  
Just a month later, Jones mobilized nearly 300 streetcar men, who declared a strike on 
August 10 for better pay and union recognition.  This transit strike paralyzed several 
Piedmont and Upcountry towns, as AASERE mobilized sympathy among the region‟s 
impoverished textile workers.  SPU President Zebulon Taylor refused to acknowledge 
Jones as a legitimate representative, despite pressure from local and federal adjudicators.  
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As a result, Charlotte‟s strike developed into a political impasse, with union sympathizers 
and progressives challenging the region‟s corporate establishment.
1 
Charlotte, the “Queen City” of North Carolina, served as the economic keystone 
that united the North Carolina Piedmont and South Carolina Upcountry during the 
Progressive Era.  James B. Duke‟s ambitious electrification program became a significant 
catalyst in this urbanization process, which accelerated during the First World War.  
Headquartered in Charlotte, Southern Power quickly accumulated most of the traction 
companies in nearby Carolina towns.  Duke and his fellow New South industrialists 
further acquired textile mills and other manufacturing assets across the entire Carolina 
Piedmont.  Therefore, when Albert E. Jones expanded his union‟s post-war organization 
drive into Charlotte, he chose to enter the proverbial lion‟s den.   
Even before World War I began, many Carolina Piedmont entrepreneurs viewed 
the transit union, AASERE, as the advance guard of a renewed effort to organized New 
South laborers.   While the region‟s streetcar workers represented mere hundreds of 
employees, Carolina textile mills employed thousands more unskilled men and women, 
who were usually low-paid and poorly-treated by their employers and foremen.  Many 
middle-class Southerners also looked down upon these “factory classes,” who usually 
inhabited mill villages or urban tenements.   
Mill owners and their investors especially feared that successful streetcar unions 
could lead to numerous and costly textile mill strikes over union recognition, particularly 
since streetcars were conduits of information for working-class riders.  Mill workers also 
had a documented history of resentment toward their employers, as evidenced by two 
                                                 
     1 Charlotte Observer, 10 August to 23 November 1919; Greenville Daily News, 12 
August 1919, 10; 15 August 1919, 10; 17 August 1919, 10. 
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recent strikes in Greenville and Anderson, South Carolina.  Unsurprisingly, labor 
organizers and rank-and-file unionists often valued these mill-hands as significant, if 
rather volatile, potential recruits.  Throughout 1919 and beyond, electric streetcar 
employees and textile mill workers forged an informal coalition against the Piedmont 
region‟s well-entrenched system of exploitation and paternalism.    
Nowhere is this working-class alliance better documented than the Charlotte 
streetcar strike of 1919.  Hundreds of mill-workers rallied across Charlotte to protest 
Southern Public Utilities, especially after Zebulon Taylor sent armed replacements to 
man his streetcars.  Several acts of strikebreaker intimidation worsened matters on 
August 25.  Before long, a crowd of perhaps 2,000 townsfolk began picketing the 
Dilworth car-barn.  Subsequently, Police Chief Walter B. Orr lost control of the 
strikebreakers and policemen guarding SPU property.  Three protesters were killed 
outright, while two others subsequently died from mortal gunshot wounds.  No policemen 
or replacement workers were among the dozens of injured reported at the “Battle of the 
Barn.”  Considerable property damage resulted to SPU streetcars during a subsequent riot 
on August 26, which subsided only when National Guardsmen patrolled uneasy streets.  
Thwarted in their quest for a union, strikers returned to their jobs in early September.2   
In the ensuing months, the political repercussions and legal proceedings 
dominated headlines in many regional newspapers.  Charlotte‟s press transformed labor 
organizers into alien invaders.  Meanwhile, the repressive violence perpetrated by the city 
police and strikebreakers underwent a similar transfiguration, ultimately finding 
                                                 
     2 This epithet for the Charlotte Strike appeared twenty years later in the official city 
history sponsored by the North Carolina Work Projects Administration; see Charlotte: a 
Guide to the Queen City of North Carolina (Charlotte: News Printing House, 1939), 31-2. 
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sanctification in Charlotte‟s courts.  But the defeated streetcar strike did not simply 
reflect a city-wide reversal, as some previous historical treatments have implied.  
Charlotte‟s streetcar union, along with its new affiliates in Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina and Greenville, South Carolina, simply withered on the vine.  None of these 
chapters sent representatives to national AASERE meetings.  Moreover, Charlotte‟s 
crackdown on labor unions retarded further organization efforts in the Piedmont and 
Appalachia for the next decade, while the strike‟s long-term effects also reversed ten 
years of past labor progress.      
These consequences were soon felt by organizing streetcar workers throughout 
Charlotte‟s sphere of influence.   In Knoxville, Tennessee, another streetcar strike over 
union recognition occurred in October 1919.  Knoxville‟s ruthless suppression of transit 
workers and allied coal-miners further weakened the tenuous grasp of unionism in eastern 
Tennessee.  More ominously, Spartanburg‟s modest labor gains, mandated by South 
Carolina‟s governor in 1919, were soon revoked by South Carolina Light, Power, and 
Railway in early 1920.3 
The AASERE‟s final gasp of union activity in the Carolina Piedmont ended with 
the Columbia Street Railway Strike of 1922.  During World War I, South Carolina‟s state 
capital enjoyed a mutually-beneficial relationship with its streetcar union.  After his 
successful union rollback in Spartanburg, Franklin H. Knox took over management of the 
Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electricity Company in January 1922.  To avoid 
bankruptcy, Knox discharged many employees, nearly all members of AASERE Division 
590.  Most of Knox‟s men elected to strike in sympathy, resulting in a year-long deadlock 
                                                 
     3 James A. Burran, “Labor Conflict in Urban Appalachia:  The Knoxville Streetcar 
Strike of 1919.”  Tennessee History Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, (Spring 1979), 62-78. 
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in the courts and state legislature.  Columbia‟s outcome virtually overturned the union‟s 
modest gains in Upcountry South Carolina, much as Charlotte had done to Piedmont 
North Carolina.  In claiming this Pyrrhic victory against AASERE, however, Knox 
blacklisted his most experienced streetcar crewmen, ensuring Columbia Light, Gas & 
Railway‟s (CLG&R) inevitable decline in 1925.  Thereafter, buses, jitneys, and private 
cars began to replace Columbia‟s failing streetcar lines.4  
*      *      *       
Between the Wheels contributes to several important literatures in modern 
American history.  First, my work sharpens our understanding of general labor history.  
Often viewed in isolation, the Carolina Piedmont region witnessed the same post-war 
developments affecting the nation, and its history conforms to a larger narrative.  
Woodrow Wilson‟s political downfall weakened political support for Southern labor 
unions, while regional businessmen capitalized on the Red Scare to discredit labor 
unions.  Hence, AASERE‟s protracted struggle in the Carolina Piedmont should be 
viewed contemporaneously with Washington‟s Centralia Massacre, the Great Steel 
Strike, West Virginia‟s Mine Wars, and the Railroad Shopmen‟s Strike of 1922. 5  
                                                 
     4 Thomas Fetters did not mention the prior Spartanburg strikes of 1919 and 1920, 
despite the Knox connection.  Duke‟s South Carolina transportation interests receive 
comprehensive treatment in this useful work.  Thomas T. Fetters, Palmetto Traction 
(Forty Fort, PA:  Harold E. Cox, 1978), 46-9; 86-94.  
     5 See David Brody, Labor in Crisis:  the Steel Strike of 1919 (Urbana & Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1965, 1987); Colin J. Davis, Power at Odds: the 1922 
National Railroad Shopmen’s Strike (Urbana & Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 
1997); Gene Smith, When the Cheering Stopped (William Morrow:  New York, 1971).  
For more analysis on the First Red Scare, see also Eliot Asinof, 1919: America’s Loss of 
Innocence (Donald Fine, Inc.:  New York City, NY, 1990); Joseph A.  McCartin, Labor’s 
Great War (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 1997); William 
Millikan, A Union against Unions (St. Paul, Minnesota:  Minnesota Historical Society 
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Heartened by Woodrow Wilson‟s liberal victory in 1912, the Amalgamated 
Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees participated in the Labor Forward 
movement.  At heart, Labor Forward remained a conservative labor movement, especially 
when compared to the more outspoken Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).  
AASERE organizers had made cautious inroads in the Piedmont.  Under the leadership of 
William D. Mahon, the national streetcar union had already established footholds in 
Asheville, North Carolina and Chattanooga, Tennessee.  In Wilson‟s first year of office, 
the AASERE successfully unionized in Columbia, South Carolina‟s capital.  But labor 
organizers also recognized their need to consolidate individual successes into a stronger 
regional network.    For complete victory, the AASERE needed to wage a campaign for 
the hearts and minds of streetcar workers, while a favorable political climate still existed.     
Between the Wheels demonstrates the AASERE‟s repeated collisions with the 
formidable James Buchanan Duke, who undoubtedly opposed the unionization of his 
Piedmont employees.  No friend to Progressivism, Duke had been forced by the U.S. 
government to break up his tobacco monopoly just before World War I.  However, Duke 
soon rekindled his lost fortunes through competitive textile, electrification, and 
transportation projects, which relied on low wages.  By 1916, nearly all Carolina 
Upcountry street railways were outgrowths of Southern Public Utilities, Inc. (SPU), a 
major holding company for Southern Power.  Some entrepreneurs, like Benette E. Geer 
and Zebulon V. Taylor, became Duke‟s partners.  Historian Robert F. Durden, whose 
                                                                                                                                                 




writings have been uniformly favorable toward Duke, uses the word “empire,” even 
characterizing Duke‟s foreign tobacco enterprises as nothing less than an “invasion.
6   
With America‟s entry in World War I, it was now labor‟s turn to invade Duke‟s 
corporate empire in the Carolina Piedmont.  The AFL had enjoyed a spurt in membership 
growth, chiefly owing to AFL President Samuel Gompers‟s political alliance with the 
Wilson Administration.  The pro-labor reformer Frank Walsh became chairman of the 
influential U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, a bipartisan Congressional 
Commission investigating labor abuses across America.  Wilson further rewarded his 
labor supporters by appointing a former United Mine Workers leader, William B. Wilson, 
as U.S. Labor Secretary.  During the war years, Woodrow Wilson‟s administration also 
established the National War Labor Board to arbitrate wage disputes and strikes with 
relative impartiality.7    
Where does this study fit within New South literature?  In 1976, Gerald Carpenter 
presented his research on the New Orleans Street Railway Strike of 1929, noting that 
many Southern labor historians were too focused upon textile workers, while “virtually 
ignoring” trade unions in the New South.  He also criticized “standard generalizations.”  
Conventional wisdom insisted that the South presented a “united front against the alien 
                                                 
     6 Durden, 39-55, 67-84.  
     7 Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North 
Carolina Press, 1997), 19-20; See also Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles 
(Harcourt, Brace and Company:  New York City, NY, 1936); Graham Adams, Jr., Age of 
Industrial Violence, 1910-1915 (New York & London:  Columbia University Press, 
1966), P.K. Edwards, Strikes in the United States, 1881-1974 (New York City, NY:  St. 
Martin‟s Press, 1981). 
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doctrine of trade unionism.”  Carpenter urged future labor scholars to re-examine these 
long-held interpretations of Southern history.8   
Certainly, the plight of textile mill workers coincided with those of Piedmont 
streetcar workers.  Historians of Southern mill worker protest have focused on the well-
known Great Depression textile strikes, without looking at earlier textile strikes, such as 
the 1919 Wiscasset Mill strike in North Carolina.  Therefore, this research complements 
Bryant Simon‟s excellent A Fabric of Defeat, which concerns South Carolina‟s long war 
against the National Textile Workers Union, ending with the unsuccessful regional strike 
of 1934.  Allen Tullos similarly addresses Carolina Piedmont labor unrest throughout the 
1920s in his work, Habits of Industry.9 
Conventional labor literature also suggests that Southern workers were difficult to 
organize, particularly before 1929.  Piedmont Carolina streetcar employees were low-
paid, much like the South‟s textile workers.  But unlike many textile workers, streetcar 
unions in the Carolinas did receive local support, even contractual recognition, such as in 
the cases of Columbia, South Carolina, or Asheville, North Carolina.  One questions the 
popular image of the monolithic South, uniformly opposed toward organized labor. 
Between the Wheels is also a study in Southern Progressivism.  Southern 
Progressives held a number of influential positions in the Carolina Piedmont.  Southern 
Progressivism has been examined by respected historians such as William Link and 
                                                 
     8 Gerald Carpenter, “Public Opinion in the New Orleans Street Railway Strike of 
1929-1930,” from Essays in Southern Labor History: Selected Papers, Southern Labor 
History Conference, 1976 (Westport, Connecticut:  Greenwood Press, 1977), 191-207. 
     9 John A. Salmond, Gastonia 1929 (Chapel Hill & London: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995), 188-9; Bryant Simon, A Fabric of Defeat:  The Politics of South 
Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); 




Dewey Grantham.  Link‟s research identified “two fundamental values” clashing in the 
New South; “the paternalism of [Northern] reformers and the… community power of 
[Southern] traditionalists.”  However, this dissertation examines native Southerners who 
embraced political reform and supported labor unionism. 10  
Most of these Southern Progressives were products of Southern urban centers that 
sprang up during Reconstruction and would continue to grow into the next century.  
Several historians have examined cities as diverse as Charlotte and Columbia.  Charlotte 
Mayor Frank R. McNinch espoused labor unionism, albeit a conservative model, and 
consistently fought against utility monopolies.  In Spartanburg, South Carolina, 
newspaper editor Charles Hearon openly speculated whether well-disciplined labor 
unions might help ensure higher safety standards in public transportation.  Charlotte 
attorney Marvin L. Ritch sacrificed his career to support streetcar workers.  Columbia‟s 
labor community also boasted a newspaper, which circulated briefly during the postwar 
years.  Meanwhile, one South Carolina state congressman, Ambrose A. Gerald, even 
served as Columbia, South Carolina‟s AASERE chapter president.
11   
According to Dewey Grantham, one of Southern Progressivism‟s major hallmarks 
was a “desire to expand the [state‟s] regulatory function in behalf of economic 
opportunity.”  Reformers increasingly came to view Southern Power as a monopolistic 
                                                 
     10 William Link, The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), xii; Dewey Grantham, Southern 
Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition (University of Tennessee 
Press, Knoxville, 1983), 258. 
     11 David Carlton, Mill and Town in South Carolina 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge and 
London:  Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Janette T. Greenwood, The Black and 
White Better Classes in Charlotte (University of North Carolina Press:  Chapel Hill & 
London, 1994); Thomas W. Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City (Chapel Hill & 
London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
10 
 
threat to economic opportunity.  This feeling culminated with North Carolina‟s regulatory 
impulse against Duke.  Regulation to protect smaller businesses fits historically with 
Woodrow Wilson‟s presidential campaign for “New Freedom.”  But like Wilson, many 
Southern reformers, were also proponents of racial segregation.  Others, like Mayor 
Frank R. McNinch, expressed nativism in their support for immigration restriction during 
the 1920s.  Moreover, Southern Progressives were deeply divided over the issue of child 
labor in textile mills.12 
Even as Progressivism ebbed nationally during World War I, both Carolinas 
entered their own phases of reform, with progressive state governors and house delegates 
swept into office after Wilson‟s narrow re-election in 1916.  Governor Thomas H. Bickett 
and North Carolina‟s General Assembly launched their anti-monopolist rate war against 
Duke‟s Southern Power.  Meanwhile, South Carolina drifted toward state-mandated 
reforms.  After the controversial Coleman Blease administration (1910-14), two 
Progressive Democratic governors took office in Columbia, South Carolina.  Richard 
Irvine Manning and Robert Archer Cooper launched tax-based efforts to improve state 
highways and improve the quality of public education.  They even broke the power of 
company stores in Upcountry mill towns.  Despite the Palmetto State‟s lack of a 
Department of Labor until the late 1930s, unions expanding their presence could hope for 
tolerance at the state level.  However, middle-class constituents in New South cities 
merely desired cheap and reliable public transportation, and as strikes disrupted the 
                                                 
     12 Grantham, 111, 360-1.   
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normal flow, these citizens turned to alternative modes, such as jitneys and motor-buses, 
and increasingly the private automobile.13     
This research also examines the First Red Scare as it affected the Piedmont 
Carolinas after World War I.  In late 1918, the AASERE and other AFL unions seized 
windows of opportunity to penetrate the Carolina Upcountry.  However, this region had 
always been suspicious of labor organizers who were, often as not, Northerners.  
Reactionary impulses were also unleashed during the war against Germany, and 
subsequent Allied interventions against Bolshevism in Archangel and Siberia.14  By 
1919, Woodrow Wilson‟s political force had been nearly spent on foreign crusades.  
Meanwhile, industrialists across the United States had begun to retrench against the 
wartime gains of labor.  Republicans had regained control of Congress in 1918, forcing 
the premature closure of the National War Labor Board in early 1919.  Consequently, 
American businessmen revitalized their “open-shop” propaganda, combining their 
arguments with elements of a conspiracy theory.  Following the recent Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia, American organized labor across the nation became tainted with 
putative connections to the “Red Menace.”15  
                                                 
     13 Robert M. Burts, Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South 
Carolina (Columbia:  University of South Carolina Press, 1973), 70-144; See also Walter 
Edgar, South Carolina: a History (Columbia:  University of South Carolina Press, 1998). 
     14 Robert M. Burts, Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South 
Carolina (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973); Frank L. Grubb Jr., The 
Struggle for Labor Loyalty (Durham, North Carolina:  Duke University Press, 1968); 
William Link, The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992); McCartin, 69-75. 
     15 See Allen Wakstein, “The Origins of the Open Shop Movement,” Journal of 
American History.  Vol. 51, No. 3 (Dec. 1964), 460-75; David Mitchell, 1919: Red 
Mirage (MacMillan Company:  New York City, NY, 1970); William Millikan, A Union 
against Unions (Minnesota Historical Society Press:  St. Paul, Minn., 2001). 
12 
 
Transportation historians have heretofore focused mostly on Northern and 
Midwestern events.  One of the best, Scott Malloy‟s Trolley Wars, focuses on Northern 
urban centers and streetcar unionism during the Progressive Era.  However, only a few 
transportation scholars have paid attention to the South, and such publications often deal 
less with streetcar workers themselves.  Thomas Fetters‟ exhaustive study of South 
Carolina streetcar lines, Palmetto Traction, covers parts of North Carolina and Georgia as 
well.  Fetters‟ 1978 research may not be scholarly, but it does provide useful background 
on Upcountry streetcar lines, as well as their bewildering changes of ownership.  While 
Palmetto Traction did not cover any streetcar strikes in Spartanburg or Greenville, he 
provided coverage in detail to Columbia‟s paralyzing 1922 walkout, not to mention the 
general decline of South Carolina streetcar transportation.    Fetters also co-authored the 
official history of Duke‟s Piedmont & Northern electric railway.16       
Some scholars have devoted historical journal articles to Southern transit strikes.  
Since 1976, two significant peer-reviewed articles have emerged, dealing with 
contemporary problems in Appalachian transportation history.  In 1979, James Burran 
published his research concerning the October 1919 Knoxville, Tennessee strike, which 
took place shortly after the Charlotte streetcar strike in August.  James B. Jones Jr. later 
wrote about organization efforts in Chattanooga, Tennessee at the turn of the century, 
                                                 
     16 Scott Malloy, Trolley Wars:  Streetcar Workers on the Line (Smithsonian Institute  
Press, Washington D.C. and London, 1996); Thomas T. Fetters and Peter W. Swanson, 
Piedmont & Northern:  The Great Electric System of the South (San Marino, Calif.:  
Golden West Books, 1976); Palmetto Traction, 86-94. 
13 
 
culminating with a violent two-month strike in the fall of 1917, during the height of U.S. 
mobilization for World War I.17 
Chattanooga and Knoxville‟s proximity to the Carolina Piedmont suggests that 
this region‟s unionization efforts did not occur in a vacuum.  Moreover, Chattanooga and 
Knoxville‟s unions were established well before the labor struggles of 1919, providing a 
staging ground for further organization.  Chattanooga‟s streetcar workers, like those in 
Anderson and Greenville, showed internal divisions over union membership and 
Northern leadership.  Knoxville‟s October 1919 strike took place subsequently (perhaps 
consequently) after the reversals of Charlotte.  Future investigation may demonstrate that 
anti-labor backlash from the Carolina Upcountry spilled over to Eastern Tennessee, 
weakening tenuous union support in Knoxville.  My research underscores a renewed need 
for regional assessments in New South labor history, instead of merely focusing on 
individual towns and isolated events.  
This study also adds to the literature of New South urban history.  Charlotte, in 
particular, has received a good deal of attention.  In 1979, Miriam Mitchell and Edward 
Perzel compiled their sourcebook on the city‟s role during the Great War, detailing the 
importance of Zebulon V. Taylor as a wartime booster. Janette T. Greenwood‟s The 
Black and White Better Classes in Charlotte leaves off well before 1919, although it 
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provides a good urban historical reference.  She discusses the creation of Charlotte 
suburbs, noting the rise of future Charlotte mayor Frank R. McNinch in city politics.  
Currently the curator of the Levine Museum of the New South in Charlotte, Thomas W. 
Hanchett covers the drab yet historically compelling world of textile mill workers in 
Sorting out the New South City.18  
No discussion of Charlotte history may be considered complete without Dan 
Morrill of the University of Charlotte, who has researched the horse-drawn trolleys of 
Charlotte and Mecklenburg County.  Beginning in the 1980s, Morrill began championing 
historic restoration efforts in Charlotte.  Morrill devoted one segment to the Charlotte 
strike with his electronic publication, The New South Elite in Control, although his 
coverage ends prematurely with the violent confrontation in Dilworth.  Morrill also 
contributed perspectives on the strike‟s 75
th anniversary to the Charlotte Observer.  
Morrill also fought unsuccessfully to preserve the original Dilworth SPU car-barn from 
demolition.  However, since Morrill‟s works are primarily focused on preservation, they 
tend to be more descriptive, less analytical of historical problems.19  
So far, the best documented scholarly account of the Charlotte chapter has been 
Carol Shaw‟s unpublished honors thesis, “A City in Conflict: the 1919 Charlotte 
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Streetcar Strike.”  Shaw cites two major city newspapers, Charlotte Observer and 
Charlotte News, as well as Motorman and Conductor publications.  She also consulted 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation records, although she did not make full use of 
them.  Lamentably, Shaw‟s original research never expanded beyond her 1980 honors 
thesis.  She focuses primarily on Charlotte‟s urban and political history, but pays little 
attention to regional links.  Shaw‟s account halts with the strike settlement, only cursorily 
assessing the strike‟s political and legal aftermath.
20     
*      *      * 
In rewriting their own past, Southern Power, and its successor, Duke Power, were 
clearly successful.  Historian Allen Tullos and journalist Richard Maschal each 
interviewed surviving Southern Power employees in later years.  Maschal concluded that 
over 75 years, Duke Power waged a campaign to discourage memory of the Charlotte 
strike.  Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) historian Shawn Perry confessed he had been 
unaware of this dispute.  Thus, even transportation workers themselves have become 
sadly ignorant about poignant chapters in their own story.21  
In 1994, Dan Morrill even debated whether urban streetcar workers actually 
possessed a true “culture,” in comparison with Carolina Piedmont mill villages.  “One of 
the fundamental things about textile mills;” Morrill reminded the Charlotte Observer, 
“people lived together, worked together, went to church together.  It was more than a 
workplace; it was a lifestyle.”  Morrill concluded his interview with this somewhat 
                                                 
     20 Carol Shaw, “A City in Conflict: the 1919 Charlotte Streetcar Strike” (unpublished 
honors thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980). 
     21 The Charlotte Observer, 23 August 1994, 1E-2E. 
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generalized assessment:  “Streetcar conductors had no „culture,‟ and in their defeat, left 
no person or institution to tell their story.”
22   
Between the Wheels ultimately concerns the vanished social history of motormen 
and conductors from the Carolina Upcountry.  These workers, while relatively small in 
number and scope, developed their own work culture alongside those of textile laborers. 
While streetcar mechanics and conductors did not have company stores, mill schools, or 
common churches, they certainly inhabited a microcosm uniquely their own.  Streetcar 
workers were visible representatives of the working class, with smartly uniformed 
conductors and dutiful motormen dealing with customer relations and public safety 
concerns.  These ordinary men struggled against extraordinary odds in Spartanburg, 
Charlotte, and Columbia.  Today, their way of life is gone, and the parallel world of 
Carolina textile mills appears to be heading the same direction, with the rise of globalism.  
While labor and corporate institutions have both allowed this significant regional 
struggle to slip into near-oblivion, individuals still remembered their world, long after it 
faded from view.  Allen Tullos‟s interviews with two streetcar workers, Loy Cloninger 
and Jesse B. Ashe, reveal much about their vanished world.  Tullos also interviewed 
retired engineer Herman Wolf, a longtime Southern Power employee acquainted with the 
strike.  Cloninger‟s story in particular serves as an eyewitness account of what actually 
happened on that blood-drenched August night.  Both men recalled their careers with 
Southern Public Utilities, from their personal lives to their workplaces.  Unmarried 
                                                 




streetcar men often shared lodgings, typically in boarding houses, where they shared 
meals together.  They also played baseball and enjoyed other pastimes.23 
More importantly, streetcar worker culture is preserved in several trade and labor 
publications, from Southern Public Utilities Magazine to Motorman and Conductor.  
SPU‟s company periodical details a vivid milieu wherein its streetcar men held 
competitions for job safety records, contributed poems and humorous stories, and above 
all, shared the happiness and sorrow of fellow employees.  Motorman and Conductor 
lends even more insight to the overall world of streetcar workers, and their responses to 
post-war changes, from the adoption of one-man streetcars to Red Scare tactics in the 
workplace.  In conclusion, Upcountry Carolina streetcar workers did not exist in a 
geographical or cultural vacuum.  Between the Wheels is ultimately their story -- a 
struggle for industrial democracy as they perceived it.  As Dan Morrill once said of these 
unsung workers, “If you don‟t tell their stories… they‟re forgotten.”
24 
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Chapter Two:  Superpowers of the New South 
 
Before visiting the microcosm of streetcar labor conflicts in the Carolina 
Piedmont, one should examine larger context of Southern Power‟s electrification 
campaign, interwoven with the development of powered textile mills across the region.  
James B. Duke‟s transition from tobacco profiteer to power-broker of the Carolina 
Piedmont is a tale unto itself.  Across the South, municipal and inter-urban traction 
corporations were a logical outgrowth of the burgeoning public utility market, which 
derived its existence from hydro-electrical developments.  As Duke‟s electrification 
projects multiplied, so grew his interests in the lucrative realms of textiles and public 
transportation.                  
After Reconstruction, South Carolina‟s Upcountry and North Carolina‟s Piedmont 
regions became the focus of intensive manufacturing and trade activity.  Northern 
developers looked southward, where raw materials were plentiful, and manual labor even 
cheaper.  But no industry proved more vital to the entire Carolina Upcountry than textile 
manufacture.  While the region‟s cloth and fabric industry reached its zenith after the 
First World War, mills were already evident beforehand.  During the 1880s, South 
Carolina launched pilot mills in Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg counties.  These 
Upcountry county seats soon became citadels of Henry W. Grady‟s “New South,” 
exemplified by Greenville‟s 1915 Southern Textile Exposition.  North Carolina‟s 
Piedmont towns also enjoyed growth in textiles and furniture manufacturing.1 
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Local boosters – principally merchants and wealthy landowners -- were able to 
channel their wealth into these new ventures, becoming stockholders in these new 
industries.  These economic and industrial advancements came with a steep price, 
however.  According to regional historians, much of the investment capital accumulated 
at the expense of Piedmont farmers, whose credit flow and crop prices were controlled by 
the merchant classes.  This situation gave rise to friction between industrialists and 
farmers, who came to resent urbanization and industrial progress.2          
Meanwhile, rural Piedmont families were also rocked by serious agricultural 
downturns throughout the 1880s and 1890s, forcing them to sell their lands and move 
into cities and towns.  According to C. Vann Woodward, ex-farmers who “almost 
overnight left the old farm for the new factory” were most enthusiastic recruits.  This 
important trend began with the Piedmont Manufacturing Company in 1876, near 
Greenville, South Carolina.  From this development, a veritable textile boom ensued in 
the Piedmont over the next two decades.  Four mills sprung up in Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina alone in the 1890s.  As historian Jeanette Greenwood describes, a “string 
of mill villages encircled” the burgeoning city of Charlotte by 1900.  “Property-less and 
seemingly rootless mill workers” often migrated seasonally between city, country, and 
mill.  As in the North, some Southern mill towns were “model” villages, masking their 
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drudgery behind company housing and schools.  But turnover rates in these multifarious 
company towns exceeded 100 percent, as massive layoffs and epidemics took their toll.3   
In the Carolina Piedmont, paternalistic capitalism became the rule, as textile 
barons sent their agents to recruit mill workers from among poor tenant farmers, with 
promises of better wages and lodgings.  In reality, these mills represented hardship and 
toil for adults and children alike.  As New South scholar Tom Hanchett shows, adult 
earnings were so meager that children as young as eight had to “help their parents” in the 
mills – a situation most mill owners cheerfully exploited.  Some mills, particularly in 
South Carolina, boasted private schools for mill-worker children, but their quality and 
effectiveness varied considerably.  Moreover, poor sanitation often cost the lives of 
children among the mill-towns, due to shortages of physicians and state inoculation 
programs.  Hence, child labor became a significant cause célèbre for those reformers and 
muckrakers who paid attention to the New South‟s plight.
4 
North Carolina‟s Department of Labor published annual reports on the state‟s 
growing industrial sector throughout this period.  In 1890, only 49 textile mills existed in 
North Carolina.  By 1905, this number had grown to 287, with the majority concentrated 
in the Piedmont region.  The period spanning 1907-08 marks the pinnacle of organized 
farmer activity in the Old North State.  Coincidentally, James B. Duke also made rapid 
strides toward hydro-electric development in the Piedmont.  In 1907, 52,178 employees 
worked for 329 North Carolina textile mills, earning a high daily wage of $2.56, with a 
low of 82 cents.  Knitting mill employees, numbering about 4,700 men and women, 
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earned somewhat less across the board.  Two in five of these employees were women, 
who typically earned about half the wages paid to males.  Children usually brought home 
60 cents per day – their exact percentage of labor went unreported.5     
Mill shifts typically lasted between 10 to 12 hours, with many operators 
unofficially exceeding these arduous schedules.  Quite a number of textile and knitting 
mills failed to report their actual hours of operation.  So-called “stretch-outs” were 
grueling periods of overtime without compensation, increasing the likelihood of 
workplace accidents.  In the Atherton Mill in Charlotte, workers often mangled their 
hands, and one overseer died when he became entangled in the belting apparatus.  Most 
employers, however, turned a deaf ear toward union appeals for eight-hour workdays, or 
living wages.  Allen Tullos documents how Protestant work ethics bolstered paternalistic 
Southern employers, enabling them to justify keeping their workers in check.  D.A. 
Tompkins, owner of Atherton Mill, summed up the attitudes shared by many of his 
contemporaries in Charlotte and the surrounding region.  He felt that “surplus time” 
would be “absolutely injurious” for the working class.  Tompkins further asserted that 
employers should not give workers more money than they knew how to spend wisely.6 
Workers could strive to change their environment, but those who went against the 
run of the mill faced dire consequences.  Employers routinely discharged workers 
suspected of joining unions.  Evictions of whole families often occurred in company 
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housing complexes.  Often, when frustrated mill workers could not lash out at their 
employers, they brawled among themselves in the streets.  This violent image tended to 
undermine cooperation between textile workers and more highly-skilled workers, such as 
streetcarmen and electricians.7    
Employers often capitalized on their workers‟ fears of outside competition from 
cheap immigrant labor.  Violent events from the previous century also shaped views, as 
strikes often resulted in bloodshed.  When private corporations or authority figures 
employed force, they were protecting property rights.  Laborers who fought back were 
invariably characterized as radical threats against law and order.  By labeling union 
organizers as “foreigners” and “anarchists,” businessmen discouraged their employees 
from seeking help from labor organizations.  Hence, the seeds for portraying trade 
unionism as a thoroughly “alien doctrine” were planted quite early in the rapidly 
industrializing Carolina Piedmont.   
North Carolina‟s Labor Department interviewed employers in 1907-08 
concerning the topics of foreign labor and radicalism.  H.L. Beck of Thomasville, 
president of Norfolk & Southern Junction Mill, opposed hiring immigrants from Italy and 
Eastern Europe, “where anarchy and dare-devils are bred.”  L.F. Graves, Secretary-
Treasurer of Flint Manufacturing in Gastonia, attacked wandering “stirrers up of strife 
and hardship,” who sought to organize mill workers “against the men who give them 
employment and… honest bread.”  J. Hirshinger of the Charlotte Duck Clothing 
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Company sought the exclusion of “labor-disturbing, strike-causing… elements” from 
Central Europe, for which North Carolina has no place.”
8    
Despite incidents of strife, Piedmont factory workers tended to side with their 
employers on immigration and race.  If nothing else, the specters of unemployed 
European immigrants affected American tradesmen on a far more individual scale.  
Potential strikers faced the unspoken threat of being replaced by imported labor.  Albert 
Smith of Gastonia remarked that “our people don‟t go to other countries hunting work, 
and we don‟t need any such people here.”  Smith also characterized “the majority of 
foreigners” as being “worse than Negroes,” often leaving “their own countries by reason 
of crimes.”  J.E. Torrence of Mecklenburg Country also felt immigrants “flooding our 
land” were largely responsible for the high crime rates reported by newspapers.  One 
Union County police officer, R.H. Moore of Monroe, went so far as to openly declare 
“ninety-five percent” of foreigners to be criminals.9      
  On the subject of foreign labor, European immigrants were almost as reviled as 
African-American laborers.  Unstable European nations seemed rife with radicals, as 
some undoubtedly turned toward anarchism or socialism.  Moreover, economic 
competition gave breath to religious hatreds, especially toward Catholic groups, such as 
Italians and Poles.  That many Southern farmers squarely blamed foreign labor for their 
misfortunes remains an unfortunate effect of nativism commonly felt across the nation.  
These men also belonged to the era of trans-Atlantic ocean liners, which brought 
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impoverished steerage passengers and their families over to North America.  These new 
arrivals were not universally welcomed by most Americans.10 
North Carolina farmers led the early struggle against this emergent industrial 
capitalism, partly as a response to urbanization and wage labor.  The National Farmers 
Union (NFU) established a North Carolina chapter in 1908, uniting white agricultural 
workers and small farm-owners.  Within four years, this militant NFU chapter boasted 
33,688 members from 1,783 locals, becoming the “largest and most effective” labor 
organization in the Upper South.  During its 1907-08 survey, the North Carolina Labor 
Department concluded that farmers in North Carolina had rallied since the downturns of 
decades past.  The state Labor Department also interviewed the Piedmont‟s industrial 
workers, primarily mill hands, who desired the same union representation enjoyed by 
farmers.  One mill worker, J.A. Thompson of Montgomery County, believed North 
Carolina “farmers should be organized, as well as other trades and professions.”
11 
Despite the Piedmont‟s overall reputation for anti-unionism, the NFU organized 
effective resistance against textile mill operators, whose recruitment efforts depleted 
white tenant populations.  This change forced remaining farm-owners to consider hiring 
black sharecroppers or European immigrants.  W.F. Logan of King‟s Mountain (on the 
South Carolina border) voiced concerns shared by many regional farmers.  Logan 
asserted:  “We are getting our state organized as fast as we can, as farmers, so that we 
may get more profit out of farming… than we have in the past.”  In particular, Logan 
                                                 
     10 See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 
(Atheneum Press, New York City, 1963). 
     11 Dewey Grantham, Southern Progressivism:  The Reconciliation of Progress and 
Tradition (University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 1983), 329-32; Robert F. Durden, 
Bold Entrepreneur: A Life of James B. Duke (Durham, NC:  Carolina Academic Press, 
2003), 39-55; Twenty-First Report, 10, 104-9. 
25 
 
blamed textile mills, with promises of year-round employment, for a recent farming 
decline:  “The farm could be made to pay just as any other work if the people would only 
stick together… the Farmers‟ Union will teach them,” he remarked.  Another North 
Carolina farmer, Avery G. Higgins of Belwood, put it another way:  “While the mills are 
a great benefit in an industrial way, they are filling graves with consumptive victims.”
12     
W.F. Logan and his fellow farmers also came to view the NFU as a political 
instrument to prevent urban industrialism – and cheap mill labor -- from eclipsing their 
own world.  As Logan also observed, “Immigrants are giving trouble in some sections 
now; so we want to keep them out.”  G.F. Hambright – also from King‟s Mountain -- put 
it even more bluntly:  “I would rather my land lay out than to be worked by Negroes and 
foreigners.”  C.A. Ridenour of Stanly County told state authorities “we don‟t need 
anarchists and hoboes.”  James Wilson of Mecklenburg County predicted that “hiring the 
scum of the world” for cheap labor would create a “hornet‟s nest” in the countryside.  
Some regional farmers were a little more discerning toward foreign labor.  B.F. Carpenter 
of Gaston County noted that the depopulation of tenant farmers lured to cotton mills 
opened the door to hiring “law-abiding” Germans.  But Carpenter would employ “no 
Southern Italians,” owing to their alleged Mafia and Black Hand connections.” 
13 
By 1916, the year before America entered World War I, the Charlotte Piedmont 
region experienced changes that hastened the general decline of state agriculture.  Long 
winter delayed the planting season, causing many hands to seek other work in the spring.  
According to state records, 89 counties reported a scarcity of farm labor during the 
summer.  Except for Mecklenburg, all Piedmont North Carolina counties reported a 
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dearth of overall labor.  Charlotte-Gastonia‟s urban industrial powerbase offered 
relatively higher wages, offering better wages and housing to more families.    
Mecklenburg men were paid $1.25 per day, while Gaston County reported its highest 
daily wage at $1.30.  While these were not North Carolina‟s highest wages at the time, 
Charlotte-Gastonia‟s daily wages were uniformly high in comparison with most of the 
Piedmont region, which often dipped below one dollar.14 
Further setbacks during the summer of 1916 hastened the demise of agriculture in 
the Piedmont.  Beginning on July 15, two days of disastrous flooding wiped out acreage 
across the Piedmont and Western North Carolina.  North Carolina Governor Locke Craig, 
hailing from the mountains, responded quickly to the crisis.  Millions of dollars were lost, 
even as engineers sought to rebuild hydro-electric plants in the Blue Ridge Mountains.  
As these men worked to rebuild Falls Branch, their laconic employer muttered “I‟ll be 
dinged,” pondering the flood‟s impact on his wide-ranging Piedmont Carolina interests.15 
*       *       * 
One of the Piedmont‟s most influential figures, James Buchanan Duke, made his 
initial mark through agriculture.  Together with his father and elder brother, Duke entered 
the post-Civil War market with ambition, if not perspicacity.  Demand for Southern 
tobacco rose in the Gilded Age, aided by mass production of cigarettes via the Bonsack 
rolling machine. This technological advance enabled James B. Duke (1856-1925) to 
dominate the global market of the smoking industry from 1890 to 1910.  Duke‟s sphere 
of influence soon extended overseas toward Great Britain, Australia and even Japan.  
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Originally from Durham, North Carolina, Duke quickly became an absentee owner in 
1885, with a Fifth Avenue mansion in New York City, as well as a posh New Jersey farm 
estate.  Across the Piedmont, Duke‟s tobacco empire also controlled hundreds of tenant 
farms, marking the advent of what today we would call “agri-business.”16   
But North Carolina and federal authorities quickly focused on Duke‟s American 
Tobacco Company, with over thirty thousand laborers.  In 1901, Duke appeared before 
the U.S. Industrial Commission to testify in defense of his company‟s practices.  One 
commissioner, John M. Farquhar, brought up Duke‟s refusal to meet with the National 
Tobacco Workers Association on two occasions.  Moreover, Duke‟s opposition toward 
the chiefly Democratic National Farmers‟ Union is fully documented.17 
Victory came for agrarian reformers in 1911, with the U.S. Supreme Court‟s 
dissolution of Duke‟s American Tobacco Company.  Duke still retained his British 
tobacco conglomerate, and continued to own stock in Southern tobacco.  However, his 
vast domestic empire had suffered a severe blow.  As a Republican, Duke chiefly blamed 
the reform wing of the Democratic Party, with its endorsements of regulation and labor 
unionism.  He especially disapproved of Woodrow Wilson‟s “New Freedom” platform.  
Duke warned progressive lawmakers: “You are pulling down the pillars of our business 
temples.”  He also once remarked to a sympathetic B.C. Forbes that wealthy men were 
admired everywhere except the United States, where success had become a crime.18  
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Duke‟s acquisitive nature has been downplayed through recent scholarship, in 
light of his charitable work.  Duke‟s many millions enabled him to donate thousands to 
charities he felt worthwhile, such as Billy Sunday‟s Protestant ministry.  While he was 
consistently paternalistic, Duke nevertheless took a charitable interest in the welfare of 
North Carolinians, donating thousands to build hospitals and orphanages in Charlotte and 
Durham.  Many of these projects benefited African-Americans living in the Piedmont.  
Allen Tullos has aptly described James Duke‟s character as a formidable combination of 
“hidebound industriousness, utilitarian ruthlessness, and fierce practicality.” 
19   
Well before American Tobacco‟s defeat in the U.S. Supreme Court, James B. 
Duke and his brother, Ben Duke, had already sensed the possibility of wealth through the 
burgeoning electric-power industry needed to energize the Piedmont‟s textile mills.  In 
1892, the Dukes invested capital in Erwin Mills, managed in Durham, North Carolina, by 
William A. Erwin, also from a significant North Carolina industrial family.  With Ben 
Duke as the formal owner, Erwin Mills later expanded to include four outlets, plus a 
fabric bleachery, according 1919 labor statistics.20   
For the Dukes, textile mill ownership began as a side-venture, bearing unexpected 
fruit in later years with the advent of hydro-electricity.  Such experiments were already 
underway in the Piedmont.  In 1894, Columbia Mills in South Carolina, popularly called 
the “Duck Mill,” successfully integrated 17 motors (at 1105 horsepower), deriving the 
region‟s first alternative current from nearby Congaree River.  Another major Piedmont 
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waterway, the Saluda, brought electrification to Upper South Carolina, while the Seneca 
River helped to power the nearby mill-town of Anderson as early as 1898.   More 
importantly, the Catawba River, flowing past Charlotte, provided an ideal location for 
entrepreneurs capitalizing on regional growth.21   
After 1895, Dr. Walker Gill Wylie (1848-1923) of Chester, South Carolina, began 
investing in new hydro-electric projects on the Catawba River.  Wylie‟s Upcountry 
experiments capped off a lengthy career of intellectual and professional distinctions.  
Graduating from the University of South Carolina at twenty, Wylie moved to New 
York‟s Bellevue Hospital Medical College, graduating in 1871.  Dr. Wylie went overseas 
to study European medical practices in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and his 
recommendations prompted Bellevue Medical College to open the nation‟s first nursing 
school for women.  Following an illustrious career as a lecturer in gynecology, Wylie 
returned to his native state during the 1890s, where he became an advocate and booster 
for hydro-electrical power in the South Carolina Upcountry.  Wylie‟s first documented 
venture at Portman Shoals in 1895 developed about 1,800 horsepower of electricity, 
sufficient to power a nearby cotton mill in Anderson, South Carolina22  
Impressed with the results at Portman Shoals, Gill Wylie subsequently enlisted his 
brother, Dr. R.H. Wylie, to back further projects along the Catawba River.  By 1900, the 
Wylie brothers had established the Catawba Power Company with Gill Wylie as sitting 
company president.  Despite flooding and personnel changes, Catawba Power Company 
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successfully completed its first dam in 1903, located at India Hook Shoals.  Coupled with 
a network of transmission lines, Wylie‟s ambitious project would bring electricity to 
Charlotte and its satellite towns, at an unprecedented rate of efficiency.23            
The Dukes, like Wylie, recognized the potential of such innovation.  On behalf of 
the Duke family, William Erwin began mapping the upper Catawba River for likely dam 
sites in 1899.  By 1901, Erwin had purchased the Great Falls environs for about $90,000.  
Erwin deemed this location less vulnerable to flooding, as the river seldom rose above 
eleven feet.  The Dukes secured their claim to Great Falls soon afterward, establishing the 
generic-sounding American Development Company.24        
Chief catalyst behind Catawba Power‟s success, engineer William States Lee, Jr. 
began his career shortly after graduating from the Citadel in 1894.  Lee served as resident 
dam engineer for two hydro-electric projects, at Portman Shoals and Columbus, Georgia.  
Soon afterward, W.S. Lee came to the attention of Dr. W. Gill Wylie, who enlisted his 
talents.  Wylie later explained to Lee that successfully building the Catawba plant would 
make his reputation as an engineer.  Wylie‟s scheme involved building hydro-electric 
dams along the Catawba, utilizing a large part of the 700-foot fall which occurred along 
the river‟s course of 130 miles, from Camden, South Carolina to Hickory, North 
Carolina.  Moreover, the Catawba River became the Wateree River in South Carolina, 
further linking both regions.  This situation, in effect, placed the Wylies in competition 
against the Dukes‟ American Development Company, situated at Great Falls on the 
Catawba River.25 
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Wylie sensed an opportunity for a “superpower system,” and began assiduously 
courting the Dukes as co-sponsors for a merger.  While Benjamin Duke had earlier given 
a modest boost to Wylie‟s India Shoals project, his wealthier brother remained aloof 
toward the venture.  Duke later admitted his reluctance, based on perceptions that the 
American Development Company did not hold the same opportunity for wealth as had 
the American Tobacco Company.  As biographer Robert Durden argues, James B. Duke 
“never invested his money capriciously.”  In late 1904, Wylie‟s medical profession 
finally broke the ice, when “Buck” Duke sought the doctor‟s advice on his brother‟s 
recommendation.  While treating Duke‟s foot inflammation, Wylie unfolded Catawba 
Power‟s capital problems to the skeptical entrepreneur.  Wylie‟s earnest vision, perhaps 
aided by W.S. Lee‟s growing reputation as an engineer, convinced Duke to reconsider.  
According to Wylie, Duke requested “that man, Lee” to bring all their plans, and 
promised “maybe I will go in with you.”  Herein lay the seeds of the great Southern 
Power Company, later renamed Duke Power, and known today as Duke Energy.26 
Using Catawba Power Company as collateral, Duke raised $2 million for this new 
joint venture in 1905.  Charlotte became the company‟s central headquarters, owing to 
the city‟s reliance on textile mills since 1881.  Within 18 months, Southern Power 
completed its first dam at Great Falls, South Carolina, yielding 40,000 horsepower.  
Within four years, William S. Lee oversaw two more successful dams, at Rocky Creek 
and Ninety-Nine Islands, on the Broad River.  By 1909, Southern Power‟s total output 
exceeded 80,000 horsepower, bringing cheap electricity to the region‟s growing towns.
27 
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Just how much impact did Southern Power exert on North Carolina by the close 
of World War One?  According to one member of North Carolina‟s Geological and 
Economic Survey, the war decade boosted Tarheel State industry from twenty-third to 
tenth place.  Crop value also skyrocketed from nineteenth to fourth place.  With this 
unheralded growth also came a “tremendous demand for power,” largely satisfied by “the 
creation of a gigantic water-power business.”  According to Thorndike Saville, 
University of North Carolina professor of hydraulic engineering, no region in America 
“east of the Rockies” enjoyed such access to electricity.
28   
While it would be an overstatement to attribute the Carolina Piedmont‟s 
expansion solely to Southern Power, its hydro-electrical developments certainly 
contributed toward new industry and population growth.  Relatively cheap electric power 
undoubtedly improved the quality of life for those living in areas within Southern 
Power‟s ever-widening sphere of influence.  But as a result, the Piedmont region 
experienced a surge in mill-building, with commensurate city growth.  Southern Power 
greatly accelerated these trends toward urbanization and expansion, following its 
incorporation in 1905.   
  The primary market for Southern Power lay with textile mills.  According to the 
1919-20 North Carolina Department of Labor, the primary energy source for North 
Carolina businesses remained steam power.  By early 1921, the Tarheel State totaled 
3,182 factories and mills powered by various means, yet electricity had enjoyed a steady 
increase in North Carolina since World War I.  1,023 of these factories used electricity 
exclusively, while 148 others used electricity in conjunction with another form of energy.  
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More importantly, a high percentage of knitting and cotton mills relied on electricity to 
the exclusion of all other energy sources.  106 of 169 knitting mills and 184 of 377 cotton 
mills reported using only electricity for their business activity during 1919-20.  
Moreover, 46 cotton mills had been established within two years.29   
According to Federal and North Carolina Geological surveys, both Carolinas 
ranked highest in actual percentage of power derived from hydro-electric operations.  
Whereas South Carolina‟s dams yielded far power more in 1907 (the first data year), 
North Carolina had begun to overtake her sister state by 1919.  Statistics place North 
Carolina‟s power percentage at 93.1 percent, with South Carolina at 92.4.  Georgia and 
Virginia came in at 82.3 and 38.9 percent respectively.30     
By 1920, Southern Power accounted for nearly 70 percent of public utility 
electricity in North Carolina alone. It was rivaled only by the Aluminum Company of 
America (ALCOA), owner of Tallasee Power Company, which yielded 113,000 out of 
the state‟s total of 360,000 horsepower.  In comparison, Southern Power‟s Bridgewater 
and Lookout Shoals dams brought only 63,000 horsepower, about one-third of Alcoa‟s 
quotient.  However, it should be noted that much of Tallasee‟s power went toward their 
ore extraction operations in the Carolinas.  Unlike Southern Power‟s network, little of 
this electricity affected the urban development of the Carolinas.31 
*      *      *  
Without question, Duke‟s Southern Power played a leading role in North 
Carolina‟s great industrial leap forward, while South Carolina‟s foothills also witnessed a 
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dramatic influx of capital and jobs.  Yet, what motivated James Buchanan Duke, one of 
the foremost exponents of the New South?  Unsurprisingly, Southern Power and Duke 
Power sources characterize their founder as altruistic, verging on the beatific.  Dismissing 
the “New South” creed as an “incantatory phrase so beloved by regional boosters and 
politicians,” Robert Durden of Duke University even goes so far as to portray his subject 
as an almost transcendental figure, storing up his heavenly estate.  Durden states his case 
thus:  “money-making, per se, was not Duke‟s prime purpose in his zealous effort to 
build up and protect the power company.  Instead, Duke sought the “industrialization of 
the Piedmont Carolinas” largely out of public spirit, while “providing a stable, 
dependable source-base for a perpetual charitable trust.”32  
One must concede Duke‟s endowment as an overall blessing to the Carolinas, but 
businessmen cannot create such a “perpetual charitable trust” without first having built 
their business empires with iron resolve.  At the heart of Duke‟s vision indeed lay a 
“ruthless utilitarianism,” to quote Allen Tullos.  Most of the Duke Endowment‟s 
philanthropy went into effect many years after his unexpected death in 1925.  To accept 
Robert Durden‟s uncritical portrait of James B. Duke, one would have to view this 
industrial titan as a modern-day Prometheus who sacrificed himself to bring divine sparks 
of electricity to his home state. Durden‟s biography presents one interpretation of James 
B. Duke, but its origins from Duke University and its conservative, pro-business bias 
should also be considered.33   
It is almost tempting to view Duke as a reformed monopolist.  His ostensible goal, 
to “pull the South out of the economic doldrums” seems more humanitarian than 
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cornering the tobacco market.  Duke personally doubted his hydro-electricity investments 
would turn out as much profit as his erstwhile tobacco empire.  But even as Southern 
Power gradually won over city planners and farmers to their electrification campaign, its 
other Piedmont interests grew apace.  Southern Power (and later, Southern Public 
Utilities) employed cheaper rates to undercut rival power companies throughout the 
region, with resultant controversy in the North Carolina Corporation Commission.  
Throughout the 1920s, Southern Power‟s “rate war” against business regulation spilled 
over into the political sphere, with great financial and personal cost to James B. Duke.34 
Governing from afar in New Jersey, James B. Duke soon found his earlier 
reservations about low profits were ill-founded.  As Duke‟s earliest biographer, J.W. 
Jenkins, described him, “mass production, volume, [and] giving the largest possible 
values for the money, were his hobbies.”  Controlling nearly all power-plants along the 
major Piedmont waterways eventually led to Southern Power‟s monopoly of electricity.  
As Southern Power expanded in the first decades of the Twentieth century, more textile 
mills became reliant on Duke‟s utility services.  Furthermore, incorporated towns and 
mill-villages were also attracted to Southern Power‟s affordable rates and record of high 
reliability.  According to company sources, Duke initially “took a dim view of expanding 
electrical service beyond the industrial and municipal markets,” which had been his 
initial targets.  Mill-villages were seen as “more of an irritant,” while rural dwellers were 
unflatteringly portrayed as superstitious rustics who mistrusted electricity.35 
Moreover, as demand grew for Southern Power‟s services, Duke began to see the 
advantages of expanding beyond his original “Mill a Mile” strategy.  Duke‟s widespread 
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gains in Charlotte convinced him to delegate management of utility services and public 
transportation to a subsidiary company.  In 1915, Duke created Southern Public Utilities 
(SPU) in Charlotte to handle contracts with textile mills, townships, and individuals.  His 
close friend, Zebulon V. Taylor, became the first SPU president.  While Southern Power 
continued to build power plants and dams, Southern Public Utilities acted as the 
intermediary, controlling transmission lines to surrounding towns, such as Salisbury.  
This expanding Piedmont town adopted a new SPU franchise in April 1919.  Newer 
textile manufacturers, such as Belbros Mills, a modest Charlotte yarn mill of 3,700 
spindles and 50 employees, also entered into power contracts with SPU.  These two 
utility contracts are all that remain extant of Southern Public Utilities business 
correspondence in the Duke Energy Archives.36 
Southern Power contracts with textile mills had brought Duke increased influence 
as a shareholder in this source of wealth, especially in South Carolina‟s Upcountry.  
Herman Wolf, a retired Southern Power engineer, provided some insight into Duke‟s 
business practices.  Wolf began working for Southern Power in 1916, at age twenty.  The 
young maintenance technician helped rebuild Lookout Shoals substation after a serious 
river flood hit the Catawba region.  Following this successful project, Wolf came to 
“Buck” Duke‟s attention, receiving more responsibility.  During his travels across the 
Piedmont, Wolf often assisted in the electrification of North Carolina textile mills, 
installing generators.  Wolf also recalled Southern Power‟s policy of loaning the mills 
money to purchase these generators, while buying up their company stocks.  “Many 
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textile mills were partially owned by Mr. Duke,” Wolf asserted.  In this fashion, Southern 
Power built a North Carolina plant nearly every year, beginning in 1908.37 
In his 1980 interview, Herman Wolf also stressed the selling points of Southern 
Power, while giving substance to his late employer‟s philanthropic image.  Duke‟s power 
rates for cotton mills were “low and attractive,” owing to the fact that electricity was one-
third cheaper than steam power.  In fact, Southern Power‟s rates were so “low and 
attractive,” it is unsurprising that North Carolina‟s state regulators on the Corporation 
Commission sought to prevent Duke from under-selling his competitors in the utilities 
market.  Wolf also maintained that Southern Power did not actually begin to show 
dividends until Duke established his endowment in 1924.  “Mr. Duke paid his own costs 
for maintenance, and even used his own office space for a bedroom,” Wolf recalled.  
Certainly, Duke‟s legendary thrift has some basis in reality.  However, his personal 
abstinence did not discourage the Duke family from purchasing “White Oaks” from his 
business partner, Zebulon Vance Taylor.  Duke later renamed the Myers Park manor 
house “Lynnwood,” residing there whenever conducting business in Charlotte.38    
Another Duke confidante, Dr. Bennette Eugene Geer (1873-1964) brought new 
investment opportunities in the South Carolina Upcountry.  Graduating the University of 
Michigan, Ben Geer served as a professor of literature at Furman University until 1911.  
Thereafter, Geer chose to assist his ailing brother, John M. Geer, in the management of 
his considerable South Carolina textile business.  Before his elder brother‟s death in 
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1919, Ben Geer had taken over several manufacturing sites, including the Westervelt 
(later Judson) Mill.  Westervelt was the first Southern mill to handle rayon and silk as 
well as cotton.  More importantly, Westervelt‟s primary stockholders included James B. 
Duke, who quickly took a shine to the learned Geer.39 
Under Duke‟s business guidance, Geer established Southern Bleachery & Print 
Works (Taylors, South Carolina), Southern Worsted Mills (Paris, South Carolina), and 
Southern Weaving Company (Greenville, South Carolina).  Geer also built the Pacific 
Mills in Spartanburg County, which relied upon Southern Power‟s Lyman power-plant.40  
Duke‟s assistance to Ben Geer sometimes went beyond advice.  At one point, Geer 
owned the American Bank & Trust of Greenville, which lost $150,000 during the early 
1920s.  According to Geer‟s biographer, the mismanagement arose from the bank‟s vice-
president.  Duke bailed out Geer for $100,000, and the owner made up the difference 
from his own funds.  In 1922, Duke also agreed to underwrite $250,000 for Geer‟s 
proposed fabrics plant in Greenville, manufacturing auto brake linings and webbing.  
Incidentally, all Geer‟s factories were located along Duke‟s personal electric railway, the 
Piedmont & Northern, which Geer eventually joined as associate director.41 
Their lifelong partnership also placed Geer on the Duke Endowment‟s Board of 
Trustees in 1924.  Duke‟s grants also proved instrumental in saving Geer‟s beloved 
Furman University from bankruptcy.  Yet, Ben Geer was a formidable person in his own 
right.  During the First World War, Geer advocated a national organization for mutual 
protection against business regulation.  This lobbyist group became known as the “Cotton 
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Textile Institute,” involving both Northern and Southern mill owners.  Geer also served 
as South Carolina‟s wartime fuel administrator.
42 
On balance, Southern Power‟s “Mill-a-Mile” concept fulfilled the requirements 
for entrepreneurialism.  Duke did not stint himself on investing business capital, as 
evidenced by his quiet expansion into South Carolina.  Exchanging Southern Power‟s 
resources for partial ownership appears to have been his overall strategy, whether it 
involved the Carolina Piedmont or the wilds of Quebec – his most ambitious feat of 
electrification after World War I.  However, relatively few textile mills actually boasted 
Duke family ownership.  According to 1919-20 statistics, Benjamin N. Duke still owned 
Erwin Cotton Mills (founded in 1892), numbering four outlets plus a separate bleachery.  
By contrast, James B. Duke was not listed by North Carolina as a principal owner of a 
single mill.  Being a “silent partner” in Carolina textile markets enhanced Duke‟s 
superpower strategy, while preserving his image as a selfless philanthropist.”
43 
Thus, despite the brief flurry of Federal and state reforms designed to curtail 
monopoly, James B. Duke‟s superpower campaign managed to flourish through the 
Wilson administration largely unhindered by Progressivism.  Democratic opposition in 
North Carolina, led by Democratic editor Josephus Daniels, could not repeat its success 
against the American Tobacco Company.  As early as 1912, Duke began speculating on a 
Canadian hydro-electrical project on the Saguenay River, in Quebec Province.  For 
several years, liberal resistance in Ottawa blocked Duke from diverting hydro-electrical 
power across the Canadian border to the United States.44      
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However, Canada‟s severe job loss and stagnant post-war economy soon brought 
a change in their government.  In 1922, James B. Duke received permission from the new 
Conservative ministry to complete his Isle Maligne project.  This feat required the 
building of a separate railroad to supply the construction sites.  Duke‟s most ambitious 
project eventually resulted in joint partnerships with such American business luminaries 
as future Treasurer Andrew Mellon and Alcoa‟s Arthur Vining Davis.  Moreover, an 
investment deal for Isle Maligne created for Duke a one-ninth stake in Alcoa‟s fortunes.45 
By the end of World War I, declining New England textile mills began relocating 
to the Carolinas, chiefly the South Carolina Upcountry.  These businesses were attracted 
by large-scale developments of hydro-electrical power, further enhancing the region‟s 
New South reputation.  Furthermore, a weak trade union presence in the Piedmont meant 
more control over labor sources.  South Carolina cities such as Columbia and 
Spartanburg had grown steadily during the First World War.  Spartanburg expanded from 
a population of 17,517 (1910) to 22,638 (1920), while the Palmetto State‟s capital leapt 
from 26,319 to 37,544 during the same time-span.  The post-war influx of Northern 
textile mills into the South Carolina Upcountry counted for much of this expansion.46   
Duke stated his sympathy for fellow businessmen in New England, and believed 
his Quebec project would also benefit textile mills south of the border, especially in 
Massachusetts.  Herman Wolf phrased it this way:  “If [Mr. Duke] could replicate the 
success of Southern Power in New England, then they could keep their mills.”  While 
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Duke‟s efforts to bring cheaper power to New England received praise for its “public 
spirit,” one must also concede the possibility of ulterior motive.  Keeping Northern mills 
from North Carolina also blocked unwanted competition for Duke‟s own widening 
empire.  Despite the possibility of competition, Duke nevertheless profited from those 
Northern interests he could not persuade to remain in New England.  Duke‟s superpower 
strategy also harnessed much of upper South Carolina‟s business capital, through a 
continuance of his “Mill-a-Mile” program, as well as Southern Power‟s strategic 
developments of the Piedmont‟s transportation system.
47 
*     *     * 
James Duke‟s Piedmont transportation interests developed alongside his plans for 
regional electrification.  Duke‟s idea took shape with his famous Piedmont & Northern 
electric railway, but even before this achievement, his Southern Power Corporation had 
taken over several urban traction companies suffering financial decline in the so-called 
“Roosevelt Recession” of 1907-08.  These assets included North Carolina streetcar lines 
in Gastonia, as well as South Carolina investments in Anderson and Spartanburg.48   
Through lucrative partnerships, James B. Duke rebuilt his business empire after 
losing much of his tobacco monopoly.  These corporate alliances proved beneficial in the 
long run.  Partnerships with powerful interests such as Alcoa permitted Duke to enjoy 
great financial influence without entangling himself in further Federal anti-trust cases.  
Moreover, local alliances with regional businessmen in Piedmont cities built powerful 
support bases in the Carolinas.  Duke‟s allies embarked on numerous “good will” tours 
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across the Carolina Piedmont to garner stockholders for Southern Power‟s transportation 
experiment, the Piedmont & Northern electric railroad.49  
This ambitious project, designed to compete with the juggernaut Southern 
Railway, began in 1909 with a proposal from William States Lee, now the vice-president 
of Southern Power & Utilities.  As Duke absorbed rivals such as South Carolina Power, 
Light, and Railway, the brilliant engineer saw an opportunity to consolidate these gains 
by linking the major Piedmont towns via an inter-urban railway system.  “Buck” Duke 
enthusiastically supported Lee‟s plan, which went into effect in 1910.  North Carolina 
chartered the Piedmont Traction Company on 8 January 1910, and South Carolina 
approved the much larger Greenville, Spartanburg, and Anderson Railway two months 
later.  Piedmont Traction spanned 21 miles from Charlotte to Gastonia, while its South 
Carolina counterpart extended 98 miles from Greenville to Spartanburg.  These two 
subsidiary corporations linked up at the Carolina borders in 1912.50     
Within a few years of its completion, the Piedmont & Northern enjoyed so much 
success that extensions were suggested by promoters.  Duke favored an Atlanta station, 
while other speculators spoke of a terminal in Raleigh, linking the capital city to Southern 
Power‟s Charlotte headquarters.  However, these ideas never came to fruition.  In time, 
however, wartime demands for textiles resulted in the Piedmont & Northern Railway‟s 
expanded freight service to mill towns, such as Gastonia and Belmont Junction.51    
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Viewing the extensive company literature and popular history on the Piedmont & 
Northern Railway, readers might be led to believe that Duke‟s trolley investments were 
mere afterthoughts.  While Duke‟s electric railway certainly ranks as one of his greatest 
achievements, at least one urban historian has speculated that Southern Power‟s 1910 
acquisition of Charlotte‟s streetcar lines may have encouraged Duke‟s construction of the 
Piedmont & Northern Railway.  In any case, Duke solidified his control over the rapidly 
expanding “Queen City” of North Carolina, which boasted a 1910 population of 34,014.  
Just before World War I, Mecklenburg County‟s overall population measured close to 
fifty thousand.  By 1920, Charlotte had blossomed into a large municipality of 46,338.52   
However, James Duke and Southern Power cannot historically claim full credit 
for Charlotte‟s staggering growth, or its suburban development.  In 1890, Edward D. 
Latta first proposed electric trolleys to replace Charlotte‟s antiquated horse-drawn cars.  
Originally from South Carolina, Edward Latta resided primarily in New York City, where 
he witnessed the development of “streetcar suburbs.”  For almost three decades, Latta‟s 
Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company (known locally as the “Four C‟s”) played 
a role in transforming the Queen City.  Many businessmen in Charlotte supported Latta, 
anticipating that a modern streetcar suburb would attract workers to a proposed textile 
mill, D.A. Tompkins‟ Atherton Mill, scheduled to begin operation in 1893.53 
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To capitalize on Atherton Mill‟s eventual construction, Edward Dilworth Latta 
planned and developed his model streetcar suburb, named Dilworth in honor of its 
creator.  Dilworth received an early boost from none other than Thomas Edison, who 
visited Latta‟s Charlotte residence in late 1890.  Edison agreed to invest in Dilworth‟s 
construction, providing an electric distribution system to enable Charlotte‟s first electric 
streetcars to begin service as early as May 18, 1891.54   
Throughout 1892-93, Dilworth boosters openly courted middle-class residents.  
Edward Latta‟s sales pitch stated:  “Buy a house with your rent money.”  However, 
Dilworth‟s development coincided with the nation‟s financial plunge, as well as the 
Homestead and Pullman Strikes.  Dilworth‟s mainstay instead became white urban 
industrial workers, living in cheaply-constructed quarters purchased through Latta‟s 
rental and loan agency.  Moreover, displaced agricultural families were increasingly 
drawn to Atherton Mill‟s proximity, while the new Charlotte Street Railway provided 
convenient transportation to nearby amusement parks.  Thus, Dilworth soon became a 
tangled urban forest of tenements and worker housing on the fringes of textile mills, 
interspersed with a smattering of middle-class neighborhoods.55   
After Dilworth‟s completion, the Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company 
went on to construct streetcar connections and housing developments to accommodate 
further population growth after 1900.  These new streetcar suburbs included Piedmont 
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Park and Elizabeth Heights (both completed in 1902), as well as the upscale black 
community of Biddleville (finished in 1903).  By 1909, Charlotte Street Railway lines 
measured fifteen track miles, serving much of downtown Charlotte.  Furthermore, new 
textile mills began operations all across Mecklenburg County, creating new suburbs at 
Belmont, Highland Park, Atherton, and Chadwick.56    
For nearly two decades, Edward Dilworth Latta basked in the Queen City‟s 
gratitude.  Charlotte‟s Board of Aldermen granted favorable public utility contracts to the 
Four C‟s, enabling Latta‟s virtual monopoly over the city‟s gas and electric power.  As 
late as 1906, one Charlotte publication lionized its city‟s premier developer for his “broad 
ideas and progressiveness.”  However, the devoutly conservative Latta lacked any true 
Progressive inclinations.  Throughout his career, Latta showed little compassion for the 
new factory class who lived in his suburbs.  During the height of his economic and 
political power, Latta openly stated that “benevolence has no rightful place in any real 
estate deal.”
57  In December 1903, Latta fully demonstrated his lack of benevolence.     
Among Dilworth‟s teeming thousands dwelt about fifty streetcar workers, 
employed by Latta‟s Charlotte Street Railway Company.  Dan Morrill indicates these 
conductors operated streetcars six days per week, with twelve hour shifts.  Depending on 
seniority, they could earn from 8 to 12 cents hourly, translating to 64 cents to $1.44 daily 
wages.  This translates to at least 33 percent better wages than most textile workers, but 
still very low in comparison with most urban streetcar workers across the nation.58   
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Latta‟s streetcar men received no vacation days, except for Christmas, when 
prizes were given to productive workers at a banquet held in the Central Hotel.  But 
Latta‟s worst trait is evidenced by his parsimonious 1903 decision to cut off streetcar 
heaters to reduce winter operation costs.  On December 2, 1903, forty-eight of Latta‟s 
motormen and conductors resolved to strike in protest.  Initially, most of Charlotte‟s 
estimated 20,000 inhabitants sided with these beleaguered workers.59 
Despite the national trend toward Progressivism, there existed few legal options 
for the workingmen to pursue in Charlotte.  While labor unions certainly existed within 
city limits, North Carolina businessmen were under no serious pressure to negotiate with 
them.  Even avowed Southern Progressives sometimes placed great confidence in their 
region‟s “enlightened industrialists.”  Boosters were similarly unreceptive toward labor 
reform, because such measures usually entailed recognition of labor unions.  As late as 
1913, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce openly boasted of their city‟s low presence of 
trade unionism, which they described as a “disturbing element.”  But Charlotte‟s 1903 
streetcar strike lacked any real union leadership.  It seems that Southern industrialists 
were more than capable of creating disturbances.  Historian Dan Morrill distinguishes 
Latta‟s conduct as “at worst self-serving, and at best only paternalistic.”  Moreover, he 
describes Latta‟s subsequent actions as “characteristic” of most New South capitalists.60     
From New York City, Edward Latta directed his eldest son, Nisbet, to discharge 
his striking workers and replace them immediately.  Upon his return to Charlotte on 
December 3, the elder Latta discovered quite a number of local citizens sporting protest 
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buttons, which read “I Walk.”  On that same evening, Charlotte‟s labor leaders met in the 
Typographical Hall to rally for the unorganized streetcar workers.  Even the conservative 
Charlotte Daily Observer (the forerunner of today‟s Charlotte Observer) gave its 
conditional support to these striking workers, whose actions were restrained, at least 
initially.  For once, it seemed that Charlotte workers might actually trump their employer 
and gain major concessions through public sympathy.61      
But the Charlotte Street Railway men had not counted upon their employer‟s 
intractability and essential meanness.  Latta‟s men agreed to return to their former jobs if 
their complaints were resolved.  The workers‟ arbitration efforts were supported by F.C. 
Abbott, a respected city realtor who knew Latta professionally.  On December 8, one 
week after the strike, Edward D. Latta agreed to restore heat to his company‟s electric 
streetcars.  However, he refused to reinstate those forty-eight employees “who, without 
provocation… elected to abandon their position with no other expectation than that the 
company and the public would be without service.”
62 
Immediately, the public condemned Latta‟s summary dismissal of his streetcar 
men.  Charlotte News editorials questioned Charlotte Consolidated Construction‟s 
integrity, even suggesting the city aldermen should review all of Latta‟s exclusive utility 
franchises.  Moreover, the newspaper argued that perhaps municipal ownership would be 
preferable to renewing the “Four C‟s” contract for another ten years.  The Charlotte News 
predicted a costly victory for Latta and Charlotte Consolidated Construction.63  While it 
might be too much to argue Latta‟s mishandling of the strike directly wrought the 
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downfall of his own company, public opinion gradually eroded the image of Charlotte‟s 
once-invulnerable entrepreneur.           
Unfortunately, mounting frustration among some Dilworth inhabitants spilled 
over, on the chilly evening of December 10.  Patience has its way of evaporating when 
hunger and betrayal hang thick in the air.  And so, two days after Latta announced his 
purge, hundreds of demonstrators converged on South Boulevard to protest hiring of 
scabs. No strikers were conclusively identified among the crowds.  Reports indicated that 
the mob hurled stones through trolley windows, striking at least one conductor, who 
suffered an ankle injury.  Witnesses also alleged the mob fired pistols in the air while 
streetcars rattled past.  Charlotte police dispersed the crowd before serious violence 
erupted, but irreparable damage to the workers‟ cause had been inflicted.  The Charlotte 
News sponsored a benefit show on December 21, featuring regional humorist Gilbert 
Warren.  Yet, Edward Latta still emerged victorious, at least for the short term.  None of 
his former crewmen were re-hired, and they gradually sought other employment.64 
No evidence directly links public opprobrium to Consolidated Construction‟s 
downfall, but nonetheless, “profound changes” affected the company‟s fortunes over the 
following decade.  In 1904, Charlotte‟s Board of Aldermen passed over the “Four C‟s” in 
favor of Duke‟s Catawba Power Company, which offered lower annual rates for city 
streetlights.  Whereas Edward Latta billed the city $90.00 for each pole, the Dukes 
drastically undercut their rival by charging $54.00.  That same year, Charlotte citizens 
also complained about the quality and price of the “Four C‟s” domestic gas services.  
That February, gas manager Nisbet Latta publicly defended his father‟s business 
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practices, labeling their critics “socialists.”  Such outbursts only worsened the local 
reputation of Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company.65    
By 1910, the Charlotte Board of Aldermen had turned completely against Latta, 
entertaining numerous bids from rivals, including Southern Power.  After years of 
wrangling, Latta grudgingly sold his gas subsidiary – and trolley lines -- to Duke‟s 
growing empire that October.66  Despite Southern Power‟s gradual takeover in Charlotte, 
Edward D. Latta continued to shape Dilworth until his death in 1925.67                
Duke still entertained plans to build electrified interurban streetcar lines across the 
region.  Duke‟s own Piedmont Traction subsidiary had been growing alongside its parent, 
Southern Power, absorbing utility services across the Piedmont.  In 1909, Southern 
Power purchased Anderson Traction Company, with Greenville Traction Company 
selling to Duke in 1910.  Just before Piedmont Traction reorganized into Southern Public 
Utilities, Duke finalized a transaction for Spartanburg‟s entire power system in late 1912.  
This made Duke a partial owner of South Carolina Light, Power, and Railway.  However, 
complications emerged when Southern Power actually came to rival its own subsidiary, 
South Carolina Power, Light and Railway (SCLP&R), for services to Spartanburg.68 
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With Charlotte‟s public utility portfolio under Duke‟s control by 1910, Southern 
Power‟s power base resided in the center of the Carolina Piedmont.  Yet profits were still 
a serious concern.  Already by 1910, automobiles had become a permanent fixture among 
Piedmont towns.  The original 15-mile streetcar tracks built by Charlotte Consolidated 
Construction Company had been operating at only a modest profit margin, according to 
fragmentary records.  North Carolina‟s Department of Labor published sporadic data on 
the state‟s street railways.  The Department‟s 1907 report shows the Charlotte lines 
serving nearly 2.75 million passengers, about 183,000 per track mile.  Despite being the 
second-largest trolley system in North Carolina, the Charlotte lines earned a mere 
$40,535 when compared to transportation services such as Asheville Electric Company 
(14 miles operating at $97,738) or Wilmington‟s Consolidated Railways Light & Power, 
whose 19 track miles brought $75, 956.69   
Moreover, Piedmont Traction‟s new assets required modernization and expansion.  
In 1911 and 1912, Southern Power devoted resources to these tasks.  Anderson City 
Lines eventually linked up with Duke‟s Greenville, Spartanburg, and Anderson (GS&A) 
Railroad.  Eventually, Greenville, Spartanburg, and Anderson became closely tied in the 
South Carolina Upcountry, although it would be too much to attribute this entirely to 
James Duke.  Greenville Traction Company (later Greenville City Lines) underwent 
major extensions to nearby textile mills -- including Duke‟s private interest at Westervelt 
Mill.  Concurrent with these developments in South Carolina, nine trolley lines served 
Charlotte‟s streetcar suburbs, expanding to 20 track miles and 38 cars by 1916.70                                                          
                                                 
     69 Twenty-First Reports, 328-9. 
     70 Fetters, 69-95; Harkey, 68. 
51 
 
To streamline Southern Power‟s corporate organization, Duke‟s Piedmont 
Traction merged its assets into the Southern Public Utilities Corporation in March 1913.  
This major subsidiary now governed Southern Power‟s widespread domestic electricity 
and gas services, in addition to public transportation lines.71  Governing this branch of 
Southern Power required someone with keen political skills, as well as a hard-nosed 
competitive streak.  Throughout Duke‟s Piedmont & Northern campaign, one man in 
particular had demonstrated these attributes.  Zebulon Vance Taylor (1868-1921) would 
supervise Southern Power‟s vast public utilities service industry until his death.  Having 
been a successful businessman raised in the old school, Taylor likewise proved a master 
of paternalism.  As a booster in the Piedmont, Taylor enjoyed business connections with 
the major towns orbiting Charlotte.72 
Zebulon Vance Taylor‟s origins were comfortably middle-class, given the 
economic chaos of Reconstruction.  His parents, Dr. C.W. and Mariah Taylor, were 
native Tarheels temporarily living in Sparta, Tennessee when Zebulon Vance – named 
for the flamboyant Confederate governor of North Carolina -- came into the world on 
September 4, 1868.  By age eleven, Taylor‟s family had relocated to Forsyth County, 
North Carolina, where their names appear in the 1880 Census.73  After attending Oak 
Ridge Institute, Taylor began his career as a telegrapher and dispatcher for Southern 
Railway.  He completed the equivalent of a baccalaureate in his spare time, before 
studying law in Greensboro, under Judge W.P. Bynum.  During the 1890s, Taylor met his 
future wife, Irving Scales, whose brothers took on the promising young attorney as a 
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junior partner.  Taylor thereafter entered Greensboro politics, serving two single-year 
terms as the city‟s mayor.  Taylor took office on October 15, 1898, filling a vacancy left 
when his predecessor, John J. Nelson, resigned for a court appointment.74 
Zebulon Taylor left politics in 1902 to assume the presidency of Greensboro 
Electric Company.  Taylor held this position until 1910, when he joined Southern Power, 
which had just acquired the utility services of nearby Winston-Salem.  Duke soon made 
Taylor a director of Piedmont & Northern Railroad, to reward his efforts as a booster 
during their campaign.  Meanwhile, Taylor managed several utility outlets for Southern 
Power, including Winston-Salem and Charlotte, until these branches were merged with 
South Carolina assets to form Southern Public Utilities in 1913.  Zebulon V. Taylor 
became the first president of Duke‟s new subsidiary arm in the Piedmont.
75  
Zebulon Taylor proved an able lieutenant, managing daily operations and acting 
as a lightning rod for controversy during the 1919 streetcar strike.  As a ranking member 
of the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, Zebulon Taylor knew the right connections to 
secure influence during the crisis.  As a business attorney, Taylor also played a leading 
role in Duke‟s court battle against North Carolina regulators.  In short, Zebulon Taylor‟s 
uncompromising conservatism made him a strong enforcer, serving as the iron hand 
behind Southern Power‟s friendly exterior.
76            
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Company literature later dubbed Taylor the “Father of SPU,” owing to his “spirit 
of service” as well as his “tact and diplomacy.”  While such traits Taylor possessed to 
some degree, he also showed another side to those who challenged his authority.  Taylor 
was a tenacious defender of business interests and an opponent of regulation, treating all 
critics with the tenderness of a “fist in a velvet glove.”  His opponents included the liberal 
Democrat Josephus Daniels, owner of the Raleigh News & Observer, who described 
Taylor‟s “almost violent” tirades against business regulation.  Daniels staunchly favored 
the regulation of Southern Power, also commented on Taylor‟s trademark “vehemence,” 
which spills out like acid during the 1919 Charlotte strike.77                   
Because Taylor achieved his success in a milieu that scorned trade unions, he 
scorned organized labor as anathema.  His formative years witnessed the Great Railroad 
Strike of 1877, the Haymarket Riot, and other great labor-capital disputes.  Growing up 
in an environment so mistrustful of organized labor, it should come as little surprise he 
would oppose their representatives throughout his political and business career.  But his 
opposition often took on personal dimensions, even to the point of abusive language.   
Despite this character flaw, Zebulon Taylor became something of a regional hero.  
One Greensboro editorial, reprinted by Southern Public Utilities upon Taylor‟s death, 
acknowledged the company president‟s faith in the “resources of the South,” including its 
people.  Greensboro‟s eulogist described Taylor as a self-made man who never settled for 
mediocrity, finishing with an appeal to young men to follow the SPU executive‟s 
example in the “business of living.”  His fame extended as far afield as Chester, South 
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Carolina, whose newspaper editors likewise spoke of Taylor‟s “fervor and enthusiasm,” 
comparable to railroad builder James J. Hill.  Such lavish tribute confirms Taylor‟s 
significance as a regional booster and developer of Southern Power‟s industry.
78  
One can also see parallels to Henry Clay Frick‟s erstwhile partnership with 
Andrew Carnegie in the steel industry.  Unlike Frick and Carnegie‟s later falling out, 
Taylor‟s relationship with Duke never ended in acrimony – indeed, Taylor‟s loyalty to 
Duke lasted until the SPU president died, while on board his partner‟s personal railway 
car in 1921.  However, labor history aficionados may see a comparison between Taylor‟s 
union-busting at Southern Public Utilities in 1919 and Henry Clay Frick‟s strong-arm 
tactics against organized steelworkers at Homestead, Pennsylvania.  While lieutenants 
handled the strikebreaking with ruthless efficiency, James B. Duke, much like Andrew 
Carnegie, preserved his public image as a philanthropist and enlightened industrialist.  
Throughout the war decade, Zebulon Taylor became the most visible agent of Southern 
Power‟s relentless dynamo, with thousands of workers answerable to him.
79    
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Chapter 3:  Labor Forward in the Piedmont Carolinas 
 
This chapter analyzes the emerging labor movement in the Piedmont Carolina 
prior to World War I.  Some Southern Progressives endorsed local unions, but many 
showed mistrust toward the American Federation of Labor and its affiliates, including the 
Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees.  However, efforts 
to organize streetcar workers in the Piedmont often intersected with similar drives in 
regional textile mill villages, so both campaigns will be examined.  Mill operators and 
their powerful allies in city and state government came to view outside labor 
organizations as a challenge to their authority.  Moreover, national labor movements 
clashed with local businessmen over the treatment and representation of their streetcar 
workers.  Since many of these public transportation workers operated in mill towns, 
employers tended to treat their streetcar crewmen in the same manner as textile mill 
employees.  This seems especially true of Southern Public Utilities during its early phase, 
where Charlotte‟s trolley-men were among the lowest paid in the region. 
According to Philip S. Foner, American streetcar workers uniformly received 
“deplorably low” wages, often working long shifts under the most unsafe conditions, 
including exposure and electrocution.  Since its creation in 1892, the AASERE had 
represented nearly half of America‟s streetcar workers, chiefly in the North.  However, 
by 1916, national membership had risen to 60,000, including Southern chapters in 
Louisiana, Tennessee, and South Carolina – the citadel of Southern textile industry.1  
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Southern textile workers were first mobilized by Knights of Labor in 1886.  This 
early wave of textile organization affected workers in Charlotte, North Carolina, who 
vainly sought a union.  Unionization efforts resurfaced in the Upper South with the 
National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) and its later incarnation, the United Textile 
Workers of America (UTWA).  As Dewey Grantham points out, nearly all textile strikes 
before the First World War met with total defeat, largely due to AFL indifference toward 
the “episodic and ephemeral” nature of Southern labor protest.  According to historian 
William B. Tindall, textile labor unions were practically moribund in the Carolina 
Piedmont by 1921.  Sympathetic municipal courts allowed corporate lawyers to file 
injunctions against unions, while National Guardsmen and police forces broke strikes, 
sometimes aided by private investigators and professional strikebreakers.2     
Long before this well-documented defeat of labor, union-busting partnerships 
existed between state authorities and businessmen.  For example, the Augusta streetcar 
strike of 1912 resulted on September 23 only after the powerful Augusta-Aiken Railway 
& Electric Corporation refused to negotiate with the national streetcar union over the 
formation of Division 577.  Augusta-Aiken Railways, much like Southern Power in 
Charlotte, crossed state lines between Georgia and South Carolina, owning all streetcar 
and inter-urban railways between these two major towns.  At the insistence of Augusta‟s 
mayor, Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown gladly sent the state militia into a town 
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already plagued with strikebreakers, provoking minor incidents of violence that Brown 
thereafter blamed on the AASERE.3   
Another reason for Southern resistance toward the national labor movement lay 
with some local craft organizations, which suspected the motives of “big labor.”  Most 
Southern union members were skilled craftsmen more interested in protecting their jobs.  
Sometimes with tacit support from manufacturers and businessmen, these conservative 
unionists were not particularly interested in helping unskilled laborers rise above their 
low-paid stations.  Hence, construction workers and longshoremen in the coastal ports of 
Savannah and Charleston were able to unionize effectively, but Upcountry textile 
workers were strongly discouraged from taking such a course.4 
Meanwhile, textile mills burgeoned in the South, as more Northern businesses 
relocated to the Carolinas and Georgia for lower wages and weaker local unions, if any.  
Throughout the period between 1915 and 1925, George B. Tindall noted “subterranean 
turbulence” in the Piedmont mill villages, signs of developing class alienation.  This 
“widening gulf” between textile workers and bosses reinforced impressions that cotton 
mill workers were becoming “a hereditary occupation group.”  While connected to 
mainstream America by railroads and newspapers, Piedmont mill towns were effectively 
isolated, with their own churches, schools, and company stores.  As their work-force 
enlarged during the war years, mill workers became restive toward their employers.  
Tindall stresses this class consciousness came less from labor militancy, more from a 
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sense of desperation and isolation.5  But when the mill towns did become energized, as in 
past cases in South Carolina, mill operators instinctively looked for troublemakers to 
blame for circumstances largely within their own control.  Despite the AFL‟s relative 
conservatism, Southern industrialists freely associated them with IWW radicals.  
While mill owners expected the state governments to support their campaigns 
against labor unions, North Carolina Governor Locke Craig and his Palmetto counterpart, 
Richard I. Manning, were both products of Southern Progressivism.  Even though both 
governors owed their elections to conservative Democratic constituencies, they were also 
swept up in Wilson‟s progressive “New Freedom” platform.  Long a foe of corporations, 
Governor Craig became known as the “Good Roads” governor of North Carolina, 
improving the state‟s Piedmont and Appalachian regions with modern highways.  Under 
Craig‟s successor, Thomas Bickett, state legislators also fought to control utility rates in 
North Carolina.  Meanwhile, Governor Manning commenced a short period of political 
reform, following his personal victory over demagogue Coleman T. Blease in 1914.  In 
short order, Manning overhauled state taxes, outlawed labor by children under fourteen, 
and set up a Board of Arbitration for labor disputes.  Manning also recognized state labor 
unions and broke the power of company stores.  His successor, Robert A. Carpenter, 
furthered this progressive trend.6   
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At the same time, Governor Richard I. Manning retained something of a 
provincial outlook on organized labor.  As a wealthy South Carolinian with conservative 
states-rights roots, Manning took a dim view toward “foreign” labor agitators, linking 
their brand of radicalism to his immediate predecessor.  As governor, Coleman 
Livingstone Blease thrived on “petty bickering and turbulence.”  But despite Blease‟s 
ruthless suppression of IWW strikers at Greenville‟s Monaghan Mill in July 1914, he also 
used local unions for his own patronage.  Following Blease‟s ouster that November, his 
disgruntled followers, known as “Bleaseites,” often encouraged mill walkouts in the 
Upcountry.  Bleaseites played to white supremacy, alleging that textile businesses treated 
white “lint-heads” worse than black slaves.  However, these agitators served more to 
undermine Manning‟s authority than to help exploited workers.7     
Monaghan Mill‟s strike in July 1914 attracted some modest national attention, due 
to Joseph James Ettor‟s involvement.  Best-known for leading the 1912 Lawrence textile 
strike, Ettor staged Socialist demonstrations in sympathy with the striking Greenville 
textile workers.  One local Wobbly supporter even carried a red banner in a downtown 
parade.  Many South Carolinians saw Ettor as the sort of “outside agitator” they feared 
most in organized labor.  For nearly two months, Monaghan Mill ceased operation.  
However, the Industrial Workers of the World soon decamped from the South Carolina 
Upcountry, after their efforts proved fruitless.  Monaghan Mill owner Lewis Parker 
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quickly settled with his own workers, but other mills in the region began sacking workers 
suspected of being Wobblies.8     
Under Richard Manning‟s governorship, the small Upcountry city of Anderson 
encountered further labor unrest in early 1916.  Since the previous year, UTWA 
organizers had sought to unionize Brogon Mill.  To punish their rebellious workers, 
Brogon Mill‟s owners sought to evict the striking workers from company housing, in 
violation of rental contracts.  Despite his Progressive leanings, Governor Manning used 
the Palmetto National Guard to enforce the company‟s eviction notices.  This action 
brought the strike to a halt, intimidating workers into silence.  Carlton explains the 
governor‟s actions as those of a “scion of an old planter family,” who later became a 
successful banker.  This fits well with the previously established premise that Southern 
Progressives preferred to handle their own reforms at the state and local levels, resenting 
outside interference.  However much Governor Manning personally disliked using state 
troops in such fashion, he also felt an obligation to uphold the social order as he 
perceived it.  As a businessman himself, Manning placed the interests of South Carolina 
business foremost.9 
Manning‟s exercise in conservative policy had its dividends; he sacrificed 
national labor unions to secure state-wide political support.  Initially lukewarm toward 
Manning‟s progressive stance, the Upcountry mill owners backed the governor‟s re-
election against Coleman Blease in November 1916.  Even the reactionary “Pitchfork” 
Ben Tillman supported Manning, despite his progressive reputation, because he dealt a 
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sound blow to the “damned factory class.”  Moreover, some urban workers in Anderson 
and Spartanburg came to see outside unions as detrimental to their livelihood.  Employers 
warned that union-dictated wages would result in massive unemployment.  Most 
Upcountry textile workers aspired toward steady income, despite the widening divide 
between skilled and unskilled workers.10 
While Carlton‟s work deals mainly with South Carolina, one sees numerous 
similarities to the North Carolina Piedmont.  Charlotte and her satellites proved resistant 
toward outside reformers, who were systematically viewed as intruders.  Like vigilant 
seraphim, Rotarians and other “organization men” zealously guarded admittance to the 
burgeoning New South middle class.  Many residents decried a “new class of loafers” 
vaguely attributed to “foreign” influences.  During the mid-1880s, factory workers, 
dependent upon their employers for home and livelihood, sided with textile mill owners 
against the local Knights of Labor.  Some successful trade unions came to Charlotte in 
the 1890s, as farms failed and urbanization spread across the Piedmont.  For example, the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers established Charlotte Division 84 in 1894.  
Indeed, most of Charlotte‟s local unions before 1910 reflected a bias toward craft workers 
and skilled tradesmen.  For unskilled workers, such as the new mill class, few advocates 
dared to plead their cases until well into the next century.11   
According to Janette Greenwood, the strongly Methodist Charlotte region had its 
own paternalistic reform movement, the Charlotte Humane Society, sponsored by 
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ministers and lay members, who began advocating temperance and cleanliness among the 
benighted mill workers during the 1890s.  One of these reformers, Frank Ramsey 
McNinch, later became Charlotte mayor in 1918, presiding over the city during its violent 
streetcar strike.  These Protestant reformers, notably suspicious toward Catholics and 
Jews, also believed themselves the rightful guardians of impoverished mill families, 
resenting outside interference from labor agitators.  Many skilled craftsmen from 
Charlotte and Gastonia were similarly divided between progressive self-interest and 
provincial attitudes toward unskilled laborers.12   
Were streetcar workers skilled or unskilled workers?  In 1915, Congressman 
Stephen G. Porter of Pennsylvania served as arbitrator during Pittsburgh‟s streetcar strike 
on behalf of Division 85.  Dissenting from the majority opinion, ruling streetcar crewmen 
were no more important than other wage workers, Congressman Porter stated his views 
on the streetcar profession.  By dint of their rigorous training and responsibility, streetcar 
men deserved concessions to ensure high levels of performance and morale.  While 
Pittsburgh‟s three thousand streetcar workers might seem worlds apart from Charlotte or 
Columbia‟s mere hundreds, their overall professional development bears comparison.
13   
North and South Carolina streetcar men underwent six months of training, and 
were not considered the equivalent of journeymen until two years passed.  According to 
Stephen Porter, prospective motormen and conductors underwent medical examinations 
to ascertain fitness and sobriety before entering a period of apprenticeship.  All streetcar 
employees could be routinely tested for technical knowledge and rules comprehension by 
                                                 
     12 Janette T. Greenwood, The Black and White Better Classes in Charlotte (University 
of North Carolina Press:  Chapel Hill & London, 1994), 128-29. 
     13 Motorman and Conductor, February 1915, 4. 
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inspectors.  Pittsburgh streetcar workers memorized 167 regulations.  Given the complex 
nature of electric streetcars, workers were expected to be mindful of machinery as well as 
passengers and pedestrians.  Exposure to elements and disease were constant risk factors.  
Moreover, these professionals had to maintain neat uniforms, handle money, and meet 
unkindness with “forbearance and self-control.”  Congressman Porter concluded that, 
given these different criteria, electric street railway employees should be considered in 
the same light as a locomotive engineer.14    
However, in Southern mill towns, especially in the Carolina Piedmont, streetcar 
companies relied more heavily on low-wage laborers.  Since streetcars often ferried 
textile mill workers, this may have reinforced the perception that motormen and 
conductors were also part of the “factory class.”  As Southern Public Utilities belonged to 
a larger corporation with textile mill interests, this may also helped justify Zebulon 
Taylor‟s overriding policy of low wages for his streetcar men.  After all, Southern Power 
had appropriated streetcar lines as an outgrowth of urban electrification.  Without union 
representation, SPU workers earned from eight to twelve cents hourly, according to 
organizational reports sent to the AASERE in June 1913.15         
Such reports doubtless troubled William D. Mahon (1861-1949), International 
President of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees 
(AASERE) since its inception in 1892.  Time Magazine described Mahon as an “old-time 
                                                 
     14 Thirty-Second Report of the Department of Labor and Printing of the State of North 
Carolina (Raleigh, North Carolina: Edwards & Broughton Printing Company, 1921), 35-
39; Motorman and Conductor, February 1915, 4.  
     15 Charlotte‟s low wage figures had not changed since 1903.  These figures are 
especially shocking when compared to Northern cities, such as Akron, Ohio, where 
streetcar men earned 18 to 20 cents, or Chicago, where workers received up to 25 cents.  
(Motorman and Conductor, July 1913, 15). 
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crony” of Samuel Gompers.  Hailing from Detroit, Mahon‟s leadership is best described 
as conservative and traditional.  Mahon‟s organization primarily served the interests of 
transit workers across the United States and Canada.  In marked contrast with other AFL 
branches, the AASERE did not agitate for “closed shop” working conditions, although it 
stressed the benefits of union membership.  While the AASERE‟s trade publication, 
Motorman and Conductor, focused more on Northern and Midwestern events, Southern 
chapters contributed sporadic progress reports.  Asheville, North Carolina, and Columbia, 
South Carolina were both fairly regular correspondents from the Upper Carolina region, 
where the AASERE‟s relatively conservative approach toward labor activity found some 
acceptance among local governments.16 
To illustrate this delicate relationship, the Labor Advocate of Columbia offers a 
rare first-hand glimpse of the conservative union ethos at work in a large Southern town.  
Writing shortly after the Armistice, Charles Henry describes his labor newspaper as 
“above all things American,” decrying radicalism as a threat to “stable labor.”  The local 
editor also boasted that Columbia had “more organized workmen than ever in its history,” 
thanks to worker patriotism during the war.  Henry further clarified his position as a 
progressive conservative, espousing the late Theodore Roosevelt‟s “Square Deal.”  That 
this shibboleth had often been twisted by Southern employers did not escape the editor, 
as he further upbraided bosses who “sow discord” or “beat down wages.”  Henry 
considered corporate strikebreakers “no less an enemy… than is the bewhiskered [Red] 
now seeking to terrorize the country.”17                    
                                                 
     16 Time, November 14, 1949, 20; Motorman and Conductor, February 1915, 4; Foner, 
History of the Labor Movement, Volume VIII, 102-116. 
     17 Labor Advocate of Columbia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1 August 1919), 4. 
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Even before the First Red Scare, labor radicalism threatened the American 
Federation of Labor‟s moderate reputation.  Mahon once stated the international streetcar 
union‟s purpose was to peacefully assist its members in “meeting the troubles of life.”  
Mahon‟s personal beliefs also espoused the Social Gospel, as evidenced by his 
devotionals in Motorman and Conductor.  “If we give men full economic development… 
they will be better prepared for the future,” he once wrote.  Mahon also counted Northern 
business leaders among his colleagues in the National Civic Federation.  Furthermore, 
Mahon remained an “adamant opponent” of radical labor groups, such as the Industrial 
Workers of the World, whose actions he blamed for sabotaging negotiations.  However, 
the IWW also promoted equal memberships among women and minorities, in marked 
contrast with Samuel Gompers and William Mahon‟s policies.
18 
Despite William Mahon‟s policy of accommodation, his nationwide organization 
faced prevalent anti-labor sentiments.  While hardly alone in its distrust of unionism, the 
“Solid South” proved difficult to crack.  One implacable foe, Governor Joseph E. Brown 
of Georgia later described the AASERE as being “defiant of State and National laws and 
ruthless in committing murder.”  Citing incidents in Augusta (1912), Atlanta (1916), and 
Savannah (1918-19), Brown also decried “bloody violence against the public” across the 
nation.  Governor Brown no doubt feared the Labor Forward movement, during which 
AFL memberships had risen dramatically to 1.75 million by 1916, with approximately 
60,000 belonging to AASERE.19  
                                                 
     18 Motorman and Conductor, January 1899, 1-3, January 1911, 1; William Onasch, 
“The Streetcar Strikes of 1917-18,” available from 
http://www.kclabor.org/streetcar_strikes_of_1917.htm. 
     19 Joseph M. Brown to Z.V. Taylor [telegram] 26 August 1919, as printed in The 
Charlotte Observer, 27 August 1919, 3;  Greenville Daily News, 28 August 1919, 4; 
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Correspondingly, the AASERE had established a few significant footholds prior 
to World War I.  In fact, Asheville, situated in western North Carolina, had organized 
under Division 128 in late 1899.  Then as now, Asheville thrived on tourism and vacation 
homes during these early decades owing to its mountainous, scenic locale.  Although by 
1920, Asheville‟s general population only numbered 10,235; many times that number 
visited the city each year.  Asheville Electric Company at its peak had 45 streetcars on 18 
track miles to accommodate traffic.  Asheville Electric Company‟s isolation may have 
discouraged Duke‟s interest in its acquisition.  Moreover, AEC did very well before 
World War I.  During 1911, services extended into West Asheville, where three new 
streetcar crews were recruited.20  
Division 128 took pride in their town, “one of the most extensively advertised 
resort towns in the United States.”  However, relations with the Asheville Electric 
Company were not always harmonious.  Division 128 informed the Amalgamated that 
“conservative observers” were present to remind them of their duty.  On 3 May 1913, 
workers won a settlement for improved wages after a brief walkout in April.  Division 
128‟s workers received wages beginning at 20 cents for the first year of employment – 
more than twice the starting rate offered by Charlotte. 21  
                                                                                                                                                 
William Millikan, A Union against Unions (St. Paul, Minnesota:  Minnesota Historical 
Society Press, 2001); William Onasch, “The Streetcar Strikes of 1917-18,” Kansas City 
Labor History Bus Tour, 1992, available from  
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36; Foner, History of the Labor Movement, Volume VIII, 102-116. 
     20 Motorman and Conductor, April 1911, 31, June 1911, 36, November 1911, 36; 
Coleman and Humphreys. 
     21 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 19, No. 11 (October 1911), 28; Vol. 21, No. 6 (May 
1913), 11; Vol. 21, No. 8 (July 1913), 15; Vol. 22, No. 6 (May 1914), 28. 
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By 1915, Asheville‟s Division 128 had constructed its own union headquarters.  
Older employees had been replaced by a dozen new men who promptly joined the 
organization.  Division 128‟s standing improved to the point of adopting benefits for 
widows and disabled members, in addition to international AASERE funds.  Several 
members were able to begin families during this period, owing to substantial pay raises.  
In 1916, hourly wages increased commensurately by approximately two cents, with 
workers earning from 21 to 27 cents depending on seniority.  This raise factored into 
Division 128‟s reported yearly wage increase of $7,600, bringing Asheville Electric‟s 
streetcar workers just under the wage scales of most Northern cities.  But these 
advancements did not come easily; Division 128‟s correspondent, known only as “Newt,” 
indicated Asheville‟s tourists made the summer runs very challenging.
22 
Successful organizations in Asheville and Chattanooga provided a springboard for 
the union to break out of the Lower Appalachians, entering the Piedmont Carolinas for 
the first time in 1911-12.  While the Amalgamated‟s campaign of 1919 stands as the most 
ambitious effort to organize public transportation, it was by no means the first operation.  
During the national upswing in labor membership before the Great War, AFL organizers 
led a comprehensive effort to unionize skilled workers in the Carolina Piedmont in the 
summer of 1911.  On July first, AFL organizer W.A. Neal commissioned AASERE 
Division 566 in Charlotte, while later in August, AFL organizer Charles McDaniels and 
AASERE Special Organizer Ben Commons established Division 571 in Spartanburg.  
                                                 
     22 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 19, No. 5 (April 1911), 31; Vol. 22, No. 6 (May 
1914), 28; Vol. 23, No. 3 (February 1915), 30; Vol. 25, No. 2 (January 1917), 9.  
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Motorman and Conductor covered both struggles, showing initial concern for their 
vulnerable compatriots in the Carolinas.23     
Just prior to the formation of Southern Public Utilities, the Charlotte Electric 
Railway had 95 employees, 83 of whom comprised Division 566.  Their union 
correspondent, “COR,” described their rail system as “small in comparison” to larger 
cities, but “very thorough” in terms of regional service.  With only one exception, 
Charlotte‟s streetcar runs were “agreeable.”  However, lamenting Charlotte Electric 
Railway‟s low pay scale, the writer indicated the company stood “at the bottom of the 
list” in comparison with other cities.  Nonetheless, “COR” anticipated no serious 
obstacles to union recognition, despite some opposition from “lesser lights.”  According 
to this correspondent, Division 566‟s future rested on their new employers, who were 
“men of the highest type and… national reputation.”
24   
 “COR”‟s allusion could only mean James B. Duke and his partners, whose 
powerbase of hydro-electric dams, textile mills, and railways throve on low wages and 
unregulated commerce.  Although no reports confirm this fact, Division 566‟s fate seems 
to have been eventual disbandment.  Two years after unionization, Charlotte Electric 
Railway‟s wages had failed to improve under Southern Public Utilities‟ banner.  Even 
their most senior employee could only hope to earn 11 cents hourly.  After July 1911, 
“COR” sent no further communiqués to Motorman and Conductor, although someone 
from the newly formed Southern Public Utilities Company leaked the 1913 wage scale to 
                                                 
     23 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 19, No. 9 (August 1911), 31; Vol. 19, No. 12 
(November 1911), 10-11; Vol. 20, No. 3 (February 1912), 24. 
     24 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 19, No. 9 (August 1911), 31; Vol. 19, No. 12 




the union publication.  This revealed that Charlotte workers initially fared no better under 
Duke and Taylor than they had under Edward Latta.  1916 efforts by AASERE executive 
Allen H. Burt to unionize Charlotte resulted in the immediate surrender of AASERE 
Division 695‟s charter.
25  Hence, Zebulon Taylor‟s predetermined hostility toward labor 
unions was well-established years before the strike of 1919.        
Taylor‟s superintendent of street railways, Roswell Lawrence Wommack, also 
opposed the unionization of his subordinates.  Wommack (1867-1940) came from 
Forsyth County – like Taylor -- and began his career with the electrification of the 
Yadkin River.  After a brief stint in Savannah, Georgia, Wommack transferred to 
Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company, arriving shortly after Latta‟s Christmas 
purge of 1903.  Wommack then went to work for Piedmont Traction in 1911, until that 
corporation merged to become Southern Public Utilities.  Wommack then became 
superintendent of all Southern Public Utilities streetcar operations across the Piedmont, 
enjoying the sobriquet of “Charlotte‟s Street Railway King.”
26   
Wommack‟s assistant superintendent, Tull R. Drum, had more day-to-day contact 
with the city‟s streetcar men.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine upheld T.R. Drum as a 
company success story, “climbing to a responsible position” through diligence and 
loyalty.  Drum began his career with the Charlotte Street Railway System in 1905, after 
                                                 
     25 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 19, No. 9 (August 1911), 31; No. 8 (July 1913), 15; 
Vol. 24, No. 10 (September 1916), 4-5. 
     26 A.V. Harrill served as SPU vice-president, but seldom emerged in the public eye.  
Treasurer Edward .C. Marshall in time succeeded Taylor as company president.  E.F. 
Taylor acted as general manager for the mammoth utility company, while its chief 
secretary, W.C. Parker, resided in Southern Power‟s head office in New York City.  
When Duke Power replaced their old streetcar lines in 1936, R.L. Wommack supervised 
the company‟s regional bus service until his death.  (Southern Public Utilities Magazine, 
Vol. 4, No. 8 (September 1918), 13; Vol. 6, No. 8 (January 1921), 30-35; Vol. 6, Nos. 11-
12 (April-May 1921), 46). 
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serving three years in the U.S. Army.  Within eight months of becoming a conductor, 
Drum received a promotion to inspector.  Drum became assistant superintendent in 1910, 
ensuring that streetcar inspectors and platform men followed daily schedules and 
operated streetcars safely and courteously.  Both Roswell and Drum were prosperous 
middle-management employees who owned their own homes, raised their families, and 
lived the American dream.  But, like Taylor, they both opposed labor unions.27 
Corporate literature also reinforced images of “self-made men” like Wommack 
and Drum.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine (later renamed Duke Power Magazine) 
circulated among workers in the region served by the company.  Part newsletter, part 
propaganda, this magazine influenced workers and perpetuated the company‟s self-image 
as a benevolent employer.  Its first editor, Leake Carraway, began as a Charlotte booster. 
Carraway established SPU‟s publicity department in 1914, lasting through the war years 
only to resign in May 1919 for employment with another company.28        
Carraway‟s successor, John Paul Lucas, enjoyed professional ties to both local 
newspapers, the Charlotte News and Charlotte Observer.  In 1905, Lucas served as 
assistant city editor for the conservative Observer, while he later edited the Evening 
Chronicle, a subsidiary of the Charlotte News.  Lucas also dabbled with real estate until 
America plunged into Great War.  Lucas then used his political influence in Raleigh to 
lead the wartime North Carolina Food Administration.  Afterward, Lucas took over 
Southern Public‟s publicity just prior to the Charlotte strike.
29 
                                                 
     27 Helms-Bell House, http://landmarkscommission.org/S&RR/HelmsBell.html; 
Internet, accessed 17 February 2009; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1920, Mecklenburg 
County, Charlotte, North Carolina.  
     28 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 2, (July 15, 1919), 11-12. 
     29 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 2, (July 15, 1919), 24-25. 
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Throughout its circulation history, Southern Public Utilities Magazine targeted its 
gas, electrical, and streetcar workers with a mixture of professional development and 
doggerel poetry, much in the same fashion as Motorman and Conductor.  Certain SPU 
workers may well have read the AASERE periodical, but they probably did so furtively.  
It is highly unlikely that Superintendent Wommack would not have approved such 
literature.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine unabashedly competed against the union 
publication, reaching at least one railway employee in Cincinnati, Ohio.  Imploring for a 
subscription, Harry Howard complained to Leake Carraway that his company did not 
publish its own magazine.  Among the professional journals Howard listed as his favorite 
reading materials Motorman and Conductor was notably missing.30 
Southern Public Utilities streetcar employees were cultivated from the immediate 
Carolina Piedmont region.  Responsibilities of motormen and conductors require some 
description.  Motormen typically handled the mechanical aspects of the streetcar, while 
keeping an eye on passengers.  Conductors managed driving, braking, and fare collection.  
SPU streetcar runs sometimes exceeded ten hours, although North Carolina 
recommended the eight-hour workday.  Literacy rates tended to be very high among 
streetcar workers, who needed to read schedules and so forth.  Locomotive and streetcar 
conductors were listed as one hundred percent literate, for example.  Streetcar conductors 
in North Carolina required five full years to establish seniority, and were required to be at 
least twenty-one.  Motormen were somewhat lower on the rung than conductors, but they 
sometimes worked their way to conductor positions.31 
                                                 
     30 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 4, No. 2, (March 15, 1918), 11; 
     31 Thirtieth Reports of the Department of Labor and Printing of the State of North 
Carolina, 1916 (Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton Printers, 1917), 31; U.S. Bureau of the 
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Statistical analysis from Charlotte‟s Eighth Ward, also known as Dilworth, 
suggests a fairly typical variety of lifestyles for streetcar workers.  Out of 36 Southern 
Public streetcar men inhabiting this contentious suburb, less than one-third (ten) were 
homeowners.  Fifteen other streetcar men also rented their homes, rubbing elbows with 
mill workers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen.  Eleven men either lodged with family or 
boarded with other streetcar workers.  Such figures are slightly lower than those given by 
the 1920 U.S. Census report, indicating 37.7 percent of Southerners owned their homes, 
while 62 percent rented.   
Two notable streetcar families interacted at every level in the Dilworth suburbs.  
Assistant Superintendent T. R. Drum, at age 44, owned a house in one of the better 
sections of Dilworth.  Adolphus McFarland, working at age 61 as a car inspector, also 
owned a home in Eighth Ward. One son, conductor William A. McFarland, rented a 
home with his newlywed wife.  Another son, Edward McFarland, shared a rented house 
with his fellow conductor, R. Olin Drum, presumably a relative of the Assistant 
Superintendent.32      
What more can we know about the ordinary motormen and conductors who 
worked for Southern Public Utilities?  Their world is but a shadow of memory, 
photographs buried in archives.  Most newspaper perceptions of the Carolina Piedmont 
streetcar men come from the company perspective.  Zebulon V. Taylor could appear 
fatherly, not to say paternalistic.  In 1919, Taylor often portrayed his “boys” as misled 
                                                                                                                                                 
Census Reports, 1920, Mortgages on Homes, 14-15; U.S. Bureau of the Census Reports, 
1920, Mecklenburg County, Charlotte, North Carolina. 
     32 At age 28, William A. McFarland served as the local streetcar union president 
throughout the Charlotte Strike.  Edward McFarland listed his age as 29, while Olin 
Drum was 21 years old.  (U.S. Bureau of the Census Reports, 1920, Mecklenburg 
County, Charlotte, North Carolina).   
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children whose prodigality had brought them under “outside influences.”  They were 
“men” when they followed orders.  Taylor‟s attitudes lent his workingmen little credit as 
to their intelligence or freedom of action.  Loy Cloninger, one of the chief union 
spokesmen during the 1919 strike, later admitted that his fellow workers did not like 
Taylor overmuch, but were unable to express their sentiments openly.  On the other hand, 
Taylor rewarded loyalty among streetcar workers who resisted the lure of unionism.33   
Jesse B. Ashe (born 1887) began his career working on the Southern Electric 
Railway, eventually rising from lowly conductor to Southern Public Utilities streetcar 
inspector in the 1920s.  Ashe had more positive feelings toward Zebulon Taylor, insisting 
he got along personally with his company president, and his co-workers “used to think a 
lot of him.”  Ashe nevertheless took part in the post-war Charlotte strike, accompanying 
Loy Cloninger to Chamber of Commerce negotiations with President Taylor.  
Unfortunately, his interview with Allen Tullos only skimmed over the topic of the strike, 
focusing instead on the recreational activities and workaday details of his career. 34   
While Ashe‟s account is descriptive, one is also left with the impression his employers 
did not encourage him to remember the events of August 1919.  
Jesse B. Ashe grew up working on a cotton farm in York County, South Carolina.  
In 1912, he left for the city of Charlotte in the company of his brother.  They both went to 
work for Southern Electric Railway before its consolidation under the Southern Public 
                                                 
     33 Loy C. Cloninger, interview by Allen Tullos, 18 June 1980, transcript, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson 
Library, 8. 
     34 Jesse B. Ashe, interview by Allen Tullos, 13 June 1980, recording, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson 
Library; Final Report of Commission, 23 August 1919, Department of Labor, Division of 
Conciliation, National Archives and Records Administration, Box 111. 
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Utilities Company.  Unlike his brother, who quit after six months, Jesse Ashe decided to 
make a career in public transportation.  He retired from Duke Power in 1955, having 
made the transition from streetcars to motorbuses.  As he recalled in 1980, “We weren‟t 
making much, about 14 cents an hour… seven days a week, nine hours a day, and no 
vacations.”  After five years as a motorman, Ashe became a conductor in 1917, but the 
pay increase only amounted to 21 cents hourly.  This wage figure quoted by Ashe, 
amounting $1.89 for a nine-hour shift, is well below the daily average of $4.50 given by 
the 1916 North Carolina Department of Labor.35 
According to Jesse Ashe, being a streetcar conductor had its unglamorous side.  
Manipulating the streetcar‟s nine points of speed proved “tough work,” requiring two 
different gloves for handbrakes and other controls.  Ashe‟s job forced him to “sit out in 
the cold, with the doors always open.”  Evidently, the heating for Charlotte streetcars did 
not improve greatly after the 1903 strike – which had occurred primarily due to that same 
issue.  During his bachelor years, Ashe lived in a South Boulevard boarding house, 
directly across from the Dilworth car-barn, sharing a room with four other streetcar 
employees.  Ashe‟s room and board amounted to $3.00 weekly, later increased to $4.00 
after the war years.  Ashe ruefully admitted his situation did not leave him with much 
money to save.  Such dearth of income suggests Ashe likely had a strong financial 
motivation to join the Charlotte streetcar union in 1919.36   
Judy M. Fourier, Ashe's sister-in-law, also revealed that Jesse‟s mother had 
dissuaded him from accepting a baseball scholarship during his youth.  Whether Ashe‟s 
                                                 
     35 Ashe interview; Thirtieth Reports of the Department of Labor and Printing of the 
State of North Carolina, 1916 (Raleigh:  Edwards & Broughton Printers, 1917), 30. 
     36 Ashe interview; United States Census Reports, 1920, Mecklenburg County, 
Charlotte, North Carolina.  
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mother held religious prejudices toward professional sports is unclear.  Perhaps, Ashe felt 
immediate employment might help his family‟s cotton farm, which may not have been 
faring well.  Beyond question, Ashe‟s decision haunted him throughout his life.  Early in 
his career, conductor Jesse Ashe made quite a reputation for himself as a promising 
pinch-hitter for the Southern Power baseball team.  In 1980, Ashe recalled that company 
vice-president William States Lee played alongside his men, rewarding good hits with a 
dollar bonus.  Home runs brought three dollars to the skilled athlete‟s paycheck.  While 
some of Ashe‟s acquaintances went to the major leagues during the Twenties, marriage 
and fatherhood forced the conductor to give up baseball entirely.37    
Loy Connelly Cloninger (1893-1985) came from Lincoln County, North Carolina, 
where his father built houses.  Best known as “L.C.” to his compatriots, Cloninger did not 
begin working for Southern Public Utilities until 1917.  By then, wartime drafts brought 
vacancies to the region‟s major employers.  Being married with one child, he received 
exemption from the draft. In search of stability, L.C. turned down a short-term 
construction job, paying daily laborers $9.00 to build a gunpowder plant in City Point, 
Virginia.  Instead, Loy Cloninger began working for SPU as a night-shift streetcar 
mechanic at $1.75 per day.  He moved temporarily into a rooming house known as the 
Flatiron Building, until he could afford to bring his family.38   
L.C. received a personal recommendation from his older brother, J.L. Cloninger -- 
already a popular streetcar conductor nicknamed “Klondike” for his wealth of anecdotes 
and jokes.  Relatives often helped one another find gainful employment.  One brother-in-
law, W.V. Osborne, later came to the Charlotte SPU maintenance section, becoming a 
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master mechanic.  Within two years, Loy Cloninger himself became night foreman, and a 
confirmed unionist.  During his 1979 interview, Cloninger showed a badge from the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, indicating twenty years of membership.  This would 
suggest a closer relationship between street railway workers and locomotive trainmen 
after the Charlotte Strike.  Since its establishment in Charlotte predated the streetcar 
union by two decades, the railroad union may have taken up the slack for street railway 
workers.39    
Cloninger‟s work involved winding electrical armatures in streetcar motors, as 
well as trolley controllers.  Sometimes, when Charlotte streetcars went off track, L.C.‟s 
crew put them back on course.  This task actually exposed the workers to extreme 
hazards.  One crewman named King received a lethal jolt of 550 volts while repairing a 
fallen trolley near the Lakewood district.  On this occasion, King unwisely used bare 
hands to pick up the non-insulated pole feeding power to the streetcar motor.  Cloninger 
recalled he must have “been stuck hundreds of time on top” of the streetcar, with the live 
wire right next to him.  Remorsefully, he repeated an old maxim for streetcar workers on 
the trolley lines: “Grab a pole and get it all.” 
40 
Cloninger‟s account is significant, not to say unique, for its references to 
interracial unionism, albeit within strict limitations.  When the Charlotte organization 
drive began in 1919, Cloninger recalled union meetings were open to black transportation 
workers, but no evidence exists to confirm that blacks took leadership roles.  Loy 
                                                 
     39 Thirtieth Reports of the Department of Labor and Printing of the State of North 
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     40 Charlotte‟s 1920 Census indicates three motormen named King, two of them living 
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Cloninger also indicated little friction between blacks and whites at the local union 
meetings.  But given the context of Jim Crow, relationships were sometimes tinged by 
condescension and paternalism.  When interviewed in 1979, Loy Cloninger shamelessly 
referred to “an old nigger,” who chided a fellow streetcar mechanic – a white man from 
Georgia -- for refusing to join the local union after complaining about low wages.41   
Southern Public Utilities streetcar employees, black and white, frequently 
interacted in the shops and car-barns, where returning vehicles were cleaned and repaired 
after each nightly run.  Unfortunately, when viewed through the lens of white authority, 
African-American streetcar workers in the Piedmont largely remain a mystery.  
According to Philip S. Foner‟s labor history, black employees in most streetcar 
companies were relegated to servile positions, such as porters and sweepers.  Southern 
Public Utilities seems no different in this sense.  No 1920 census data confirms the 
employment of black motormen or conductors.  However, at least ten African-Americans 
held maintenance jobs in Charlotte.  Six black men were general laborers in the car barns, 
while other individuals fulfilled specific duties, such as track maintenance or car 
cleaning.  Only a single black streetcar employee, Frank Moss, at age forty-two, held a 
significant skilled position as car-barn electrician, inspecting the streetcar wiring systems.  
Moss and his family of five rented their home in Third Ward, a predominately black 
sector of Charlotte.42   
Charlotte also boasted two segregated black streetcar suburbs, Biddleville (1903) 
and Washington Heights (1912).  Often referred to as “Black Dilworth,” Biddleville had 
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its own college, and provided employees for two cotton mills.  One might assume that, 
under the vagaries of Jim Crow, streetcars going through Biddleville and Washington 
Heights might have been operated by African-Americans.  However, Southern Public 
Utilities were proprietary toward “white” jobs, outweighing any perceived stigma of 
running streetcars through a black neighborhood. Moreover, black citizens of Charlotte 
rode toward the back of segregated streetcars, partitioned with a screen.  African-
American conductors would certainly have posed a challenge to this system.43   
Southern Public‟s Jim Crow policy toward its streetcar lines seems representative 
of the era‟s contradictory racial policies.  In Making Whiteness, Grace E. Hale 
acknowledges a permeable color line aboard Southern streetcars, which she terms as 
“disorder” amid Jim Crow‟s “racial order.”  Grace Hale echoes Progressive Era writer 
Ray Stannard Baker‟s description of streetcars as relatively free “points of human 
contact.”  However, she also paraphrases Robin Kelley‟s argument that Southern 
streetcars continued as “arenas of racial struggle” until motorized buses took their place 
in the Civil Rights era.44   
Most black Southern Public Utilities employees worked in the most dangerous 
occupations, chiefly in gasworks installation.  John Ellis, one black construction worker, 
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nearly perished from gas inhalation in 1919.  Company publications described a white 
senior engineer, John V. Brookshire, using medical skills honed in wartime France to 
revive Ellis from his near-coma.  Later, in 1920, the former ambulance driver rescued 
another black gasworks employee, Wylie Johnson.  Both men appeared in what today 
would be considered a “photo opportunity.”  John Brookshire acted selflessly and above 
the call of duty in saving these two black workers. Yet, however much the company 
magazine emphasized human interest; these articles still possess an undertone of racial 
hierarchy.  In both cases, black workers were portrayed almost like children who needed 
a white father to save them from danger.45      
My research has not divulged any proof that Piedmont traction companies ever 
engaged black employees as replacement workers.  Such tactics were not unknown in the 
Deep South; coal operators in Alabama employed black strikebreakers against the United 
Mine Workers in 1920, thwarting the UMW‟s interracial union efforts.  But Piedmont 
newspapers of the era fail to make any mention of such decisions to hire black 
strikebreakers, a move that would conceivably strengthen local support for striking 
whites, despite anti-union prejudices. 46   
Spartanburg, located in the South Carolina Upcountry, proved even more hostile 
to unions than Charlotte.  That city‟s connection to Southern Public Utilities‟ empire 
solidified in March 1913, with Duke‟s investment in Spartanburg‟s utility company, 
South Carolina Power, Light, and Railway (SCLP&R).  Franklin H. Knox remained the 
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company‟s titular president, while his corporation enjoyed semi-autonomy.  In early 
September 1913, Knox discharged several employees involved in the organization of 
Division 571.  Knox also fired envoys from the local union when they pled for worker 
reinstatement.  On September 23, Division 571 declared a strike that lasted four days.  
Spartanburg‟s city government brokered an “open shop” agreement with Knox, who 
promised to reinstate his workers at a pay scale of 14 to 18 cents, based on one to four 
years in service. However, a follow-up report in March 1912 indicated that SCLP&R had 
rehired “very few” of Division 571‟s members.  Despite AASERE organizer Ben 
Commons‟ best efforts, Spartanburg‟s first attempt to organize its transit workers met 
with failure.47 
Spartanburg‟s streetcar workers, like Charlotte‟s complement, tended to inhabit 
urban sectors, although a few motormen and conductors lived in outskirt farming 
communities.  Most Spartanburg streetcar men were still renting homes by 1920, with 
some few homeowners, such as the streetcar “overseer” William H. Deming, a veteran 
employee at 57 years.  Most of the Spartanburg streetcar men from First and Second 
Wards were married with several children per household.  Adolescent children often 
worked at local textile mills.48   
Like Southern Public, black laborers working for SCLP&R usually held menial 
jobs, although George Evans served as streetcar repairman at the relatively young age of 
26.  Spartanburg‟s workers tended to live in segregated parts of town, but unlike the 
Queen City, Spartanburg tended to be less suspicious toward European immigrants.  
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Samuel C. Burris, a conductor in District 110, lived next door to a Russian Jewish 
shoemaker, whose eldest children worked in a department store.  District 112, home to 
several streetcar workers, boasted a well-established Russian community.49             
Despite setbacks in Charlotte and Spartanburg, the AASERE met with success in 
two major South Carolina towns, Charleston and Columbia.  In the Palmetto state capital, 
160 platform men from Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric Company successfully 
unionized on May 24, 1912.  Unlike Charlotte, Columbia‟s streetcar workers were not 
employed by Southern Public Utilities.  Instead, the Columbia Street Railway also 
remained independent of Southern Power.  Following a six-day strike, company president 
Edward W. Robertson signed a two-year “closed shop” contract on 25 October 1912.50  
Division 590‟s president, Ambrose A. Gerald, led his chapter throughout its 
existence, commanding strong political clout at the local and state levels.  Riding on 
South Carolina‟s wave of progressive reform, Gerald and another streetcar union 
member, William D. Hampton, were elected to state legislature in 1918.  Included within 
the umbrella of Columbia‟s Federation of Trades (linked to the nationwide American 
Federation of Labor), streetcar conductors and motormen were represented equally as 
skilled workmen.  Ambrose Gerald even served a term as the Federation President.  
Moreover, Division 590 repeatedly expressed its support for conservative leaders such as 
Governor Coleman L. Blease.  In 1913, the Federation of Trades sponsored the Heat and 
Air Brake Bill, requiring South Carolina‟s streetcar services to install electric heaters and 
air brakes on all vehicles.  With Governor Blease‟s vocal support, this legislation became 
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effective on 1 October 1914, ensuring the streetcar union‟s support for Blease in 
November.  Division 590 even sent Mary White, teenaged daughter of one of its officers, 
bearing a bouquet of flowers to the Governor‟s Mansion.
51   
Columbia‟s streetcar workers were well-organized, but friction still persisted 
between Division 590 and its employers, despite their initial victory.  After Cole Blease‟s 
defeat by Richard Manning in November 1914, Columbia‟s platform men relied less on 
state patronage, more on local arbitration efforts.  In March of 1915, Division 590 
received a settlement for higher wages, owing to a general perception that Columbia‟s 
street railway had fallen behind.  Later in September, Columbia Light, Railway, and Gas 
Company allegedly began circulating “spotters” to keep tabs on their workers.  Two men 
were sacked, prompting the union to strike for one week.  Arbitration successfully ended 
the strike and reinstated the lost workers.52  
 “Spotters” were commonly used to check up on motormen and conductors in 
street railway systems, especially those belonging to unions.  Wisconsin reported similar 
activities in March 1915, describing these spies as “reptiles” with the “inherent elements 
of a scoundrel.”  Workers from Peoria, Illinois, reported two pretty girls employed as 
“spotters” aboard a streetcar in October 1916.  They were accused of intentionally 
provoking conductors and motormen into flirtation.  Columbia‟s instances of company 
espionage focused upon whether the crewmen kept accurate headcounts of their 
passengers.  Crewmen who made errors were unceremoniously sacked, sparking an 
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outcry from Division 590.  While only Governor Manning could overrule such a 
checking system, arbitrators were successful in convincing the company to desist in its 
practice.  On this rare occasion, Division 590 sent for outside help to enforce the 
arbitration process.  J.C. Colgan of the AASERE‟s General Executive Board oversaw the 
reinstatement of workers discharged in September 1915.  Columbia‟s street railway men 
were also mollified by a modest pay raise in the spring of 1916.53 
Columbia‟s streetcar workers were mainly South Carolina men, with a few from 
Georgia or North Carolina.  Much like their counterparts in Charlotte and Spartanburg, 
the Columbia car men effectively barred their profession from African-Americans, 
although Columbia Light, Railway, and Gas Company did employ at least one black 
woman, Eva Smith, as a car-barn laborer.  Nearly all workers from First Ward of 
Columbia either rented or lodged with someone.  Charley Morgan, married with four 
stepchildren, provided lodgings to three other conductors and motormen in District 80.  
Even Ambrose A. Gerald, a member of South Carolina‟s General Assembly and local 
union leader, still rented his own house in Fourth Ward, District 88.54  
Despite these economic setbacks, Columbia‟s streetcar union had won both 
recognition and a closed shop contract.   Resolving their differences with company 
president Edward Robertson, Division 590 of Columbia remained a vital mainspring of 
South Carolina labor throughout the next three years, serving the interests of public and 
company alike.  Unlike cities such as Chattanooga, Tennessee, or Atlanta, Georgia, 
Columbia did not experience notable transportation strikes during the Great War.  Until 
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Columbia Light, Railway, and Gas management changed for the worse after 1920, 
Columbia‟s streetcar union remained a working model of wartime union cooperation. 
Hence, some elements of organized labor were still able to penetrate the industrial 
South before World War I, even in the Carolina Piedmont.  While full unionization of the 
textile mills still seemed impossible, the existence of Columbia‟s Division 590 
represented a new birth of unionism for semi-skilled workers.  However, even the 
AASERE‟s superior organization had failed to tackle James Duke‟s powerful utility and 
industrial empire, now headquartered in Charlotte.  After the United States entered World 
War I, streetcar labor unions reached their peak in power, even as traction companies fell 
under government control or went into receivership.  However, Southern Power 
prospered in the war years, largely due to its connection with James Duke.  Even though 
wartime influence enabled the Amalgamated to reach out once more toward the 
Piedmont, Duke still remained an implacable – if imperceptible -- foe of unionism.            
85 
 
Chapter 4: The Great War Comes Home 
 
America‟s official involvement in World War I ignited hopes for organized labor 
across the United States.  AFL leadership tended toward moderation and cooperation 
with business, using strikes only as a last resort.  In late 1917, President Wilson approved 
the National War Labor Board (NWLB), chaired by ex-President William H. Taft.  This 
body of arbitrators resolved many strike situations to facilitate wartime production and 
transportation.  By supporting the war, the American Federation of Labor also hoped the 
Wilson Administration would lend its political support for labor organizers operating in 
states hostile to unionism.  Meanwhile, federal crackdowns on labor radicals such as the 
IWW met with few objections from Samuel Gompers and William Mahon of AASERE.  
Yet, despite such cooperation from labor leaders, conservative newspapers across the 
U.S. portrayed unions as wartime malcontents and potential traitors.  Southern 
newspapers led the way, often adding charges that unions incited racial tensions.1 
During World War I, William Mahon delegated more authority to his chief 
lieutenant, William B. Fitzgerald.  Fitzgerald, a one-time factory worker in Troy, New 
York, switched careers in 1896 to become a streetcar conductor.  Fitzgerald‟s successful 
organization of Troy‟s streetcar union, Division 132, soon brought him to Mahon‟s 
notice.  In 1903, Fitzgerald joined the Amalgamated Association‟s executive board.  
Rising through union ranks, Fitzgerald had become the First International Vice President 
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in 1917.  Throughout World War I, Fitzgerald personally oversaw all but the most 
difficult strikes and arbitrations.2 
As Joseph McCartin denotes, a “chilling conformity” overtook the United States 
during World War I, as reactionary impulses silenced dissent among the ranks.  The 
Espionage Act provided government officials with the tools to silence the IWW, while 
organizations like the American Protective League (and its local equivalents) suppressed 
other groups, such as the pacifist Non-Partisan League.  While union-busting 
organizations like the Minneapolis Citizen‟s Alliance existed before the war, such groups 
gathered support and membership during the war, convincing many that labor unions 
were working hand-in-glove with Bolsheviks.3  
Public transportation also underwent changes during World War I.  While 
Southern traction companies never went so far as hiring female “conductorettes,” as New 
York City did in 1918, they shared many common problems with Northern companies.  
One ongoing major problem lay with fluctuating wages and car fares.  Transportation 
workers facing increased work hours during the war often received war bonuses from 
their employers.  Some of these raises were the results of NWLB arbitration, citing the 
cost of living increases in 1918 and early 1919.  In other cases, employers used the pay 
raise as a defensive tactic to ensure nearby strikes in such cities as Memphis and 
Spartanburg did not spread to their own work force.  However, the traction companies 
also had to raise car-fares to make up for their overhead, which invariably aroused the 
                                                 
     2 Motorman and Conductor, June 1919, 27-28; December 1923, 1.  
     3 Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997), 108; Millikan, 87-123.   
87 
 
riding public, who often felt they were footing the bill for labor unions.  Sometimes, this 
public sentiment played into the hands of union-busters and employers, as we will see.4 
In 1918, Southern Public Utilities workers were rewarded with two wartime 
bonuses in May and September to counter living expenses, raising effective wages to 
between 28 and 35 cents per hour.  On 10 September, Zebulon Taylor addressed his 
platform men, stating his desire to grant even higher wages, but revenues under the five-
cent car fare did not permit it.  This carefully worded statement, with reminders of loyalty 
and duty, served to recruit worker support for higher car fares.  If the company 
president‟s statement also served as a backdoor plea for the Piedmont region‟s towns to 
approve a fare hike, then it succeeded.  On the first of October, as the war ground to a 
close, Charlotte and Winston-Salem raised fares to seven cents, followed by South 
Carolina towns such as Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg.  Generally, the Piedmont 
citizenry accepted this hike with the usual wartime attitude of sacrifice.  The Greenville 
News, for example, acknowledged that their SPU branch had been operating at a loss, and 
townsfolk preferred a modest increase in car fares in lieu of raising electricity rates.5 
Columbia‟s Division 590 did somewhat better than the unorganized Southern 
Public streetcar workers during World War I.  During Camp Jackson‟s existence, a five-
mile extension connected soldiers to Columbia, adding an estimated 30,000 passengers to 
the system.  In 1917, Ambrose Gerald lobbied to protect his chapter‟s jobs through a city 
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ordinance blocking the use of one-man streetcars.  Moreover, the city of Columbia passed 
a transportation law requiring streetcar crews to have fifteen days of training under 
motormen and conductors, each of these trainers being required to have six months or 
more track experience.6    
From 1917 to 1919, Columbia Railway and AASERE Division 590 resolved their 
differences without resorting to strikes or lockouts.  Nearly all Columbia employees, 
excluding part-time “extras,” belonged to the union, which exercised restraint during the 
war years.  In January 1917, Ambrose A. Gerald assumed leadership of the Columbia 
Federation of Trades, perhaps explaining his chapter‟s high level of discipline.  Only 
weeks before America entered the war, the company granted a major wage increase.  
Regular employees received from 19 to 24 cents hourly, slightly below Asheville‟s rate.  
One year later, 1918 rates improved to 20 cents for new employees, working upward to 
27 cents for senior crewmen.  Columbia Railway also instituted a wartime bonus system, 
awarding 3 more cents hourly on every tenth day of service.  By January 1919, overall 
rates jumped to 30 cents for new crewmen, with senior streetcar workers earning 40 cents 
hourly, plus overtime.  Such rates exceeded Southern Public Utilities wage scales by two 
to five cents, reflecting Division 590‟s overall power.7 
However, the economic problems that affected streetcar services during the Great 
War smoldered beneath Columbia‟s atmosphere of compromise.  In November 1914, 
Columbia Street Railway lost nineteen cars in a barn fire.  Although Camp Jackson 
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brought military passengers during the war years, general ridership began to slacken with 
the purchase of automobiles.  Raising the car fare to seven cents, plus three cents for 
transfers brought the “proverbial wolf knocking at the door,” according to transportation 
historian Thomas Fetters.  Soon, Columbia Railway was in serious financial straits.  
Likewise, Division 590‟s post-war relationship with Columbia Railway, Light, and Gas 
Company deteriorated rapidly after 1919. 8                         
In other Southern locales, street railway labor relations were more contentious.  
One salient example of wartime tensions exists in the Chattanooga Streetcar Strike of 
1917.  This event provides illustrations for the bitter divisions within the ranks of 
streetcar workers toward unionism.  It also sets the immediate stage for the Piedmont 
campaign, as AASERE organizers began to re-orient their strategy in the western sectors 
of North and South Carolina.  Chattanooga, known as the “Dynamo of Dixie,” prided 
itself on its mountain location as well as its recent modernization, factors in common 
with the Carolina Piedmont.  However, the same class conflict later inherent in the 
Piedmont prompted the Chattanooga streetcar workers to strike four times within twenty 
years.  In Chattanooga, AASERE chapter Division 115 formed as early as August 1899.  
Chattanooga‟s union later reorganized into Division 715.
9 
The AASERE sought to organize in Tennessee for the next two decades.  
Knoxville‟s Division 644 was chartered in September 1913, with Memphis‟s Division 
713 following in July 1916.  However, union recognition in Chattanooga faced 
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unexpected resistance in 1899 and 1911, both times due to older streetcar employees‟ 
mistrust toward “foreign” union organizers.  In this case, “foreign” meant labor 
organizers from the North.  One senior Chattanooga Railway and Light (CR&L) 
conductor, E.L. Mallicoat, outright scorned AASERE organizers, stating: “When we get 
ready for anyone else to show us how to run our personal business, we will send for 
him.”  Younger streetcar men, however, continued in their efforts to gain union 
recognition, through the maintenance of informal meetings and caucuses.  Such a division 
between older and newer workers may reflect generational and political differences.10   
During World War I, strikes occurred in 1916 and 1917, testing the resolve of 
AASERE Division 715.  After Memphis trolley men staged a walkout in the summer of 
1916, Chattanooga employees received a 7 percent pay raise to ensure loyalty.  But 
CR&L‟s July 1916 pay raise, based on seniority, tended to favor the anti-union segment.  
This action precipitated unrest among some of the company‟s 215 workers, and by mid-
August, over 55 percent of CR&L employees had signed union cards, according to 
AASERE organizer Chris Cline.  Shortly thereafter, twenty employees were discharged 
for joining the union.  Cline announced a strike on August 21, which eventually resulted 
in temporary recognition of Division 715.11 
Broken promises on the part of CR&L management eventually led to a more 
serious strike in September 1917.  Unrest and dissatisfaction simmered among the union 
members over wages, but under Chris Cline‟s distant guidance, Division 715 maintained 
the peace throughout the summer.  In late August, CR&L introduced new ticket 
machines, Rooke Automatic Fare Registers.  Previously, conductors had collected fares 
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by hand, marking their daily intake on a wall chart.  The AASERE supported this 
innovative register for its labor-saving merits, but local conductors resented these devices 
as an implication of mistrust from their employers.  Rumors also circulated about a 
company purge of union members.12   
Several workers were fired for noncompliance or insubordination at the behest of 
CR&L vice-president Von W. Hoover, a known foe of unionism.  Thereafter, Hoover 
announced that the CR&L would endorse an “open-shop” doctrine.  Hoover subsequently 
dismissed officers of Division 715, which touched off a strike on September 7.  
Strikebreakers were deployed on the company streetcars while AASERE representatives 
met with Hoover.  Since CR&L workers were technically still under union contract, 
organizer Chris Cline declared the company in violation of its union contract.13  
What resulted in Chattanooga remains one of the most violent and acrimonious 
strikes in the city‟s history.  On the evening of September 7, union members and 
strikebreakers clashed in the streets, while union supporters vandalized twenty streetcars.  
No deaths resulted, but several injuries were reported on both sides.  Two U.S. cavalry 
troops were called into Chattanooga to restore order.   Chris Cline soon regained control 
over Division 715, counseling the union men to await arbitration.  But many local 
businessmen, represented by the Chattanooga Manufacturers Association (CMA), 
suspected outside agitation from the IWW.  First National Bank president C.A. Lyerly 
even accused the strikers of collaborating with Imperial Germany.  U.S. Attorney Wesley 
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T. Kennerly of Knoxville, Tennessee, looked into this allegation, but military 
investigators from nearby Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, found no such connections.14         
Federal arbitration efforts in Chattanooga began almost immediately after the 
September 7 riots.  However, violent incidents still occurred on the streetcar lines.  
During one confrontation, a bystander suffered minor shotgun wounds after a CR&L 
replacement fired at a band of union supporters attacking his streetcar.  On September 23, 
Division 715 renewed its strike, staging a joint march with other unions, numbering about 
2,000 workers.  At Von W. Hoover‟s order, two CR&L streetcars blocked the parade‟s 
path, triggering an outbreak of violence that left one brewery worker slain by a federal 
officer, S.O. Welch, acting as a strikebreaker.  Welch later faced indictment for murder.  
Four companies of U.S. infantry restored order without further injury to the civilians, 
although one soldier was wounded in the process.  Fort Oglethorpe received orders to 
dispatch machine-gun units to Chattanooga on the following day.15                  
Fallout from the strike hit the region‟s newspapers immediately.  Opinions were 
polarized, with a very strong showing for the workers.  While conservative editors railed 
against the specter of class warfare, Chris Cline turned the tables by accusing company 
vice president Von W. Hoover of acting like a German sympathizer.  As a counterblast, 
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CR&L‟s chief attorney, George Lancaster, implored U.S. Attorney Kennerly to arrest 
Cline on a technicality that their client‟s streetcars sometimes conveyed U.S. mail 
shipments.  This ploy had proven effective for both company and government officials 
during the 1893 Pullman Strike in Chicago.  But Kennerly reasoned that CR&L streetcars 
were private property, and no one could prove these vehicles were carrying mail during 
the vandalism of September.  In any case, Kennerly asked both sides to restrain their 
hostilities until the Department of Labor had completed its negotiations.16   
George Lancaster subsequently took the streetcar company‟s charges of IWW 
terrorism to Attorney General Thomas Gregory‟s office in Washington, where they were 
considered without much fanfare.  Both Chattanooga Railway and the Chattanooga 
Manufacturer‟s Association pleaded for the Attorney General to enforce the “open shop.”  
However, none of these mill and factory owners could prove connections with radical 
groups.  Considering Gregory‟s role in establishing the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 
1917, his office‟s lack of alacrity tends to disprove the CMA‟s charges.  Gregory also 
used similar “anticipatory action” toward the 1917 Minneapolis streetcar strike.  
Throughout this time, one hundred and sixty-six members of the Industrial Workers of 
the World stood trial for sedition in Chicago, including their leader, William “Big Bill” 
Haywood.  But nothing came of Chattanooga Railway and Light‟s efforts to link their 
striking workers to greater national, not to say global, events.17 
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Chattanooga streetcar workers agreed to return to work on October 7, under 
CR&L‟s “open shop” contract.  Unfortunately, some streetcar workers resented the 
company‟s retention of ten African-American linemen who were suspected of being 
scabs.  During this racially-charged era, whites often considered replacement by black 
workers as a personal insult.  Despite Chris Cline‟s moderation, sufficient members of 
Division 715 were motivated to strike without warning on October 16.  Following a court 
injunction, the strikers lost public sympathy, especially after one CR&L streetcar 
exploded mysteriously on December 2.  Even though most CR&L workers had returned 
to the open shop by January 1918, their union – and way of life --collapsed quickly 
afterward.  Chattanooga Railway and Light fell into receivership by 1922, as the rise of 
automobiles and motor-buses ended the city‟s history of streetcar transportation.18      
*      *      * 
Incidents such as the one in Chattanooga were a foretaste of what would come 
after the Armistice of 1918.  Owing to public outrage over fare hikes, plus gradual 
increases in private car ownership, many transit enterprises went into receivership after 
the Great War.  Fourteen percent of the nation‟s streetcar companies had fallen to 
receivers within one year of the war‟s end.  While Southern Public Utilities avoided such 
a fate, exaggerated fears of nationalization proved useful to the company‟s anti-labor 
arguments in 1919 and beyond.  Meanwhile, other regional traction corporations failed 
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across the Carolina Piedmont region.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine and its chief 
rival, Motorman and Conductor, both weighed in regarding the causes of this economic 
threat to their combined interests in streetcar transportation.  However, as one might 
expect, the streetcar company and the union drew widely divergent conclusions.19 
One popular cost-cutting measure employed by streetcar companies, the one-man 
streetcar proved more threatening to platform workers and streetcar operators than 
automatic cashiers.  Motormen were gradually phased out in favor of conductors, who 
were thereafter expected to do both jobs.  As one might imagine, the decreased work 
force and increase in responsibility did not please AASERE leaders, reflected by a 
campaign to discredit the one-man car‟s design and implementation.  While Southern 
Public Utilities Magazine printed favorable editorials toward its use of one-man cars, 
Motorman and Conductor aired many complaints, especially during the immediate post-
war period of 1919-21. 
One editorial decried a massive advertising campaign in 1920 to replace all two-
man streetcars with single-conductor models.  The unsigned writer blamed poor behavior 
and indifference on the part of some conductors, but criticized the lack of two-man cars 
because single conductors tended to make more mistakes without a counterpart to watch 
out for them. 20  Prophetically, Motorman and Conductor warned that one-man streetcars 
would encourage the traction companies to eliminate jobs and raise car fares.  Another 
article warned that single-conductor streetcars were more prone to accidents, owing to the 
conductor being so busy making change and collecting fares.  Without a motorman to 
                                                 
     19 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 6 (January 1920), 1-4.   
     20 Motorman and Conductor, January 1922, 12. 
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assist in braking, Motorman and Conductor asserted that streetcar accidents had 
increased nationwide from 1919-21. 21                
By January 1921, unions were strong enough in Detroit and Philadelphia to block 
use of single-conductor streetcars in their respective suburbs.  Some cities, such as 
Minneapolis, only employed these models in downtown areas.  However, many Southern 
cities, such as Mobile, Alabama found these new streetcars quite profitable.  In the 
Carolina Piedmont, Southern Public Utilities introduced their first single-operator 
vehicles as far back as 1916.  According to Loy Cloninger, his older brother, J.L. 
Cloninger, took charge of the first one-man car in Charlotte.  Wartime labor shortages 
accelerated the need for faster, more efficient streetcars, especially after the establishment 
of Camp Greene, where SPU had built a terminal extension to serve hundreds of young 
officers and thousands of enlisted men visiting Charlotte during the weekends. 22    
By December 1918, the South Carolina town of Anderson had totally replaced 
their older two-man cars with newer models.  Mayor Foster Fant believed that “no good 
end [could] be attained by a return to the old type of cars,” while a local attorney, H.H. 
Watkins discounted complaints from larger cities, where loading and unloading 
passengers often required a motorman as well as a conductor.  After the 1919 strike, 
Charlotte and Winston-Salem introduced “one-man safety cars,” designed for safer stops 
and loading procedures.  These went into effect in January 1920, with Dilworth 
predictably receiving the first improvements.  Eight cars covered the First and Fourth 
Ward lines through Dilworth, with only five-minute layovers.  Among the drivers 
selected for this new route were G.L. Cloninger and Jesse Ashe.  Twelve other cars were 
                                                 
     21 Motorman and Conductor, January 1921, 7-8.  
     22 Cloninger, 2-3; Mitchell and Perzel, 2-7. 
97 
 
divided evenly between the Winston-Salem and Greenville lines.  Proponents believed 
these one-man safety cars would save the electric streetcar industry. 23   
Instead, this measure merely staved off the inevitable decline, as new modes of 
transportation eclipsed the trolley.  The proliferation of automobiles, taxis, and 
motorbuses, plus the advent of quasi-legal jitney services, all led to a decline in street 
railways.  Moreover, as the automobile became a symbol of middle-class prosperity and 
perceived independence, streetcar suburbs and trolleys no longer had the same 
respectability they once enjoyed before the war.24   
*      *      * 
Throughout the immediate post-war year of 1919, the AASERE continued its 
nationwide campaign for national influence.  Winning hearts and minds proved more 
difficult in the post-war Carolinas.  Despite federal support and acknowledgement, the 
Amalgamated‟s recognition in traditionally hostile regions like the Carolinas still hinged 
upon boardroom decisions and public opinion.25  Isolated victories aside, the Carolina 
Piedmont remained unchallenged by AASERE organizers.  Without an apparatus to link 
Asheville to Columbia, these gains would remain islands in a hostile sea.  For a truly 
successful campaign, the union required more cities to organize their streetcar lines, 
creating a stronger regional network of disciplined municipal labor unions, capable of 
controlling emotional impulses, such as “wildcat” strikes and vandalism.     
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However, establishing such labor unions required compromises with utility 
corporations and traction companies that seldom were forthcoming.  Throughout the 
country, many businessmen resisted organized labor, despite their contributions toward 
the war effort.  Union memberships flourished during wartime, but new employer 
associations also proliferated.  Chattanooga‟s Manufacturers Association had many 
counterparts across America, so-called “unions against unions.”  William Millikan used 
this term to describe professional strikebreakers in Northern industrial sectors such as 
Detroit and Minneapolis.  However, Southern textile mills could also rely on professional 
strikebreakers who used intimidation, vandalism, and deadly force.26  
As wartime cooperation with the government waned, corporations saw a grand 
chance to break the unions.  As the nation‟s brief spurt of wartime productivity wound 
down, consumer prices skyrocketed.  Congress prematurely ended price controls, further 
compounding the situation.  Following the dissolution of the National War Labor Board 
in August 1919, corporations no longer felt obligated to negotiate over union recognition 
or wage increases.  Under the so-called “American Plan,” major corporations breathed 
new life into the old “open-shop” gospel, blaming unions for the economic downturn.  As 
a lame duck, Wilson‟s wartime policies had already alienated conservative voters, 
evidenced by the Democratic Party‟s losses in Congress in November 1918.  By late 
1919, distracted by his physically exhausting battle for the League of Nations, Wilson 
seemingly placed less emphasis on the conditions of labor in America.27   
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To be fair toward President Wilson, he did not totally ignore the plight of 
American workers as he strove for peace in Versailles.  Labor Secretary William B. 
Wilson remained in contact with his chief executive, concerned about the “strained 
conditions” and anti-union hostility in the public transportation sphere.  On May 15, 
President Wilson approved the creation of a Washington conference on the state of U.S. 
electric railways, moderated by John H. Pardee, presiding officer of the American 
Electric Railway Association.  Given the receiverships and mounting strikes after the 
war, both the traction companies and unions feared their way of life would soon end.  
Delegates from investment banks, state commissioners, and the mayors‟ league shared 
the same table as union members, but notably missing were representatives from major 
street railway and utility companies.  Perhaps the corporations sensed that not everything 
said in Washington that summer would be to their liking.  However, Southern Public 
Utilities Magazine dutifully reported the proceedings, as did Motorman and Conductor.  
Both were very selective in their quotations from the proceedings and reports, adding 
choice editorial comments in regard to the speakers and their conclusions.28      
This railway conference began on July 15, and lasted until August 11.  Former 
President William Howard Taft spoke first.  As Joint Chairman of the National War 
Labor Board in 1918, Taft described his official position as a neutral conciliator who 
settled industrial disputes without strikes or lockouts.  Taft acknowledged the wartime 
authority of Congress to raise streetcar fares, usually regulated by state and local 
officials.  While Taft felt the public had to make sacrifices in order to ensure labor‟s 
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cooperation, he felt raising the car fares actually hurt consumers more than utility 
increases.  Rates above seven cents would hurt consumers as well as businesses 
themselves.  Since most traction companies were outgrowths of municipal utility 
corporations, Taft argued these businesses should find more equitable means of making 
up for their losses.  On the subject of pay, he felt peacetime rates should be decided by 
the companies, but wages should not be decreased.29 
Harlow Clark, editor of the American Electric Railway Association magazine, 
Aera, believed merely increasing fares would not restore lost credit.  Operation costs 
were becoming more expensive by the month.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine listed 
48 companies in receivership during 1919 alone, with 53 U.S. cities already charging ten 
cents. While SPU blamed federal control during 1917-18 for beginning this decline in 
revenue, their own mathematical figures indicate these problems began as early as 1915, 
when investment bonds tripled.  In 1914, only 10 traction companies reported losses.  But 
over the next year, 27 streetcar lines fell into receivership – two years before the U.S. 
entered the war.  Moreover, 1909 through 1913 had also been poor years, with 1910 
reporting over $75 million in debts against $12 million in profits.30 
Other distinguished speakers weighed in concerning the solvency of streetcar 
services. Secretary of War Newton Baker, prior to his political appointment, had served 
under – then succeeded – Tom L. Johnson as Cleveland mayor during that city‟s 
disastrous 1908 street railway strike that led to Johnson‟s removal.  Baker helped 
establish one of the first successful “service-at-cost” street railway systems – the Taylor 
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Franchise.  In practice, a company would put its entire property up for collateral in 
exchange for investments.  Banks would risk 6 percent of the total property‟s worth in 
order to bolster the traction service.  Fares were regulated depending on actual cost of 
operations, plus the 6 percent capital.  This operational method appealed even to 
moderate conservatives like Taft, who believed “service-at-cost” could counter pleas for 
public ownership – viewed by many as one step removed from socialism.31   
However not everyone in the ranks of labor shared the same enthusiasm for the 
Taylor Franchise.  Motorman and Conductor, for example, believed that keeping fares at 
the lowest possible rate would also act as an incentive to keep employee wages at a 
similar level.  Public ownership and profit-sharing enterprises appealed more broadly to 
AASERE members.  One of the more cogent – and controversial – public ownership 
proposals became known as the Plumb Plan, named for its chief proponent, Glenn T. 
Plumb.  Author of Industrial Democracy, Plumb represented labor organizations during 
the war, becoming a popular speaker at labor rallies.   Plumb argued for the continuance 
of government management of railways, which popular historian Eliot Asinof later 
alleged “turned chaos into order.”  One New York City franchise expert, Delos F. 
Wilcox, told the Washington committee that continued municipal control, if not 
ownership, would be the only solution for saving street railways.  By contrast, AFL 
leaders, including Samuel Gompers, feared this step would invite charges of Bolshevism.  
Gompers opposed endorsement of Plumb‟s proposal during the AASERE‟s June 1919 
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convention.  However, William Mahon changed his opinion toward public ownership and 
halfheartedly endorsed the Plumb Plan, perhaps as a gesture toward union solidarity.32  
In August 1919, the Motorman and Conductor began featuring a subscription to 
the Plumb Plan League, proposing “railroads shall be managed by human beings for 
human beings,” instead of solely for profit.  Despite opposition to the plan, Samuel 
Gompers even consented to become its honorary president.  Acting as a lobby for 
government ownership, the Plumb Plan League convinced lawmakers to incorporate the 
railway plan into the Sims Bill in late 1919.  However, Plumb‟s proposal met with defeat 
during Congressional hearings in early 1920. 33 
The Lower Carolina Piedmont appears to have split over the question of public 
ownership for street railways.  In one Columbia, South Carolina, newspaper, Frederick J. 
Haskin cited the period‟s high bankruptcy rates in public service companies as a 
“casualty of war.”  While Haskin did not begrudge the streetcar union‟s drive for higher 
wages, he lamented the companies being forced to raise their fares, prompting 
unpopularity among those citizens unable to afford cars.  Haskin‟s solution to South 
Carolina‟s street railway crisis resembled the Plumb Plan in most particulars, except it 
relied upon state, rather than federal oversight.  Charles Henry, editor of the Columbia 
Labor Advocate, deemed the Plumb Plan too radical for his tastes.  However, he urged 
Railroad and Streetcar brotherhoods to propose a “more understandable and realistic” 
government plan.  More indicative of the Upcountry‟s mood, newspaper editor Calvin 
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Hemphill of Spartanburg avowed total opposition to the Plumb Plan or “service-at-cost” 
franchises.  Marrying labor radicalism to proposed federal control, one unsigned 
Greenville editorialist warned his readers to “get ready for a strike to force government 
ownership,” because railroad labor organizations were prepared to use “other means” 
than persuasion.34   
Most corporations, including Southern Power, printed refutations of government 
ownership in their company publications.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine featured 
editorials from such notable anti-labor apostles as Boston governor Calvin Coolidge and 
Seattle mayor Ole Hanson.  These impassive figures, like James B. Duke and his 
corporate lieutenants, were opposed to public ownership, as well as “service-at-cost” 
plans.  After all, Duke‟s ventures had done pretty well during the war.  Thus, Southern 
Public Utilities aligned itself against organized labor and post-war reforms.  However, 
during the war years, SPU offered incremental pay raises to offset the increasing costs of 
living.  Between October 1, 1916 and August 1, 1919, the company boasted an aggregate 
wage increase of more than 100 percent.  Moreover, Taylor promised future pay 
increases for 1920, subject to revenue improvements.35    
Initially, Southern Public Utilities streetcar workers did not openly question 
Taylor‟s economic arguments.  Some of Taylor‟s men were perhaps swayed by a 
November 1918 appeal to “revival” among its workers.  However, this same company 
editorial autocratically stressed servility and deference, traits which seemed out of place 
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in a nation so recently devoted to battle for democracy. 36   As post-war economic 
troubles mounted across the Carolina Piedmont, Southern Public Utilities streetcarmen 
and electricians commenced a quiet rebellion, which eventually led to open war with their 
employers by the summer of 1919.   
*     *     * 
What conditions helped convince the streetcar workers of the Piedmont-
Upcountry to unionize?  After the November Armistice, returning servicemen almost 
invariably found their prior jobs had been filled by men who did not serve overseas.    
Immediately, the AASERE launched campaigns to win veterans over to unionism, 
stressing trade unionism‟s altruistic motives toward war veterans.  The Motorman and 
Conductor decried the “returned soldier problem” as a means for post-war “open-shop” 
exploitation.  Indeed, many non-union manufacturing plants had closed down in late 
1918, rather than permit the return of unionized workers.  When these factories reopened 
for a peacetime economy in 1919, they began hiring unemployed veterans at reduced 
wages, stressing “patriotic preference.”
37 
Union rhetoric, however, only played a modest part in convincing Carolina 
Piedmont workers to organize.  As a field ambulance driver who served in four Western 
Front campaigns, Jesse B. Ashe later admitted Southern Public‟s low wages had been a 
primary factor in his decision to join the streetcar union.  To Zebulon Taylor‟s own 
credit, Southern Public re-employed some returning veterans, including Ashe.  Even so, 
disappointment continued to foment unhappiness among many streetcar workers.  Ashe, 
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at thirty-two years, still lived in a boarding house on short commons, with little hope of 
marriage, and even less hope for home ownership.38 
After the war, an aura of quasi-militarism also seems to have penetrated Southern 
Public Utilities.  Zebulon Taylor utilized wartime rhetoric against unionism, appealing to 
wartime duty and obligation on one hand, while simultaneously condemning union 
organizers as traitors.  Uniformed streetcar workers competed in safety drill teams led by 
captains, first lieutenants, and second lieutenants.  These teams were rewarded for their 
drills with cash rewards totaling over $1,000; although the captains and lieutenants 
received most of the cash.  Fifty-five streetcar employees boasted honorable service 
records, but perhaps not everyone enjoyed replicating Army life in the civilian sphere, 
especially now that their wartime duties were concluded.39   
Union sickness benefits and widow relief programs may also have appealed to 
Southern Public workers in a decade punctuated by the Great Influenza.  October 1918 
brought the epidemic to Charlotte.  Conductor A.T. Hamlet died of pneumonia after 
suffering from the virus.  Over twenty other conductors and motormen reported illnesses, 
some affecting entire families.  One SPU machinist, R.L. Crosby, tragically lost two of 
his three children to the rampant illness.  Another employee lost a newborn son due to 
complications.  Quarantines left most SPU workers short about two weeks of pay.  Even 
as late as February 1920, several motormen still reported attacks of influenza.40      
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By late spring of 1919, the South faced an unemployment crisis, with South 
Carolina suffering particularly hard times.  Columbia and Spartanburg‟s streetcar 
employees were both adjudged poor in morale and efficiency by regional newspapers.  
Charleston reported about 400 unemployed industrial workers; in Columbia, more than 
1,000 mill-hands and mechanics were out of work.  Federal offices were so overwhelmed 
that they closed briefly during the summer.  Spartanburg‟s Journal and Carolina Spartan 
further speculated that many unemployed workers were returning “Negro” veterans, who 
met with redoubled Jim Crow prejudices on their return from the Great War.  Job 
competition fueled racial tensions.  During one eighteen-month period, from January 
1918 to June 1919, the Tuskegee Institute Records and Research Department reported 
seventy blacks lynched across the South.41  
How did national trends, characterized by the “Red Summer” of race riots in 
Chicago, affect the Carolina Piedmont?  Southern conservatives blamed racial conflicts 
on Bolshevik subversion.  South Carolina progressives, like Richard Manning and James 
F. Byrnes, were not immune to such fears.  Senator Lee S. Overman of North Carolina 
also saw putative connections between Bolshevism and race riots.  Meanwhile, Ku Klux 
Klan activity increased in the Upper South.  In June 1919 alone, South Carolina 
witnessed one lynching, while North Carolina reported two documented cases.42 
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Yet race played a surprisingly peripheral role in the Piedmont streetcar strikes, 
primarily because none of the employers brought in African-American replacements.  
White streetcar workers in the South zealously protected their jobs against so-called black 
“scabs,” as evidenced by the conduct of Chattanooga workers in 1917.  In New Orleans, 
African-Americans were able to qualify for conductor jobs, but this trend does not seem 
to have spread across the South.  White shopmen and electricians openly supported the 
Southern Public Utilities strike of 1919, but no evidence suggests participation from 
black shopmen.  Moreover, black mill workers did not show open sympathy for either 
Spartanburg or Columbia‟s streetcar strikes.  If this had been the case, both corporations 
and newspapers would have described these situations in racial, rather than Red Scare, 
terminology.  Moreover, returning black veterans had more problems than unemployment 
facing them.  Blacks were outraged by conservative implications that they were witless 
tools of the Bolsheviks.  One African Methodist Episcopal bishop, Charles H. Philips, 
stated in the Carolina Spartan that race riots, while detrimental to “peace and harmony,” 
were independent from the Bolshevist revolution.   One regional newspaper, the Star of 
Zion, claimed in “The Negro and Bolshevism” that “the Negro will be kept immune” 
from labor agitators once the issues of “lynching and burning” were resolved.43  
Inevitably, white workers fared better than blacks, even during the post-war 
economic tailspin.  North Carolina streetcar employees were listed on paper as improving 
economically due to wartime wages, averaging 48 percent increases by 1919.  North 
Carolina required all railway work shifts to match the Federal standard of eight hours.  
Union pay scales were encouraged for all employees, including textile mill hands.  
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However, such gains were seriously offset by cost of living increases, which averaged 
about 104 percent in North Carolina alone.  Nationwide, food expenses had risen 84 
percent since 1914, while clothing increased 114 percent.  By 1920, Charlotte became the 
most expensive city in the Piedmont.  Annual food costs for a Charlotte working-class 
family amounted to $772.20, with average yearly rents at $45.07.44   
Ultimately, American involvement in World War I did not last nearly long 
enough to seriously challenge longstanding social order in the “Solid South.”  While the 
Great War certainly expanded the growth of Charlotte and other Piedmont towns, 
peacetime meant business as usual.  Historian David Carlton concludes that the future 
belonged to Piedmont industrial towns, with their vision of a “well-organized, rationally-
run” society.  Fellow historian Allen Tullos echoes this perception, citing Duke Power‟s 
promotional literature distributed across North Carolina.  Duke‟s answer to abject rural 
poverty in the Piedmont lay with the recruitment and urbanization of “racially pure” old 
pioneer stock, a Southern “yeomanry” unhampered by “un-American ideas.”45   
Such language appealed to many Piedmont entrepreneurs, and it also resonated 
among white Protestant workers.  While most laborers certainly desired better wages and 
prospects, many were swayed by arguments of company loyalty and local protectionism.  
Powerful, influential men capitalized on these workers‟ doubts by promoting their 
mistrust of federal interference and Northern labor agitation.  From Spartanburg to 
Charlotte, these prejudices hardened during World War I, posing a challenge to the 
region‟s fledgling union chapters in 1919. 
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Chapter 5:  Grant Us a Contract 
 
In June 1919, the AASERE General Executive Board sent Albert Essex Jones to 
organize Spartanburg‟s street railway employees.  Despite a decade of union leadership 
experience in Ohio, Albert Jones lacked regional knowledge of the South and knew even 
less about the people he sought to assist.  Jones, widely perceived as an outsider to the 
Carolina Piedmont, now faced the challenge of winning Spartanburg‟s conservative 
leaders over to the side of organized labor.  His arrival in Spartanburg augured a summer 
of labor controversy, beginning with Spartanburg‟s streetcar strike of July 1919.   
Over the Fourth of July weekend, labor organizers from two chapters of the 
American Federation of Labor led a strike against South Carolina Light, Power, and 
Railways, a subsidiary of Southern Power‟s utility empire.  This strike opened a wider 
regional dialogue on organized labor, encompassing textile, transportation, and electrical 
workers.  A closer examination of the events in Spartanburg suggests the eventual 
rejection of labor unions in the Carolina Piedmont was never a foregone conclusion.  
Spartanburg‟s two newspapers, the conservative Journal & Carolina Spartan and its 
progressive rival, the Spartanburg Herald, provide a gauge of sentiments, from outright 
scorn to cautious tolerance.  Equally important, the Spartanburg strike triggered a bitter 
contest for the unionization of the region‟s most powerful corporate structure.  Although 
James B. Duke remained elusive, his invisible hand still guided the larger events of 
Piedmont industry.  Meanwhile, Duke‟s partner, Zebulon V. Taylor, watched the 
unfolding events at South Carolina Light, Power, and Railways with deep concern.   
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Streetcar strikes were the last thing on Duke‟s mind that summer, as he quietly 
attended the third annual Southern Textile Exposition, held in Greenville.  None other 
than his close ally, Benette E. Geer presided over this week-long event, just before the 
Spartanburg strike demanded his talents.  In all, 40,000 attendees came to the recently 
unveiled Textile Exposition Hall.  Southern Power funded much of the $225,000 to build 
this structure, which included a huge auditorium and two levels for exhibitions.46 
Benette Eugene Geer‟s participation in the Spartanburg strike is significant, 
principally because of his close relationship with James B. Duke and Southern Power.  
Little has been written about Geer, apart from L.M. Glenn‟s hagiographical treatment.  
As mentioned in the second chapter, Geer shared common business interests with Duke.  
But Geer also operated independently, evidenced by his leadership in the Cotton Textile 
Institute.  This lobbyist organization sought to protect textile mill owners from regulatory 
efforts in Washington – just the sort of collective bargaining rights many Piedmont 
employers sought to deny their workers.47 
Despite his alignment with the forces of capital, Geer also enjoyed a reputation 
for diplomacy and moderation that made his participation integral to a strike settlement.   
Geer would doubtless benefit from a prompt resolution of the transit deadlock because he 
owned Pacific Mills in Spartanburg, whose employees often relied on the SCLP&R 
streetcars.  As sitting president of the Spartanburg Commercial Association, Geer‟s 
influence could make or break the union‟s chances in the “City of Success.”
48            
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Between 1910 and 1920, Spartanburg grew steadily from 17,517 to 22,638 
inhabitants.  Four major railroads converged at this Upcountry city, including Duke‟s 
Piedmont & Northern electric railway.  One factor in this railway hub‟s growth was 
Camp Wadsworth, but its impact was fleeting.  Like many of the Southern military bases 
established during the Great War, Camp Wadsworth dried up following the Armistice.  
Nevertheless, its presence doubtless accelerated the Piedmont‟s urbanization.
49   
Spartanburg County‟s thirty or so textile mills had felt economic jolts throughout 
the war.  Spartanburg, alongside Greenville and Anderson, launched South Carolina‟s 
textile industry during the 1880s.  Converse Mill, one of the largest in the nation, began 
its eighty-year lifespan in 1892.  Wartime contracts brought prosperity to mill owners, if 
not their workers.  Spartanburg later benefited from the decline of Northern textile mills.  
Overproduction and labor disputes forced many mill owners to transfer assets to the 
Piedmont, renowned for its anti-union sentiment.  For decades afterward, Spartanburg 
became known as the “Lowell of the South.”  Ten unincorporated mill towns orbited the 
county seat, connected by a series of roads, and significantly, trolley lines.50 
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These trolley lines were owned and controlled by South Carolina Light, Power, 
and Railways (SCLP&R).  Originally the Spartanburg Railway, Gas, and Electric 
Company, this mid-sized corporation had managed for years to remain independent of 
Duke‟s Southern Power, operating twenty-one track miles leading from Spartanburg to 
the mill towns of Clifton, Glendale, and Saxon.  This independent status changed after 
June 12, 1912, when SCLP&R became a subsidiary of Southern Power in all but name.51 
Franklin H. Knox (1864-1936), described by editor J. Calvin Hemphill as a “brass 
tacks booster,” served as both general manager and senior vice-president for SCLP&R.  
Originally from Pennsylvania, Knox remained a bachelor at age 55, living with his elder 
brother, William, who acted as company purchasing agent.  Franklin Knox also backed 
Spartanburg community projects, such as a memorial park for fallen South Carolina 
soldiers.  Usually well-liked by Spartanburg citizens, Knox could, nonetheless, be 
paternalistic toward his men, as well as contradictory in his public dealings with 
Spartanburg and the streetcar union.52                                    
Doubtless, Knox expected many Spartanburg businessmen would share his 
opposition to labor unions.  Foremost among these local leaders, J. Calvin Hemphill 
served as managing editor of the Journal and Carolina Spartan.  Hemphill and his wife 
Rebecca lived in a rented townhouse located in the city‟s Second Ward.  At 68, Hemphill 
represented “old” Spartanburg‟s views toward states‟ rights and organized labor.  
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and Spartanburg County, South Carolina (Nashville, Tennessee:  Brandon Printing, 
1903).     
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Hemphill had only recently crowed over labor leader Eugene V. Debs‟s imprisonment in 
Atlanta for protesting the war.  Hemphill also praised hardliner mayors who forbade 
unions from congregating within city limits, comparing Spartanburg‟s John F. Floyd to 
the infamous Seattle demagogue, Ole Hanson.53      
According to one Palmetto historian, South Carolina‟s city mayors at this time 
were endowed with the same powers as a police court magistrate.  This authority 
governed the passage of town ordinances and declarations of emergency, placing Mayor 
John Floyd in a strong position of authority to block labor unions from meeting in 
Spartanburg – despite the fact such laws violated the Constitutional right to peaceful 
assembly.  Floyd certainly had the wherewithal and clout to use such magisterial powers.  
During the Great War, Floyd also served as president of Spartanburg‟s Chamber of 
Commerce, negotiating valuable contracts for Camp Wadsworth.  Floyd also had a 
reputation for strictness and forthrightness.  However, given Mayor Floyd‟s reputation as 
a foe of organized labor, some of his gestures during the forthcoming strike reveal a more 
complex figure than Hemphill‟s description might lead one to expect.
54 
But not all in Spartanburg shared such prevalent anti-union views.  Calvin 
Hemphill‟s rival, Charles Oscar Hearon of the Spartanburg Herald, took a somewhat 
different tone.  Hearon, at age forty-one, represented the “new” South Carolina.  
Originally from Virginia, Hearon earned Spartanburg‟s respect for his tireless service, 
alongside Mayor John B. Floyd, as a major wartime booster for both Spartanburg and 
Camp Wadsworth.  The Hearons owned a house on Marion Street, where the editor and 
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his wife Belle raised four school-age children.  His newspaper once advocated the 
“mutual advantage” of its long-standing relationship with Spartanburg‟s Typographical 
Union.  Hearon‟s support for skilled laborers is well-documented, although his feelings 
toward the region‟s unskilled mill workers seem less clear.
55 
However, Charles O. Hearon consistently demonstrated Progressive values 
throughout the Spartanburg strike.  The Spartanburg Herald stood for the public interest, 
which its editor held separately from business or labor concerns.  Hearon also 
championed consumerism, efficiency, and public safety.  While hailing Franklin Knox as 
a “considerate gentleman,” Hearon criticized Spartanburg street railways as “one of the 
most unsatisfactory services in [this] city.”  Serving on the city council, Hearon had 
previously voted against the company‟s request for higher streetcar fares.  Hearon‟s paper 
further cited the SCLP&R‟s lack of progressive spirit, of good equipment, and of trained, 
well-paid men.  Moreover, Knox‟s company had failed to yield annual profits except 
during the previous year, owing to traffic from Camp Wadsworth.  Hearon further 
suggested a municipal study of the company‟s streetcar problems, in order to suggest 
reforms that would mutually benefit the company, its workers, and the public.56  
By June 1919, the SCLP&R‟s traction services in Spartanburg had become 
notorious for poor working conditions.  D.L. Goble of the electricians‟ union spoke at the 
Temple of Justice on behalf of streetcar workers as well as electrical employees.57   
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Goble, originally from Dallas, Texas, played a leading role throughout the campaign to 
mobilize trade unions in the Carolinas.  On 16 June, he decried the treatment of the 
SCLP&R‟s forty car-men, who were “treated worse than prisoners in any state.”  Goble 
attributed low worker morale to “speedups:” grueling twelve-hour shifts, for which a car-
man received no more than $24 weekly.  Nor was Goble alone in such condemnations.  
State Senator W.S. Rogers and local solicitor Ibra Blackwood gave their support to these 
statements.  This convergence of organized labor and local opinion suggests that not 
every South Carolinian characterized unionization as the chief tool of Bolshevism.58   
With thousands of visitors coming to the Piedmont, rebellious streetcar workers 
could prove an embarrassment to the region‟s power-brokers.  In this tense atmosphere, 
the Amalgamated Association decided to launch its campaign to unionize the Piedmont 
and Upcountry transit workers.  Several chapters had already been organized throughout 
the region, as noted in previous chapters.  But streetcar workers in the South were 
especially hard hit by the ongoing economic slump, owing to low pay scales and hard 
hours.  While the national Street Railway Commission in Washington still deliberated 
over possible reforms, hundreds of streetcar men across the Carolinas took 
encouragement from union leaders on the front lines. 
One of these front-liners, Albert Essex Jones (1874-1962) figures prominently 
throughout Spartanburg and Charlotte‟s respective strikes.  Jones had been a lifelong 
citizen of Cincinnati, Ohio, where he served as president of Division 627, which 
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consisted of 400 conductors and 128 motormen.  Twice married, Jones had lost his first 
wife, Irene, in childbirth.  Remarried by 1917, Albert Jones‟s familial status and 
approaching middle age precluded him from military service.  However, Jones‟s 
dedicated wartime union service earned him a promotion to Ohio‟s special organizer, 
responsible for preventing violent confrontations across the state.59   
From available records, it appears that Jones was a sincere crusader for 
workingmen‟s rights, with a gift for oratory matched by a fierce combative streak.  One 
whimsical picture from 1914 reveals a broad-shouldered, clean-shaven man in early 
middle age, posing next to a large doll meant as a contest prize for Cincinnati Street 
Railway‟s employee picnic.  Yet underneath such humor and generosity, Jones also had a 
quarrelsome side.  In September 1917, a local rival questioned Jones‟s integrity as 
Division 627 president.  A quarrel ensued between the two union members, requiring the 
intercession of a special committee of peers, which promptly exonerated both litigants.  
Such a penchant for controversy could not have improved Albert Jones‟s standing in 
Cincinnati.  By early 1918, Jones had left his union chapter to become a full-time 
organizer, coordinating a new union chapter in Columbus, Ohio.  Shortly afterward, the 
AASERE sent Jones to aid new organizations in the Appalachian and Piedmont regions.60  
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In late June, Albert Jones conferred with C.E. Diltz, spokesman for the aggrieved 
SCLP&R workers.  Resultantly, Division 897 of the AASERE formally drafted its charter 
on June 25, 1919, with H.E. Sitton serving as first president of the Spartanburg chapter.61  
Nevertheless, Franklin Knox considered this union‟s charter as an act of disloyalty.  
During the third week of June, the company director fired one worker, R.L. Kitchins, on 
charges of union activity.  But if Knox had hoped to make an example to discourage 
unionization, he instead created yet another grievance among his workers.  During the 
first round of negotiations on July 1, 1919, Kitchins‟s co-workers requested that Knox 
reinstate the discharged man at his prior level of seniority.62   
Spartanburg‟s transit workers officially declared a strike at midnight on July 2, 
after their first negotiation with Knox failed to yield concessions.  Chapter 897 sought a 
new wage scale of thirty-seven cents to forty-one cents hourly, depending upon seniority.  
Workers had also requested a nine-hour shift to replace grueling “speedups” lasting 
eleven and a half hours.  These terms were quite modest compared to suggested federal 
standards.  President John Pardee of the American Electric Railway Association argued 
in Washington for overall pay hikes of one hundred percent in order to encourage striking 
workers to return to their cars. 63   
The sticking point, however, lay with Knox‟s staunch refusal to officially grant 
his workers the right of collective bargaining.  On this point, Knox characteristically 
masked his iron resolve behind cautious, sometimes ambiguous statements.  On the 
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strike‟s first day, Knox told Journal and Carolina Spartan reporters he would not 
recognize “forced demands” from labor unions.  However, Knox offered to eliminate 
“split runs” in favor of two nine-hour shifts per day.  Union members described this 
concession as one of Knox‟s longstanding promises that he had never honored.  On July 
3, Knox replaced his striking motormen with new recruits and transferred personnel from 
the sheds.  Maintenance crewmen were not covered by AASERE, so they were under no 
expectations to strike. But there were too few remaining skilled men to staff the streetcars 
in operation for the Fourth of July.  Knox‟s streetcar foreman and freight manager had 
already joined the union.  Eight more workers defected to Division 897 over the 
weekend.  While Knox took a brief vacation, only three trolley-men were available for 
work.  Since Knox could not run streetcars anyway, he pointedly gave these “loyal” 
workers the day off.64        
Division 897 did not take this snub lightly.  A.E. Jones stated publicly that the 
Amalgamated did not intend to attack business outright.  Instead, his organization sought 
to compromise with the company on behalf of workers.  He stated that his union‟s goal 
was a “fair living wage” for each one of its members.  South Carolina‟s Central Labor 
Union, a federation of local trade unions, endorsed Division 897.  According to the 
Journal and Carolina Spartan, many Spartanburg citizens either walked or got a lift 
during the Independence Day celebration.65  
One form of blue-collar protest against the streetcar company developed out of 
necessity.  The Spartanburg Herald noted the use of “jitneys” to convey workers to their 
jobs.  Such impromptu car-pools might remind present-day observers of municipal “ride-
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share” programs.  Strike sympathizers across the United States often rode “jitney” 
transports to boycott streetcar lines raising their fares or employing “scab” replacements.  
In several cases across the United States, transit corporations and private citizens actually 
filed injunctions against such activities, citing a spike in traffic accidents. 66   
Unfortunately for Spartanburg County, the SCLP&R‟s inter-urban lines only 
connected to three communities:  the unincorporated mill towns of Clifton and Glendale, 
as well as the incorporated town of Saxon.  Eight other mill towns in the county at large 
were not serviced by the SCLP&R, so their interest in the strike would have been 
minimal at best.  Thus, the actual impact of jitney travel on the Spartanburg strike of 
1919 is difficult to ascertain.  Nonetheless, textile mill workers comprised the vanguard 
of strike sympathizers during the AASERE campaign of 1919-22.67   
The two main – and rival – city newspapers reacted promptly to the forced 
cessation of streetcar service.  J.C. Hemphill of the conservative Journal and Carolina 
Spartan preferred compromise to confrontation, and suggested that shift changes would 
improve both public safety and employee morale.  However, the editor doubted whether 
the SCLP&R could afford any government-mandated wage hike – Hemphill neglected to 
mention that federal standards were far higher than the modest rates expected by the 
Spartanburg car-men.  Hemphill vehemently remained opposed to all reforms smacking 
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of government oversight or state ownership, such as the aforementioned Plumb Plan. 68  
Hemphill‟s subscribers did not unanimously agree with his sentiments.  On July 6, his 
newspaper printed a caustic letter from R.E. Tillotson, an employee of the Southern 
Railways Company.  Tillotson voiced frustration toward loyal SCLP&R workers who 
remained on the job.  He also addressed the company‟s refusal to recognize the local 
streetcar union, characterizing “Mister Knocks” as the opponent of labor.  Although 
Hemphill did not deign to comment, the Journal and Carolina Spartan held fast 
throughout the strike.69  
Charles O. Hearon‟s Spartanburg Herald took a more tolerant approach toward 
labor. As previously mentioned, Hearon‟s newspaper operated in conjunction with 
Spartanburg‟s local typographical union.  Correspondents interviewed streetcar workers 
who revealed that Knox had fired several employees who had asked for back pay.  These 
men did not identify themselves, most likely over the real possibility of blacklisting.  
Hearon also criticized Mayor John Floyd for his perceived indifference to the strike.  But 
Floyd, whose anti-labor reputation we have already noted, deliberately chose to take 
neither side in the dispute.  Spartanburg‟s mayor also noted that if SCLP&R failed to run 
their streetcars within nine months, the company would violate its franchise with 
Spartanburg and go out of business.  Floyd also praised the orderly conduct of both 
strikers and company men.   City policemen reported only one incident over the holiday 
weekend, wherein a strikebreaker swore at two local citizens for calling him a scab.  The 
city government fined this replacement worker $5.85.70        
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In this manner, the Spartanburg Streetcar strike affected the city for an entire 
week, with virtually no streetcar service throughout the city.  Calvin Hemphill opined 
that the strike had become “more of an annoyance than a real problem.”  But the editor 
also warned union members that the public grew tired of the dispute.  Charles Hearon‟s 
column, entitled “Can‟t We End This Strike?” urged the members of Division 897 to give 
their company president‟s proposals another chance.  Hearon felt that the streetcar union, 
reliant upon “out of town” leadership, held the weaker position.  Therefore, the editor 
further exhorted the strikers to face reality by placing the public interest first in priority.71       
On the evening of July 10, Mayor John Floyd made a public-minded gesture of 
his own, by openly visiting Division 897 president H.E. Sitton, convalescing at home 
with appendicitis.  Despite his anti-labor reputation, Floyd seems to have understood the 
need for mediation.  Sitton and Floyd promptly scheduled a second conference for the 
next day, bringing company and union representatives to the bargaining table.72  
On July 12, Floyd and Knox met with AASERE organizer Jones and local union 
president H.E. Sitton.  Knox refused to acknowledge Jones as a spokesman, but offered 
Sitton a new wage schedule that the company established for replacement workers over 
the previous week.  Knox conditionally agreed to implement nine-hour workdays, as 
personnel would permit, but would not budge on collective bargaining.  Knox also 
pointedly refused to reinstate the discharged worker, R.L. Kitchins.  This meeting 
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concluded without any progress, as lines began to harden between Knox and his 
disgruntled employees.73   
Following this round of negotiations, Jones openly praised the mayor for “using 
his good offices” on behalf of the public trust.  The organizer asserted that Floyd had 
caught the company president in a prevarication during the hearings.  Knox had given 
one set of terms to Mayor Floyd during the preceding week, but his actual terms on July 
12 were substantially different.   The SCLP&R‟s new wage scale did not equal the first 
offer Knox made prior to the strike.  Moreover, in this new contract proposal, overtime 
wages and “time-and-a-half” guarantees were dropped altogether. 74   
These discrepancies fostered an atmosphere of mistrust throughout the summer.  
Jones further commented on Knox‟s past record, stating that his promises “looked very 
rosy, but never materialized.”  His fellow workers could not “sell their lives and very 
existence without the scratch of a pen to protect them.”  Jones reminded Knox that his 
“personal feelings” alone could not support families, and implored him to “grant us a 
contract … and we will start your cars before the ink is dry.”  If Knox persisted in his 
hostile course, Jones warned, “then [your] men will never operate them again.”
75  
Despite Jones‟s forthright vow, Knox continued to reject the mayor‟s requests for 
compromise with his striking workers.  Nor would the company recognize national labor 
organizations such as the AASERE.  Charles Hearon made a very perceptive summation 
                                                 
     73 Journal and Carolina Spartan, 12 July 1919, 1. 
     74 Journal and Carolina Spartan, 12 July 1919, 1, 8. We can assume Knox 
communicated with other traction companies and utility corporations. He might have 
been under pressure not to cave in to labor demands, because if SCLP&R made 
concessions, then other locals would demand the same of other companies. This is borne 
out by the fact that after SCLP&R settled the strike, Southern Public Utilities raised 
employee wages in an effort to forestall a similar strike in Charlotte.  
     75 Journal and Carolina Spartan, 12 July 1919, 1, 8.  
123 
 
in his editorial on July 12.  “In this present controversy,” the Herald editor observed, 
“unionism will rise and fall by the fate of the demand that the union be recognized.” 
Hearon also asserted that organized labor hitherto had failed to make headway in 
Southern states because “individualism… pride of family… and freedom of action” 
prevailed in their culture. But while “the average Southerner can take care of himself 
without organizations,” the Spartanburg Herald also speculated whether “increased 
industry [in the South] may well require better acceptance of organized labor.”76   
Spartanburg‟s now week-long transit strike subsequently drew the attention of 
Governor Robert Archer Cooper (1919-22).  Cooper had recently succeeded Richard I. 
Manning, but unlike his predecessor, the Laurens County native had not yet faced a 
serious labor dispute in South Carolina.  The incoming governor, while expressing 
empathy for “the man who toils,” failed to delineate his policy toward organized labor or 
collective bargaining.  Governor Cooper roundly condemned “Bolshevism, anarchy, and 
commercial greed.”   His remedy for these post-war evils lay with the “spirit of sacrifice 
and disinterested purpose” which he believed had guided the nation during wartime.
77     
More significantly, while Cooper called for “improved transportation facilities,” 
he did not imply public transportation, but private autos.  Highway constructions derived 
from state taxpayers became a hallmark of Governor Cooper‟s two terms.  As later 
chapters will elucidate, Cooper‟s road initiatives directly affected South Carolina‟s public 
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opinion toward traction corporations as well as transit workers.  But, in July 1919, 
Governor Cooper had a full-blown labor-capital crisis on his hands.78     
As a progressive, Governor Cooper favored conciliation between the company 
and union, which he promised to oversee personally in Spartanburg if the situation failed 
to improve.  Several citizens‟ groups with connections to Cooper had already registered 
their concerns with the governor‟s office.  Given the potential disruptions in textile mill 
production and public commerce, such opinions were not to be idly ignored.  Moreover, 
since South Carolina‟s establishment of a conciliation board in 1916, the state legislature 
had also granted wide subpoena powers to its governor-appointed arbitrators.  Cooper‟s 
statements came as a surprise to the major principals of Spartanburg‟s transit strike, who 
quickly resumed their conference on July 13.  During the negotiation, Knox proceeded to 
restore partial streetcar services by using his replacement workforce.79   
This fateful decision carried some consequence, as striking workers could lose 
their jobs to these alleged “scabs.”  Knox‟s replacements appear to have been a mixture 
of loyal company men and new hires.  The SCLP&R could not likely employ 
professional strikebreakers, trained more for intimidation than for industry.  Nonetheless, 
the company expected opposition from strike sympathizers, if not the strikers themselves.  
On July 13, Superintendent B.A. Buckheister, Knox‟s second-in-command, armed his 
streetcar crews with concealed handguns from an undisclosed private arsenal.80   
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Subsequently, three SCLP&R streetcars returned to the lines. Initially, no troubles 
arose from local strike sympathizers or union men.  But ill will gathered against union 
membership, as reported in the Greenville Daily News.  One unnamed correspondent 
attacked Jones as a “rank outsider,” who was bent on “making trouble between employer 
and employe[e].”  This critic of the Amalgamated Association also referred to the 
organizer‟s opening speech in Spartanburg, insisting that because Jones “gave [SCLP&R] 
the business,” he should be “run out of town as a nuisance.”  Significantly, this writer did 
express his support for a local streetcar union, but argued that it should answer to the 
community, not outsiders.  This unsigned editorialist likely meant either a company 
union, or perhaps a local employee representation plan, divorced from Northern, ergo 
“foreign” ties.
81  
As a so-called “foreigner,” Albert Jones did take considerable risks entering a city 
like Spartanburg, with its reputation for hostility toward union agitators.  Just three years 
before, Ben Commons, one of the AASERE‟s regional vice-presidents, suffered bodily 
injury in Memphis, Tennessee.  Streetcar workers in Memphis had just endured a lockout 
over union recognition.  Company strikebreakers assaulted the visiting union officer 
shortly after his arrival on June 27, 1916, openly striking him in a restaurant.  In the 
presence of Memphis policemen and a court justice, the Memphis company 
superintendent then warned Commons his assailants “would get him if he did not leave 
town.”  Subsequently, one of Ben Commons‟ escorts suffered serious injury from a 
blackjack-wielding ruffian, who was arrested and promptly released on bail.82             
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However, negotiations among Knox, Jones, and Floyd remained peaceful.  
Despite any inconveniences, Spartanburg‟s citizens could claim their town was working 
far better to resolve its labor strikes than Macon, Georgia.  Both newspapers covered 
Macon‟s streetcar strike, wherein 180 employees struck for wages, briefly paralyzing the 
entire Georgia city.  Neither editor wanted the same conditions to emerge in Spartanburg.  
Charles Hearon praised his own city government‟s “square-dealing” efforts to find a 
balance between company revenue and worker wages.83                
By July 14, the situation improved enough for the company to add a fourth car to 
service, even though Knox‟s new motormen were inexperienced.  Countywide rumors of 
greased tracks and derailed cars proved false, and no acts of violence were as yet reported 
anywhere in Spartanburg.  Perusal of Spartanburg County‟s criminal records indicates a 
spike in malicious damage arrests in June and July of 1919, but case details remain terse.  
Police officers seemed more concerned with prohibition violations and morals charges.  
While eight cases of criminal assault and battery were reported in July, none of these 
were connected with the streetcar lines outside Spartanburg.  Therefore, one can surmise 
that the ensuing violence of July 15 did not spread to the nearby textile mill towns.84     
On July 15, just before 6 pm, the first blows were exchanged aboard SCLP&R‟s 
Streetcar 32.  One hothead, Grady LeMaster, forcibly attempted to remove a replacement 
conductor from his post.  Both men were arrested for causing the affray, whereupon 
strikebreaker C.E. Edwards revealed that he was carrying a concealed handgun issued by 
Superintendent Buckheister.  Edwards and LeMaster paid their bonds, $66.50 and $15.75 
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respectively and went before Mayor Floyd to hear his verdicts.  Under Spartanburg‟s city 
statutes, mayors exercised the same powers as a magistrate within city limits.  Floyd‟s 
decision to uphold the company‟s right to issue firearms came as no surprise to those who 
knew his views.  LeMaster‟s actions vindicated everything opponents of labor associated 
with unionism.  While Floyd did not hold the streetcar union accountable for LeMaster‟s 
actions, he ruled that C.E. Edwards had the “same right as a constable” in the line of his 
duty. Although concealed weapon charges held a higher penalty than brawling, the mayor 
nonetheless fined the strike sympathizer, Grady LeMaster, $100.  85        
Worse violence occurred that same evening at Pine and Main Streets when 
another streetcar returned to its barn.  Local demonstrators halted the car and demanded 
to know if the operator or his two bodyguards were union supporters.  One of the 
strikebreakers, J.L. Brown, brandished a firearm, and fisticuffs ensued between the two 
opposing groups.  C.C. Crouch, the motorman on duty, was a fifteen-year employee who 
had refused to strike on July 2.  He suffered serious injuries and required hospital 
treatment.  Interviewed later in his hospital room, Crouch could only vaguely identify his 
attackers as “union men.”  Whether these unionists were Crouch‟s former co-workers 
remains unknown.  But Hemphill‟s editorial on 16 July implored the streetcar union to 
find and “turn out” Crouch‟s assailants.86     
Three Spartanburg policemen promptly arrested J.L. Brown for carrying a 
concealed handgun.  In the meantime, Superintendent B.A. Buckheister arrived on scene, 
brandishing his own firearm.  Officer Jack Alverson arrested Buckheister as well.  Mayor 
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Floyd acquitted the company official subsequently on precedents set by his July 15 ruling 
for C.E. Edwards.  Since SCLP&R employees were entitled to carry arms “as a 
constable,” Buckheister‟s case was clear, at least in Mayor Floyd‟s eyes.  Despite claims 
from witnesses who saw Buckheister draw the handgun from his coat, the superintendent 
firmly insisted that he had carried his gun openly, as he had expected trouble at the car-
barn.  Buckheister also threatened to charge his accusers with inciting the previous 
evening‟s riot.
87  
Vandalism escalated during the evening of July 15. Police cars drove to South 
Church Street to remove one automobile blocking the trolley line.  Edward Wooten was 
arrested for placing bricks upon the tracks and later fined.  Hundreds of townsfolk 
congregated following the incidents, but apart from the exchange of angry words, no 
further violence ensued.  The mayor subsequently stationed a police officer on each 
operational streetcar. Incidentally, one plainclothesman, Moss Hayes, registered strong 
objections to the use of police to guard company property, resigning after 15 years with 
the Spartanburg police. Evidently, some policemen at least sympathized with the local 
union.  But Hearon‟s newspaper later castigated the disobedient Hayes for “setting a 
dangerous precedent.”
88  
Undoubtedly, these problems convinced Governor Cooper to become personally 
involved in the local Spartanburg strike.  He appointed a mediation committee and 
mobilized fifty South Carolina reserve troops from Company F of the “Spartan Rifles.” 
Another military reserve company from Greenville remained on stand-by in case of 
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emergency.  Despite rumors of steam-plant sabotage, there were no more incidents.  
However, streetcar services were suspended until a compromise could be reached.89   
How did these small tremors of violence affect public opinion toward the 
AASERE?  Hearon pleaded for “sanity and resourcefulness” from all sides in the 
controversy. Furthermore, he warned that the union would lose “public sympathy” if 
recent incidents were to multiply during negotiations.  Perhaps, Hearon reasoned, the 
newly formed Spartanburg Commercial Association could “take the helm” of arbitration 
and thus avoid reliance on Governor Cooper‟s intervention.90  This suggestion appears 
consistent with local sentiments emphasizing independence and self-reliance in the face 
of any outside interference.  Moreover, Spartanburg did not want to experience a military 
intervention, such as those witnessed in the recent textile strikes at Greenville and 
Anderson.  While Governor Cooper had mobilized a token force, he preferred diplomacy 
as well.91  
On the evening of July 17, Governor Cooper convened a board consisting of five 
labor representatives, five company spokesmen, and twelve South Carolina arbitrators.  
Governor Cooper remained in Spartanburg as an observer.  Jones and Sitton directed the 
labor contingent, while Knox voiced company concerns.  Benette E. Geer, president of 
Spartanburg‟s Commercial Association, led the final negotiations.  For several hours, 
Geer‟s committee reviewed two contract proposals, one from each side.
92   
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Geer walked a delicate line as chief arbitrator.  As a major Upcountry booster, 
with manufacturing interests, he seems an unlikely champion of unionism.  Moreover, 
Geer had clashed with Governor Cooper‟s predecessor, Richard I. Manning, over state 
mill reforms.  On the other hand, Geer likely wished to resolve the city‟s streetcar crisis 
quickly before unionism spread to other segments of the Piedmont‟s working class.93   
Under pressure from the Spartanburg Commercial Association, Knox agreed to 
reinstate all striking employees, provided these men swore under oath they had no 
involvement in the July 15 disorder.  This new contract also retroactively covered R.L. 
Kitchens, the union activist who had been discharged prior to the strike.  Knox also 
promised a review process for employees and a wage schedule matching the union‟s 
earlier demands.  Senior employees would earn 42 cents hourly after five years of 
service.  Furthermore, Knox promised to organize two nine-hour shifts by August 15, and 
offered vacation days amounting to seventy-two hours each quarter.94   
However, Knox‟s agreement did not reflect a capitulation on the subject of union 
recognition.  Knox permitted his men to form local unions as long as they promised to 
remain loyal.  But Division 897 still lacked official standing.  Recognizing Knox‟s 
ambiguous terms as the best possible settlement, Jones agreed, as did the local chapter 
president, H.E. Sitton.  Public reaction to this settlement proved reassuring, as 
Spartanburg citizens began riding the trolleys once again. 95  Despite relatively minor 
incidents of hostility, Spartanburg had resolved its transit strike largely on its own terms.   
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While the AASERE did not gain outright legitimacy, its successful efforts on 
behalf of car-men were viewed as a potential threat to local authority.  Spartanburg‟s two 
major newspaper editors did not conceal their dislike of “outside interference” from 
either the state government or the AFL.  Despite the governor‟s decisive and careful use 
of state power, neither newspaper credited Cooper with hastening the resolution of July 
17, nor did they even mention him by name.  Hearon did congratulate the Spartanburg 
Commercial Association and praised both Knox and Sitton.  Moreover, neither 
newspaper gave favorable coverage to AASERE‟s organizer, Albert E. Jones.  Hemphill 
did make a sarcastically oblique reference to “imported talent” and suggested that local 
unions could resolve their problems without such “outside sympathizers.”  Yet, 
Hemphill‟s Carolina Spartan conceded Knox‟s initial hesitance to compromise had 
brought public “ill will” against the SCLP&R.  Greenville‟s newspaper issued a call for 
“compulsory arbitration” in all future strikes.  But after two weeks of the “hottest and 
sloppiest weather [in] the season,” Spartanburg could move forward.
96  
By July 19, Division 897‟s streetcar men were back on the job.  Newspapers 
reported some friction on the first day, as old employees were not always returned to their 
usual positions.  Knox promised to uphold the contract he had signed but also explained 
that changes would require patience and time.97  Shortly thereafter, local papers turned 
toward rising utility prices and race riots, two reigning news issues of post-war America. 
Emboldened by his unexpected success in Spartanburg, Albert Essex Jones 
traveled to Charlotte, where Knox‟s concessions had already sent shockwaves to 
Southern Public Utilities.  Streetcar workers comprised only one segment of James B. 
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Duke‟s Piedmont workforce, which included electricians and mechanics.  Yet, SPU‟s 
traction services also extended to Winston-Salem in North Carolina, as well as Greenville 
and Anderson in South Carolina.  SPU president Zebulon Taylor took pre-emptive steps 
to forestall union encroachment into Duke‟s empire.  On August 1, he gave substantial 
pay raises to all his streetcar employees, which served to divide their ranks in the coming 
strike.  Jones had decisively won the first skirmish in South Carolina; now, battle lines 
formed in Charlotte, where Jones entered a much larger forum than Spartanburg.98 
Spartanburg hosted the annual South Carolina labor conference on September 15.  
Given the state labor federation‟s relatively successful negotiations that July, its 
Secretary-Treasurer, John L. Davis, invited no less than Samuel L. Gompers himself.  
Governor Robert Cooper also planned to attend this significant labor meeting, in 
recognition of his largely unsung efforts to resolve Spartanburg‟s transit crisis.99 
John L. Davis presided over South Carolina‟s Federation of Labor meeting, hailed 
by the Columbia Labor Advocate as “the most successful ever.”  Governor Robert 
Cooper gave an address touching on the Spartanburg strike and the importance of 
arbitration.  South Carolina‟s labor contingent boldly endorsed the Plumb Plan as a 
solution to railroad receivership.  Union leaders more cautiously addressed “Negro 
unions,” favoring a Jim Crow approach, wherein blacks should be represented by their 
own State Federation and local chapters.  The few black unionists present at the meeting 
quickly stressed to their white counterparts that they “sought emulation only in an 
industrial sense.”  This statement is especially relevant in light of concurrent events.  
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Only that previous August, the Southern Labor Congress convened in Asheville, North 
Carolina, where SLC President Jerome Jones from Atlanta made a surprise endorsement 
of black laborers as equals to whites in terms of union representation.100 
More importantly, the Spartanburg streetcar strike occurred at the high watermark 
of labor activity in the Tri-City region.  Both Anderson and Greenville played roles in the 
Charlotte regional strike, despite eventual defeat for the movement.  Moreover, 
Spartanburg itself had changed since the war began.  Unions had indeed established a 
solid foothold.  By early 1920, Spartanburg‟s Central Labor Union had grown to include 
almost 20 chapters, jointly operating a co-op grocery store on South Liberty Street with 
$10,000 capital.  Union and non-union customers were treated equally in terms of prices, 
with business supervised by a nine-man board elected by the Central Labor Union.101 
In retrospect, the Spartanburg streetcar strike seems relatively modest in its local 
impact.  But it serves as a prelude to further strife across the Carolina Piedmont.  
Moreover, it encapsulates the major issues found in many Southern streetcar strikes 
throughout the time period.  The company‟s refusal to negotiate with the international 
union triggers a strike for better wages and treatment.  Inevitably, the city (or state) 
government is drawn into the debate, as local opinions clash over the presence of 
“outside” agitators.  Violent incidents flare up over the use of scabs or strikebreakers.  
Finally, some concessions are made to the workers, but the company is not legally bound 
to recognize the Amalgamated Association, or even to permanently keep its agreements.   
                                                 
     100 Unfortunately, it seems Samuel Gompers declined John Davis‟s invitation to 
Spartanburg.  John L. Davis should not be confused with the unsuccessful 1924 
Democratic Presidential candidate from West Virginia.  (Labor Advocate of Columbia, 1 
August 1919, 1; 22 August 1919, 1; 19 September 1919, 1)  




Regrettably, this proved the case with Spartanburg, whose fledgling union would suffer 
reversals in 1920, in light of the next chapter focusing on Charlotte‟s strike.
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Chapter Six:  Battle of the Barn 
 
Charlotte‟s rapid transition to a regional metropolis, initialized by the New 
South‟s textile revolution, accelerated when federal negotiators agreed to establish Camp 
Greene just outside Charlotte in July 1917.  None other than Zebulon V. Taylor led the 
city‟s lobby effort, favorably impressing General Leonard Wood with the Piedmont‟s 
untapped potential.  Southern Power held an outdoor banquet where General Wood 
intemperately criticized the Wilson Administration for its perceived lack of preparedness.  
Politics aside, Taylor‟s interests were well served by Camp Greene‟s construction, as 
Charlotte‟s street railway system expanded, permitting thousands of officers and enlisted 
men to socialize.  Camp Greene officially disbanded in July of 1919.1                                                                                     
At this crucial time, Southern Power and Southern Public Utilities also strove to 
contain the labor movement in the Piedmont.  To forestall a repetition of Spartanburg, 
Zebulon Taylor increased company wages by ten percent for motormen and conductors, 
beginning August 1, 1919.  Prior to this announcement, SPU streetcar workers brought 
home 28 to 35 cents hourly, depending upon seniority.  Taylor‟s platform men now 
earned 37 to 42 cents per hour, with annual raises of a single penny.  Ostensibly, Taylor 
anticipated economic improvement through one-man safety cars, which would eliminate 
the number of workers on the lines.  But Taylor‟s ten-percent wage increase also matched 
union rates won by Albert E. Jones in Spartanburg earlier that July.2 
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Despite Taylor‟s efforts, labor unrest soon began chipping away at Southern 
Power‟s powerful foundations.  On August 4, 600 Columbia shop-men struck en masse 
for higher wages, leaving Southern Railways, Southern & Atlantic Coastline, and 
Seaboard Air Line without skilled mechanics.  The latter two railroads were still under 
federal management, so President Wilson expressed his outrage toward unauthorized 
“wildcat” strikes.  Both union and government leaders expressed their fears that this 
independent strike might soon spread.  No doubt, Zebulon Taylor likewise watched these 
new developments, given their scope and proximity to Southern Public Utilities‟ sphere.
3   
Taylor‟s concerns were soon confirmed on August 6, when forty Piedmont & 
Northern platform men struck in sympathy with the Columbia shopmen and a related 
Southern Railways strike at Spencer, North Carolina.  Since the electric Piedmont & 
Northern belonged to Southern Power, this directly affected the Duke conglomeration.4 
Despite Taylor‟s August wage increase, AASERE organizers sought to press their 
point in Charlotte, nerve center for the most powerful streetcar employer in the Carolina 
Piedmont.  By this point, Southern Public Utilities had also acquired streetcar assets for 
Salisbury-Spencer, North Carolina.  Albert E. Jones did not sit idly after his initial 
success in Spartanburg.  Even while that Upcountry town resolved its streetcar conflict, 
Charles W. O‟Daniel of the AFL had already organized AASERE Division 901, while 
A.E. Jones organized Division 904 in Greenville-Anderson.  These two chapters were 
chartered in July 1919, along with Division 893 in Winston-Salem.5   
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Therefore, the Charlotte strike could not have come as a great surprise to “Buck” 
Duke and his lieutenants.  But the question remains:  how much personal involvement 
was there from Duke himself?  While no correspondence remains between Duke and 
Taylor, one may safely assume the Southern Public Utilities president had his partner‟s 
complete confidence in handling potential streetcar strikes.  Yet, John W. Bridwell, the 
federal conciliator sent to Charlotte in August, still predicted “Southern Power… may 
become involved, although not now shown on the surface.”  Bridwell also identified “the 
close affiliation of the Utilities [Company] and the Southern Power [Company]” as the 
central issue during the Charlotte Strike. Emphasizing Southern Power‟s ownership of 
225 cotton mills and 2,000 miles of primary electrical lines, Bridwell urged his 
Washington superior, H.L. Kerwin to “just think of the magnitude of this company!” 
6 
By 1919, magnitude had indeed become a chief hallmark of the Southern Public 
Utilities Company.  Long the nerve center for Duke‟s urban transportation, Charlotte‟s 
streetcar system now boasted fifty operating cars on almost 30 track miles, with about 7.8 
million passengers.  Bought by Duke in 1913, Winston-Salem‟s streetcars numbered 49 
cars on about 10 busy track miles, with 4.1 million riders by 1920.  Gastonia‟s numerous 
mills received their public transportation service from the Duke-owned Piedmont & 
Northern inter-urban electric railroad, connecting it to Greenville, Spartanburg & 
Anderson Railway – also the possession of Southern Power.  Moreover, Piedmont & 
Northern had built a three-mile extension to Belmont Mills in March 1916.7 
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Charlotte‟s regional strike officially began on Sunday, August 10, 1919.  The day 
before, Taylor met with his workers at the Mecklenburg Chamber of Commerce to 
discuss terms for a union contract.  Albert Jones excused himself from these proceedings, 
hoping his absence would improve the meeting‟s tone.  Representatives from all three 
local divisions agreed to a nine-hour workday, guaranteed overtime, and salaries from 41 
to 45 cents per hour.  SPU streetcar workers currently received no overtime for their 12-
hour shifts.  Company officials indicated their income could not support union-dictated 
wage figures.  Moreover, Taylor refused to negotiate with these three AASERE 
representatives, labeling their parent organization as a “foreign influence.”  Taylor 
conceded that he might negotiate with members from a local union, calculating that their 
bargaining strength would be weaker.8 
Taylor reiterated his official position through the auspices of local newspapers, 
but saved his choicest words for Southern Public Utilities Magazine, where his words 
could be printed in full.  Once again, the utility company would “deal or enter into a 
contract with unions of its own men,” but refused to deal with outsiders.  Taylor singled 
out the Amalgamated Association for its reputed “disorder, rioting, and bloodshed,” 
citing the isolated violence in Spartanburg‟s recent strike, as well as a major walk-out in 
Brooklyn, New York.”  Entering into contract with the AASERE, Taylor argued, would 
“plant the seeds for trouble… for our Company and for the public which we serve.”  He 
specifically charged that the union‟s mandated wages might eventually force his 
company to raise fares, thereby reducing Charlotte‟s considerable number of riders. 
9  
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Initially, the company president took a paternal tone.  Taylor professed respect for 
North Carolina Governor Bickett‟s “Square Deal” approach toward labor and capital.  
Taylor also stressed a lack of “ill feeling” toward his striking workers, expressing 
“personal regret” if he were forced to secure replacement workers to fill vacant positions.  
However, Taylor reminded his workers that they had “a very distinct duty and 
responsibility to the public.”  To demonstrate his own public spirit, Taylor assured 
Charlotte‟s citizens, wary of rioting and bloodshed: “We shall not import strikebreakers.”  
Instead, Taylor proposed keeping his streetcars in barns until he could interview “good 
men of our own section and community,” who would be paid at the company‟s best 
possible wage scale.  Meanwhile, Taylor still hoped for a peaceful settlement with his 
striking employees, whom he often referred to as “our boys.”
10    
Following their rebuff, Taylor‟s “boys” convened at the Woodmen‟s Hall in 
Charlotte.  At 11 p.m., on Saturday, August 9, Divisions 893, 901, and 904 elected to 
strike effective Sunday, August 10.  Charlotte‟s Central Labor Union, with sixteen craft 
organizations and three thousand members, lent their support to the streetcar divisions.   
Jones felt commencing the strike on a Sunday would cause “a minimum of annoyance.” 
Perhaps, Jones also anticipated potential support from the religious community, as most 
streetcar workers attended church.  Presbyterians largely dominated Charlotte‟s society, 
but other Protestants were no less active, especially in the wards of downtown Charlotte. 
One prominent Methodist, attorney Marvin Lee Ritch, supported textile workers.11    
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Meeting with city reporters, Albert Jones asserted that SPU motormen and 
conductors were 100 percent organized, totaling over 200 union members.  Charlotte 
counted 120 members, while Winston-Salem had 65.  Greenville-Anderson, South 
Carolina counted the remaining 30.  However, during the arbitration process, Federal 
conciliator John Bridwell later counted the total number of Southern Public Utility men 
as follows: Charlotte (131), Winston-Salem (73), and Greenville-Anderson, (59).  While 
approximately ninety percent of Charlotte and Winston-Salem streetcar workers were 
unionized, the same could not be said of Greenville-Anderson.  Bridwell‟s precise figures 
suggest a degree of numerical overstatement on Jones‟s part.12      
Albert E. Jones‟s leadership throughout the Charlotte strike deserves scrutiny.  
While he demonstrated courage and sincerity toward the region‟s workers, Jones also 
downplayed their precarious position in his reports to William D. Mahon.  His 
confrontational personality clearly did not suit the region‟s conservative political climate.  
Moreover, Jones overestimated the strength of AASERE‟s support base in the Carolina 
Piedmont.  For one matter, the streetcar union‟s three divisions lacked a labor network.  
While Columbia, South Carolina, and Asheville, North Carolina, had streetcar unions, 
these cities were too distant to afford much support to Charlotte.  Southern Power 
electricians, organized that same year by D.L. Goble, were reliable allies, but they were 
fewer in number than the streetcar workers.13   
When the Charlotte division staged its walkout on August 10, union president 
W.H. McFarlane united streetcar worker demands with those of forty Piedmont & 
                                                 
     12 National Archives and Records Administration, Department of Labor, Division of 
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Northern platform men already on strike. However, these railway men swiftly returned to 
work on August 11, after Southern Railways settled with its striking workers.  Piedmont 
& Northern workers remained on the job throughout the Charlotte regional streetcar 
strike, although at least one Southern Railways engineer took part in the events to come.14   
Jones‟s hopes for worker solidarity suffered a further blow when Anderson SPU 
workers parted ways with their Greenville counterparts, showing up for work on Sunday, 
August 10.  Citing their recent pay increase on August 1, Anderson streetcar employees 
issued a statement of loyalty to Southern Public Utilities.  Under the heading, “A Study in 
Contrasts,” Taylor exploited this development in Southern Public Utilities Magazine and 
regional newspapers.  The company boasted that Anderson‟s platform men remained on 
the job “without a single deflection (sic).”  Praising the Anderson workers, Taylor 
indicated their rebellious co-workers were not acting “of their own volition.”  Instead, the 
unionized workers were acting on the orders of “outside influences,” who did not share 
their best interests.  The company president also promised the Anderson SPU workers 
that their “splendid loyalty” would not be forgotten. 
15            
How did this serious rift occur within the ranks of AASERE Division 904?  Fear 
of unemployment or home loss may have convinced the Anderson contingent to remain 
on the job.  One could point toward the respective labor experiences of Anderson and 
Greenville.  Whereas Greenville‟s working class may have taken inspiration from the 
near-successes of 1914‟s Monaghan Mill strike, Anderson‟s 1916 strike ended with the 
traumatic eviction of mill workers by Palmetto National Guardsmen.  Faith in their 
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company‟s leadership may also have been a factor, as Zebulon Taylor‟s promised wage 
increases materialized in January 1920.  Southern Public Utilities Magazine alleged their 
company‟s employees had “no thought of striking,” while the Charlotte Observer 
confirmed Anderson‟s service was not suspended on August 10.16   
Given Jones‟s inflated figures, Greenville-Anderson‟s union membership may 
have only accounted for about 30 of 59 total workers, with Anderson refusing to abide by 
August 9‟s decision to strike.  One must also consider the possibility that Anderson‟s 
streetcar workers may not have actually agreed to join Division 904.  Albert Jones 
included Anderson with Greenville‟s figures in order to exaggerate AASERE‟s presence 
in the region.  Present-day Anderson and Greenville have developed alongside 
Spartanburg to create the Upcountry Tri-City region, but in August 1919, these three 
towns were still distinct entities, with different agendas.17  
Immediately after the strike began, Greenville Daily News admonished local 
strikers for their “slight degree of ill-advised haste” even as the National Railway 
Conference sought to resolve their problems.  The Greenville editorialist quipped that it 
was “better to strike „on the job,‟ than to strike by quitting the job.” 
18  However, other 
South Carolina Upcountry towns unaffected by the strike registered only cursory interest 
in Charlotte.  While the Spartanburg Herald duly reported major developments in the 
Southern Public Utilities strikes, Charles Hearon‟s editorial column remained curiously 
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silent.  Similarly, the Daily Spartan paid less attention to the Charlotte Strike, despite its 
editor‟s staunch conservative position.  One might surmise both editors had felt enough 
had been said during the previous Spartanburg strike in July.19     
In 1919, the Queen City had two major newspapers, the Charlotte Observer and 
the Charlotte News.  One retired Charlotte News reporter, Emory Wister, reminisced that 
“back in the old days… the Observer was considered the conservative newspaper and the 
News was the liberal newspaper.”  Wister mused that when the “liberals got more 
liberal,” many News reporters went over to the Observer.  Both papers merged in the 
1980s, with the Charlotte Observer remaining moderately liberal in its sympathy.  Later 
in the century, the Observer led historical preservation efforts, while its editorials largely 
supported the return of Charlotte‟s trolley in the 1980s.
20   
Initially, the Charlotte News took a somewhat balanced position toward the 
union‟s strike.  Emphasizing the moderating efforts of James Pardee during the ongoing 
Federal Commission on Electric Railways, Charlotte News editors Julian Miller and 
Jasper C. Hutto urged moderation.  One representative News editorial, reprinted in 
Southern Public Utilities, even acknowledged “badly demoralized service” in 
                                                 
     19 Spartanburg Herald, 11 August 1919, 1; 12 August 1919, 1; 24 August 1919, 1, 5; 
27 August 1919, 1, 5; Journal and Carolina Spartan, 11 August 1919, 1, 10; 16 August 
1919, 1, 8; 25 August 1919, 1, 8; 28 August 1919, 1, 8. 
     20 Charlotte Labor Herald also circulated during the strike, but sadly this newspaper is 
lost.  Some fragmentary articles were quoted by other newspapers, but no microfilm 
exists in the Charlotte Library archives.  (Emory Wister, interview by Edward Perzel, 23 
May 1979, transcript, Special Collections, J. Murrey Atkins Library, University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte; Richard Maschal, “Forgotten Night of Fear,” Charlotte Observer, 
23 August 1994, 1E-2E). 
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Spartanburg and Columbia.  Since both South Carolina trolley lines were under AASERE 
contracts in 1919, this concession cost Southern Power very little.21     
However, such conciliation did not inform the Charlotte Observer‟s ultra-
conservative editor, Colonel Wade Harris.  Harris, a long-time foe of unionism, began 
circulating full-page propaganda inserts for the Sunday edition.  These cartoonish 
drawings were unique to the Observer.  Touted as “one of a series,” at least twenty 
different articles were circulated between July and August.  One such item invoked the 
images of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln, showing their 
disapproval toward “un-American” labor organizers.  “Tousle-haired radicals” had misled 
good American workers to wreck the sacred free enterprise system.  Union organizers 
were also demonized in the Observer as Semitic stereotypes with disheveled appearances.  
Those who listened to these “Apostles of Unrest” were portrayed with sloppy clothes and 
slouching postures, while virtuous Americans walked past the rabble-rouser, wearing 
stylish garments and hats denoting respectability and affluence. 22 
What effect did Wade Harris‟s virulent propaganda have on Charlotte‟s public 
opinion?  None of the letters printed in the Charlotte Observer throughout the strike 
endorsed the cause of unionism.  Furthermore, two representatives from the Charlotte 
Central Labor Union petitioned U.S. Senator Lee S. Overman, a staunch Democrat, citing 
Colonel Wade Harris‟s “tremendous advertising campaign… to prejudice the citizens.”  
Charlotte‟s Central Labor Union implicated Zebulon V. Taylor‟s inflammatory 
statements in the regional newspapers as another factor in swaying people against 
                                                 
     21 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3 (15 August 1919), 9-15; 
Charlotte Observer, 16 July 1919, 1; 10 August 1919, 3. 
     22 Charlotte Observer, 20 July 1919, 11; 15 August 1919, 11;  
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organized labor.  Federal conciliator John W. Bridwell later sent samples of Taylor‟s 
screed and Harris‟s anti-labor cartoons to Washington for “future use.”23  
Attorney John Franklin (Jake) Newell (1869-1945) also excoriated the Observer 
for failing to present the “bold and unbiased” truth to its readers.  Newell, a liberal 
Republican, had recently won acquittal for a black jitney driver accused of murdering a 
white soldier outside Camp Greene.  Newell ably demonstrated how his client had been 
nearly robbed at gunpoint.  Newell later represented the Charlotte Central Labor Union in 
the strike.  In his post-strike letter to North Carolina Governor Bickett, Newell expressed 
his professional opinion that the streetcar workers‟ cause had been “muddled in Charlotte 
by a wave of propaganda,” exercising “an unhealthy control of public sentiment.” 24   
Some citizens were certainly swayed by Wade Harris, but others were neutral or 
even sympathetic.  Loy Cloninger maintained that Charlotte‟s riding public did not 
express much anger toward the SPU streetcarmen during or after the strike.  In fact, 
Cloninger indicated strong vocal support from North Charlotte, where hundreds of textile 
workers traveled by streetcar to Atherton Mill.  While strikebreakers manned the cars in 
late August, ordinary people with “Model T‟s” would sport “eight or nine hanging… on 
[the] old running boards.”  These jitney drivers were allowed by the city to charge a dime 
per passenger, keeping the proceeds for themselves.  Historian Carol Shaw‟s urban 
                                                 
     23 National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division 
of Mediation and Conciliation, Box 111, John W. Bridwell to H.L. Kerwin, (20 August 
1919), Charlotte Central Labor Union to Lee S. Overman, (25 August 1919); Carol 
Shaw, “A City in Conflict: the 1919 Charlotte Streetcar Strike” (unpublished honors 
thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980), 41-42; Loy C. Cloninger, 
interview by Allen Tullos, 18 June 1980,  transcript, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Library, 14-15.   
     24 National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division 
of Mediation and Conciliation, Box 111, Jake F. Newell to Governor Thomas W. Bickett 
(3 September 1919); Star of Zion, 8 May 1919, 6.  
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research confirms a proposed local ordinance permitting jitneys during the strike, which 
would suggest that some elements of the Charlotte city government were tolerant enough 
toward the striking streetcar workers to refrain from halting a jitney boycott.25   
To John Paul Lucas‟s credit, Southern Public Utilities Magazine initially 
refrained from excessive abuse when the strike began.  However, after the events of 
August 25 and 26, Lucas employed Red Scare tactics to further damage the union‟s 
flagging support base in the Piedmont.  Much of Southern Public‟s cant quoted directly 
from Scripture, while other examples came from major newspapers.  “A Strike for 
Power,” in the New York Commercial, cast the labor war as “Americanism versus 
Russianism.”  Another chief contributor, F.G.R. Gordon of the American Anti-Socialist 
League, preached about the worldwide menace of Socialism, using selective examples 
from history.  Lucas also delighted in teaching a “Lesson for the Radical,” quoting 
Massachusetts governor Calvin Coolidge, hero of the thwarted Boston Police Strike.26          
Ultimately, how persuasive were these anti-labor cartoons from the Charlotte 
Observer?  One can assume that Harris‟s propaganda merely reinforced already-existing 
prejudices toward labor organizations, especially among many middle-class and elite 
Charlotte citizens.  Others who empathized with the plights of workers were either 
offended, as in the case of the Charlotte Central Labor Union, or otherwise ignored the 
newspapers outright.  Nevertheless, the violence ensuing in late August 1919 eclipsed 
any incident in the Queen City‟s recent history.  Some quantity of hate must have been 
exacerbated by the city newspapers‟ irresponsibility.  Wartime passions had not yet 
                                                 
     25 Cloninger, 14-15; Shaw, 16.  
     26 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 5 (October 1919), 1, 5-10, 15; Vol. 
5, No. 6 (November 1919), 13; Vol. 5, No. 7 (December 1919), 1. 
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abated, local prejudices toward foreigners permeated each level of society, and new fears 
of Bolshevism coursed through the media.  One can further speculate about the 
ramifications if these virulent drawings had been circulated in Greenville or Winston-
Salem.  Fortunately, Colonel Wade Harris lacked the influence of a Pulitzer or a Hearst. 
Meanwhile, the Charlotte regional strike continued unabated in its first week.    
Greenville‟s public transportation remained paralyzed, while cars in Anderson ran 
smoothly.  Greenville Daily News supported municipal ownership of transportation, 
based on the city‟s ownership of its waterworks.  However, despite the Upcountry 
paper‟s unusual championship of “complete democratization of transportation,” Zebulon 
Taylor still purchased advertising space in order to publish his statements and solicit 
strikebreakers.  Greenville‟s newspaper also promulgated a rumor that union motormen 
were allegedly paid 60 cents per hour in comparison to a college professor‟s 18 cents.  
Another columnist made light of the entire situation, stating simply:  “The Walking is 
Good.”  This editorial further reasoned that Greenville did not rely on streetcar 
transportation as much as Spartanburg, although the writer conceded the area‟s farm and 
textile laborers would soon feel the strike‟s effects.
27       
Charlotte newspapers did not comment on the first three days of the strike, 
although they covered the union‟s activities.  Initially, the strike appeared orderly.  
Workers continued to appeal to their former employers for union recognition, with 
predictable, if courteous refusals.  Department of Labor officials evidently deemed the 
situation too minor to consider intervention.  The Amalgamated Association‟s first 
appeals to the U.S. Department of Labor were postmarked August 18.  At the time, 
                                                 
     27 Greenville Daily News, 11 August 1919, 4; 12 August 1919, 4; 13 August, 1; 
Charlotte Observer, 11 August 1919, 4. 
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Washington‟s policy-makers felt that streetcar strikes should be resolved at the local and 
state levels.  In this spirit of cooperation, Charlotte‟s progressive mayor, Frank Ramsey 
McNinch, promised to help seek a mutually beneficial solution.  Preliminary mediation 
took place in the Mecklenburg County Chamber of Commerce.28 
Rescinding Charlotte‟s antiquated town alderman board, city officials established 
the new Chamber of Commerce on June 17, 1915.  Charlotte‟s first Board of Directors 
included conservative businessmen, such as William States Lee, Zebulon Vance Taylor, 
and Edward Dilworth Latta.  Yet other members were confirmed liberals, such as W.S. 
Alexander and Clarence “Booster” Kuester.  In 1912, Alexander had developed 
Washington Heights to accommodate the growing African-American population in 
Biddleville.  “Booster” Kuester started out as a travelling salesman and druggist before 
entering city politics.  Well-liked for his optimistic, sunny disposition, Kuester received 
his nickname due to his promotional efforts on behalf of Charlotte.  Both Kuester and 
Alexander played significant roles on the arbitration commission chaired by the mayor.29 
Meanwhile, the forces of labor gathered under Albert E. Jones and D. L. Goble, 
leader of the electricians union.  Strikers staged a midnight demonstration between 
August12 and 13, at the Southern Public Utilities substation on present-day Elizabeth 
Street.  At approximately 3 a.m., two unionized electricians, J.L. Baker and S. M. Farris, 
                                                 
     28 Charlotte Observer, 11 August 1919, 4; Raleigh News and Observer, 11 August 
1919, 1; Greenville Daily News, 11 August 1919, 4; National Archives and Records 
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division of Mediation and Conciliation, , Box 
111, William B. Fitzgerald to Hugh Kerwin, telegram, 18 August 1919; Hugh Kerwin to 
John W. Bridwell, telegram, 18 August, 1919; Shaw, 16-17. 
     29 Norman J. Pease, interview by Edward Perzel, 22 May 1979, transcript, Special  
Collections, J. Murrey Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte; LeGette 
Blythe and Charles R. Brockmann. Hornet’s Nest: the Story of Charlotte and 
Mecklenburg County (Charlotte:  McNally of Charlotte, 1967), 341.  
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cut municipal power for an entire hour.  Charlotte Police Chief Walter B. Orr quickly 
regained control of the substation.  Baker faced criminal trespass charges and paid an 
undisclosed fine, while Farris escaped charges altogether, in exchange for giving 
testimony to the police and Southern Public Utilities.  Farris implicated an alleged 
conspiracy fomented by the AASERE, referred to simply as “the Association.” 
30   
However, no conspiracy motivated the three hundred or so North Charlotte textile 
workers who descended upon Elizabeth Street later that night on August 13.  In general, 
streetcar union members initially welcomed the mill-hands, but they also sought to 
discourage undisciplined crowds from taking part in their demonstrations.  But SPU 
conductor Jesse B. Ashe saw these mill hands as a potentially dangerous crowd, often 
engaging in fisticuffs and drunken brawls.  Ashe later described North Charlotte as “a 
bad place,” characterized by “cutting and fighting on the weekends.”  Ashe also believed 
these “mill people” used the streetcar strike for their own purposes.  Loy Cloninger 
confirmed that most of the strike sympathizers came from the textile mills ringing 
Charlotte.  North Charlotte textile workers may also have felt a particular animosity 
toward Chief Walter B. Orr, who had a controversial reputation among Charlotte‟s 
working class.  However, this first assembly of picketers dispersed without incident.31                   
Zebulon V. Taylor exploited these minor acts of civil disobedience to their fullest 
potential.  Using the company magazine and local newspapers, Taylor took to the 
offensive.  Exaggerating the actual impact of the Elizabeth Street incidents, Taylor 
asserted: “We are standing between you and lawlessness.”  The corporate executive 
                                                 
     30 Charlotte Observer, 13 August 1919, 3; 20 August 1919, 2; Shaw, 17-19. 




vowed to fight “vicious outside influences” responsible for “jeopardizing the lives of the 
suffering in hospitals.”32  Condemning Albert Jones‟s “Organization” in tenebrous terms, 
Taylor questioned the real motive behind the strike, claiming that his company offered 
higher wages than those contracts Jones had won for Spartanburg.  He accused the 
AASERE of duping J.L. Baker and S.M. Ferris on the previous night, then abandoning 
them to the courts.33   
Taylor wrote a simultaneous appeal to his crewmen to return under their original 
contracts.  “I have thought…with all the sympathy one human being might have for the 
distress of another,” the executive reassured.  The president blamed “foreign influences” 
for “prying apart the close bonds” between his company and its professed “friends.”34  
Comparing these labor leaders to German soldiers, bent on “victimizing” innocent 
“Southern” women and children, Zebulon Taylor openly declared war on the strikers.  
Southern Public Utilities began placing newspaper advertisements for replacement 
motormen on August 15.  R.L. Wommack took charge of the interview process, which 
continued for ten days.35   
Mayor Frank R. McNinch (1873-1950) subsequently abandoned his neutrality, 
publicly denouncing the perceived “outrage against an innocent and helpless public.” 
Charlotte could never “countenance” such a “high-handed invasion” of private property, 
although he did not specify whether he meant the rebellious electricians or the protestors. 
McNinch also declared further challenges to public safety would incur “personal risk.”  
                                                 
     32 Charlotte News, 14 August 1919, 1; Greenville Daily News, 11 August 1919, 4.  
     33 Charlotte Observer, 14 August, 1919, 5; Greenville Daily News, 12 August 1919, 8; 
15 August 1919, 12.   
     34 Charlotte Observer, 17 August 1919, 1-3. 
     35 Charlotte Observer, 16 August 1919, 5; Greenville Daily News, 18 August 1919, 4. 
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However, behind the scenes, McNinch exercised his municipal office to seek a 
compromise between the utility company and representatives of the AASERE.36 
Frank Ramsey McNinch came from staunch Presbyterian stock, a curious mixture 
of parochial and progressive traits.  Historian Janette Greenwood characterizes McNinch 
as a “middle-class reformer” who began as a traveling salesman.  A notable 
Prohibitionist, McNinch drank goat‟s milk for his ulcers.  After graduating from law 
school, McNinch entered local politics as a Democrat.  In 1917, McNinch succeeded his 
older brother, Samuel S. McNinch, as Charlotte Mayor.  In this office, the younger 
McNinch distinguished himself as a “soft-spoken” problem-solver whose political 
instincts made many friends and foes alike.  According to his nephew, Samuel S. 
McNinch III, his uncle “did not give a damn; he was fiercely independent.” 
37   
During the week of August 15, Mayor McNinch presided over talks between 
strike leaders and SPU president Zebulon Taylor.  Their primary arguments focused on 
company wages.  Taylor claimed corporate revenues could not support the 
Amalgamated‟s proposed wage increase of three pennies.  Given the SPU executive‟s 
affluent lifestyle, his justification must have infuriated the union.  His wife, Irving Scales 
Taylor, had recently sold their opulent mansion in Myers Park to their business partner, 
James B. Duke himself.38  Now aware of Taylor‟s campaign to replace his colleagues, 
local streetcar union president W.H. McFarlane rejected Taylor‟s explanation.  Mayor 
McNinch congratulated McFarlane for his “orderly manner” throughout the meeting.  
                                                 
     36  Charlotte Observer, 13 August, 1919, 5. 
     37  Samuel S. McNinch III, interview by author, 18 September 2008, transcript; 
Janette T. Greenwood, The Black and White Better Classes in Charlotte (University of  
North Carolina Press:  Chapel Hill & London, 1994), 129.  
     38  Charlotte Observer, 17 August 1919, 1-3; Hanchett 178-9. 
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Albert E. Jones withdrew from the proceedings as a gesture toward local politics, but 
inwardly, the union organizer must have seethed at his harsh treatment in the city 
newspapers. 39   
Throughout the conflict, Charlotte Observer editor Wade Harris remained highly 
biased against labor.  Harris expressed “no sympathy with [the strikers‟] attempt to hold 
up [community services] because of a mere quarrel as to [with] whom the employers will 
deal.”  The Charlotte News subsequently began to shift from cautious tolerance to 
outright dislike toward Albert Jones, questioning: “Why the services of the professional?”  
Julian Miller further queried whether the Charlotte streetcar workers should “wed 
themselves to this professional organizer instead of shouldering the responsibility 
themselves?”  Likewise, the Greenville Daily News grew impatient with the ongoing 
strike.  “At the outset,” pronounced the editor, “public opinion favored the employes 
(sic).”  However, the workers‟ “use of outside interference” delayed a negotiation with 
President Taylor.  The Greenville Daily News expressed resentment toward such 
outsiders for “failing to recognize the South‟s ability to solve its own crises.”40   
Meanwhile, Zebulon Taylor kept publishing calculated insults against the 
streetcar union in regional newspapers.  Taylor seldom referred to the streetcar union or 
Jones by name, instead using euphemisms like “Foreign Organized Autocracy,” or 
“Professional Foreign Agitator.”  Taylor also compared the AASERE to the Imperial 
German Army, claiming the streetcar union employed similar brutality to assert control 
over the city of Charlotte.  For Jones, who fought for industrial democracy as he 
                                                 
     39  Charlotte Observer, 17 August 1919, 1-3. 
     40 Charlotte Observer, 15 August, 1919, 5; Charlotte News, 12 August 1919, 10. 
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understood it, such words questioned his organization‟s integrity, not to mention his own 
patriotism.  Unfortunately, Jones‟s temper got the better of his judgment.
41 
On August 17, Albert E. Jones delivered a vitriolic speech in the Mecklenburg 
Courthouse.  Reporters listened intently as Jones addressed the entire Chamber of 
Commerce on behalf of his organization.  Without naming James B. Duke or Southern 
Power, Jones openly accused the “capitalists who employ Mr. Taylor” of controlling 
Charlotte‟s local government, newspapers, and banks.  Jones further upbraided Southern 
Public Utilities for gouging its customers at ten cents per kilowatt, while refusing to pay 
their workers a living wage.  Lastly, Jones attacked Zebulon Taylor‟s paternalistic 
overtures as the “greatest piece of camouflage ever written,” while his propaganda served 
as an “insult to the intelligence of every man.”
42   
Jones‟s outburst immediately met with venomous bites from the local press.  
Charlotte Observer assistant editor William B. Sullivan challenged Jones to substantiate 
his charges toward the newspapers.  Sullivan called his statement “the most pronounced 
instance of public incitation to the passions of man that has ever been promulgated in 
Charlotte.”  In the Charlotte News, Zebulon Taylor labeled Jones a “rank slanderer,” 
appealing to the loyalty of “Anglo-Saxon” and “Scotch-Irish” citizens to reject his “filthy 
falsehoods.”  Taylor concluded his sermon on nativism with an imperative to his 
wayward “boys”: “Away with him!”  
43  Even more injurious to the streetcar unions, 
Jones‟s tirade alienated Frank R. McNinch, the one man who might have helped his 
cause.  The mayor decried Jones‟ accusation as a “willful and scurrilous lie.”  On August 
                                                 
     41 Greenville Daily News, 12 August 1919, 8; 18 August 1919, 18. 
     42 Charlotte Observer, 17 August 1919, 11; Greenville Daily News, 18 August 1919, 
18. 
     43 Charlotte Observer, 23 August 1919, 2; Morrill, 17. 
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22, Albert Jones subsequently retracted his words in a contrite letter to Mayor McNinch, 
but the Ohio labor organizer would be excluded from future negotiations.  Division 901 
president W.A. McFarlane, however, remained in good standing. 44  
Jones‟s public statement, if tactless in its accusations, certainly bore many 
elements of truth.  Did not Zebulon V. Taylor belong to the Charlotte Chamber of 
Commerce?  And was Taylor not a close advisor and partner to James B. Duke, one of 
the pre-eminent capitalists in the region?  Conciliator John W. Bridwell said much the 
same of Southern Power‟s influence throughout the region, but he confined these 
criticisms to his superiors in Washington.  Jones cut ties he could not afford to 
severbecause Mayor McNinch‟s disapproval now stripped the beleaguered streetcar 
workers of their chief and most effective advocate.  Fortunately, a new leader arose to 
unite the Charlotte workingmen in the mounting struggle. 
Charlotte attorney Marvin Lee Ritch (1889-1971) had little benefit to gain from 
supporting the cause of organized labor.  However, Ritch‟s Scotch-Irish Methodist family 
shared agrarian roots with many resettled farmers who now staffed the Piedmont‟s textile 
mills.  Ritch escaped factory drudgery through his prowess on high school and college 
basketball courts.  Leaving Chapel Hill at age twenty-one, Ritch transferred to 
Georgetown in 1910, where he captained their first varsity program.  Playing both 
forward and center during the 1912-13 seasons, Ritch achieved records that still stand 
almost a century later.  Ritch would remain active in high school and college athletics 
throughout his public career, coaching basketball and football.45 
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Ritch also seems to have been something of a square peg.  His surviving daughter, 
Ann R. Brantley, confesses Ritch was well-liked, but had little use for social graces.  
During his sojourn at Georgetown, he was the only Protestant on the varsity basketball 
team.  Instead of finishing his program at Georgetown as a “tramp athlete,” Ritch chose 
to clerk for several Washington law firms.  Licensed to practice in North Carolina, Ritch 
moved to the burgeoning city of Charlotte.  Shortly before World War I, Ritch married 
Hazeline Morris, a vivacious art teacher who soon gave birth to a daughter.  During the 
war, Ritch served as city attorney and coached football at Chapel Hill.  But as the nation 
celebrated the Armistice in November 1918, tragedy befell Hazel Ritch.  Complications 
from influenza led to her untimely death from pneumonia at age 28.  Marvin Ritch‟s 
promising legal career offered him the only positive means to work through his sorrow.  
Ritch‟s loss might also explain his energetic burst of pro-labor activity in 1919-20, 
leading streetcar and textile workers in a brief, yet impressive coalition.46 
On August 18, Zebulon V. Taylor issued an ultimatum to his striking workers:  
return to work by 5 p.m. on the following day or face a lockout.  Taylor‟s lockout order 
triggered a joint meeting of representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Charlotte Merchant Association, the Charlotte Automotive Association, and the local 
Rotary Club.  Mayor McNinch‟s ad hoc Citizen‟s Committee subsequently exerted 
pressure on Taylor to retract the lockout.  Taylor agreed to meet with union 
representatives, giving them his assurance that he would not discharge employees who 
belonged to the union.  However, his proposed contract once more fell short of 
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expectations, because it lacked recognition of the AASERE.  Workers resumed their 
strike amid growing public concerns; the strike now approached two weeks without hope 
of compromise.47 
By this point, Albert Jones appears to have contacted William B. Fitzgerald at the 
AASERE‟s Detroit headquarters.  Fitzgerald consequently appealed to Hugh Kerwin, 
chief conciliator of the U.S. Labor Department, to dispatch a Federal arbitrator to handle 
the Charlotte situation.  John W. Bridwell arrived from Atlanta on August 20, reporting 
the chief problem as being one of union recognition.  Bridwell quickly assessed Zebulon 
V. Taylor as the central figure, and urged his superior to personally wire the Southern 
Public Utilities executive, although no record exists of such a telegram.  Bridwell also 
concluded that Albert Jones‟s rash statement against Taylor had aggravated the union‟s 
case in Charlotte.  Bridwell instantly began coordinating his efforts with the Queen City‟s 
Central Labor Union, which repeatedly commended the Washington conciliator‟s quiet 
and earnest approach toward the streetcar strike.48    
On August 19, attorney Marvin L. Ritch seized the proverbial gauntlet, speaking 
on the strike at Mecklenburg Courthouse before two thousand Charlotte citizens.  Early in 
the strike, Ritch began mobilizing nearly 2,000 strike sympathizers among the region‟s 
mill towns.  Some came from North Charlotte, but many more were poor textile workers 
from Gastonia and Albemarle.  Gastonia‟s mill hands were accustomed to riding 
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subsidiary lines belonging to Piedmont & Northern, but Ritch exhorted his friends to 
boycott these trolleys in support of the AASERE.49  Foreseeing Taylor‟s employment of 
armed strikebreakers, Ritch warned townspeople they would ride Piedmont & Northern 
and Southern Public Utilities streetcars “at their own risk.” Some conservatives decried 
Ritch‟s remark out of context, alleged a veiled threat on the attorney‟s part.  However, 
Ritch defended his speech, indicating that the strikebreakers were a risk factor for trolley 
passengers owing to their violent nature and lack of work experience.50 
Another brief period of uneasy quietude fell over Charlotte as the conciliation 
process continued for three days under J.W. Bridwell‟s capable direction.  Possibly at 
Bridwell‟s request, Albert Jones formally apologized to the City Commissioners on 
August 22, hoping for a rapprochement with Mayor McNinch.  However, the mayor 
barred Jones from further proceedings.  Only one man, North Charlotte merchant W.H. 
Hall, spoke in Jones‟s defense, protesting that Charlotte‟s new form of government 
concentrated too much power in the hands of too few men.  Meanwhile, electrician D.L. 
Goble formally took over the representation of AASERE Divisions 893, 901, and 904.51 
On August 23, Mayor McNinch and his Citizens‟ Committee proposed 
recognizing the three AASERE divisions without reservations, for a trial period of one 
year.  Also present during the negotiations were Zebulon Taylor and his treasurer, E.C. 
Marshall.  However, Taylor spurned the Committee Report, announcing limited streetcar 
service would resume on August 25 -- with strikebreakers manning the vehicles.  In 
exasperation, John Bridwell wrote his supervisor, describing the company president‟s 
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obdurate refusal to accept even his “home people‟s” suggestion.  He suspected Taylor‟s 
union-busting tactics had received direct support from Duke himself.  However, despite 
obvious corporate connections, the conciliator also acknowledged each company had its 
own president.  Still hoping to appeal to Taylor as a disinterested party, Bridwell resolved 
to reach a “peaceful solution” over the next week.
52   
Zebulon V. Taylor certainly had the capacity to make his own decisions.  But 
Bridwell‟s hope for compromise was ill-placed.  Taylor‟s response to the Citizens 
Committee said simply: “a thousand times no.”  Taylor argued for his company‟s 
“industrial freedom,” and upbraided Mayor McNinch for harboring sympathy for a 
“Foreign Organization,” founded upon “I.W.W.-ism and Bolshevism.”  More 
significantly, Taylor withdrew his previous offer to reinstate his former employees.  On 
Monday, 25 October, Taylor‟s strikebreakers readied for their first day.  Picketers 
gathered at the Dilworth streetcar barn, where Police Chief Orr had stationed nearly forty 
patrolmen.  One replacement crew fired several gunshots to disperse a crowd blocking 
the tracks, yet the police said nothing.  Protecting Southern Public Utilities interests 
through intimidation and force, Taylor‟s replacements enjoyed tacit support from 
Charlotte‟s police chief, Walter Baxter Orr.
53 
Walter Orr (1883-1957) came from a family of police officers, beginning with his 
father, Assistant Police Chief Joseph L. Orr, a Confederate veteran who lost one arm 
fighting under Stonewall Jackson.  Joseph Orr served as a police officer for forty-two 
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August 1919, 2; Charlotte Observer, 25 August 1919, 4.  
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years.  Father and son also shared a tradition of ringing the First Presbyterian Church 
bells for each New Year.  Walter Orr rose swiftly through police ranks, serving as Deputy 
Sheriff of Mecklenburg County during the war years.  On 14 May 1919, Walter Orr 
succeeded Police Chief Neal Elliot at age thirty-five.  Hence, when the Charlotte strike 
ensued in August, Chief Orr had just assumed his new responsibilities.  Orr also had a 
reputation for strong-arm tactics directed toward the working class in North Charlotte.  
Therefore, he likely saw Taylor‟s strikebreakers as a means to combat lawless elements.
54         
According to SPU conductor Loy Cloninger, local streetcar men came to view 
gun-toting Southern Public Utilities strikebreakers as “outsiders” who usurped the 
rightful jobs of Southerners.  Following an unwritten code of the South, many working 
men may have believed that no true Southerner would deprive his neighbors of their 
livelihood. Strikebreakers allegedly pocketed daily income from their shifts, and outraged 
locals with violent behavior.  Loy Cloninger recalled “some guy” offering to catapult a 
dynamite charge atop the paint shop building where the strikebreakers were quartered.  
Even though most of the strikebreakers were from Georgia and the Carolinas, Cloninger 
still believed these were Northern “scabs.”  John W. Bridwell confirmed this general 
perception toward strikebreakers as “foreigners” to his supervisors in Washington.55  
At dusk, Taylor‟s men returned their cars to Dilworth, where two hundred 
outraged townsfolk greeted them with harangues and threats.  These men were mostly 
rowdies from North Charlotte, according to several sources.  Apparently, the only 
                                                 
     54 Donna Johnson, Descendants of James “Whistling” Orr, 2008, available from 
http://www.geocities.com/pawcreek.geo/orr/nti00120.htm; Internet; accessed 9 August 
2009; Hanchett, 73-74. 
     55 National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division 
of Mediation and Conciliation, Box 111, John W. Bridwell to Hugh L. Kerwin (26 August 
1919); Cloninger interview, 7. 
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streetcar men present anywhere near the Dilworth barn were night foreman Loy 
Cloninger and an inspector named Ramseur.  They were permitted by their union leaders 
to remain on line because the replacement workers lacked qualified night supervisors.  
Jesse Ashe also did not believe there were any union members present, nor did he 
acknowledge “foreign” strikebreakers manning the cars.  Ashe, at best a passive strike 
supporter, admitted several decades afterward that he had “lain low until matters were 
straightened out.” 
56 
Mecklenburg Sheriff Newt W. Wallace made peaceful overtures to the hostile 
crowd, observing no weapons among the strikers.  Nonetheless, several men tried to 
swarm over the rope barrier to lash out against the so-called “wops” and “scabs,” now 
lodged in a nearby shop building.  At approximately 10 p.m., Patrolman Thomas H. 
Merritt struck teenager Clem Wilson to the pavement, senseless.  Merritt described Clem 
Wilson as having “pressed too closely.”  One unnamed strikebreaker later attested Wilson 
went for Merritt‟s holstered pistol.  However, several other witnesses swore that Merritt 
had kicked Wilson‟s prone body, while two other officers held rescuers at bay with their 
sidearms.  Loy Cloninger also witnessed a Charlotte police officer strike a young man 
named Wilson using his gun, but decades later, the retired foreman confused Clem with 
his older brother, John.  Some spectators thought Clem dead, but Sheriff Wallace sent the 
unconscious sixteen-year-old boy over to St. Peter‟s Hospital.57   
Sheriff Wallace and a St. Peter‟s nurse later testified Clem Wilson had been 
inebriated, which, if true, begs a question.  Some eyewitnesses described many of these 
                                                 
     56 Cloninger interview, 1-9. 
     57 Charlotte Observer, 26 August 1919, 1-4; 19 October 1919, 7; 17 November 1919, 
9; 18 November, 10; Charlotte News, 25 August 1919, 1; Cloninger, 1-8. 
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onlookers as being teenage boys in “shirtsleeves,” perhaps returning from a baseball 
game.  Hardly a Bolshevik, Clem may have passed through Dilworth to partake of illicit 
alcohol after a hot summer‟s evening.  Despite the recent advent of Prohibition, several 
bars flourished in downtown Charlotte.  Tavern-keeper Dick Wentz would later admit to 
selling “enough alcohol to fill a courthouse” during the last August weekend.58 
Some demonstrators allegedly threatened to lynch Thomas Merritt, perceiving 
him as Clem Wilson‟s “killer.”  However, Sheriff Wallace assured the boy‟s safety, 
convincing most of the crowd to disperse.  By midnight, only fifty or so hotheads 
lingered to glare at Chief Orr‟s thirty-man barricade.  Frank Boomershine, who resided 
across from the Dilworth car-barn, later became a police eyewitness.  Boomershine‟s 
testimony later portrayed this small group of demonstrators as a lynch mob of two 
hundred.  Boomershine, a Charlotte businessman, said he overheard this mob take a vote 
to kill Chief Orr as well as “the man who hit Wilson.”  Boomershine also testified that a 
gang proposed to overturn R.L. Wommack‟s private automobile parked in front of the 
car-barn.  Boomershine later alleged their ringleader to have been Clem Wilson.59   But 
one must also consider that Boomershine‟s testimony emerged weeks after the strike, 
when Clem Wilson proffered murder charges against Chief Orr.  Clem Wilson may have 
lacked good judgment, but he might just as well been a bystander caught up in a surge.    
During this interval, John Wilson had learned of his sibling‟s injury from North 
Charlotte police.  In his horse buggy, he arrived at Dilworth by 12:45 a.m., seeking his 
brother.  The 1920 census manuscripts lists two John Wilsons in North Charlotte, both of 
                                                 
     58 Charlotte Observer, 26 August 1919, 3-4; 19 October 1919, 7; 17 November 1919, 
9; 18 November, 10; Charlotte News, 26 August 1919, 1.    
     59 Charlotte Observer, 26 August 1919, 3-4; 19 October 1919, 10; 17 November 1919, 
9; 18 November, 10; Charlotte News, 26 August 1919, 1.    
162 
 
whom were employed on farms.  Chief Walter B. Orr later claimed John Wilson had a 
“bad reputation as fighting man.”  Loy Cloninger also described Wilson as a “rough kind 
of guy.”  According to Chief Orr, John Wilson reportedly approached the streetcar barn 
with “a crowd surging around him,” demanding in “a boisterous tone” why his brother 
Clem had been struck.  However, Sheriff Wallace described John Wilson‟s conversation 
with Chief Orr as “most friendly” in tone.”  Deputy Sheriff V.P. Fesperman confirmed 
Wilson shook his hand before speaking with Chief Orr.  Orr absolved himself of Clem‟s 
injury, but picketers condemned the senior policeman for a liar.60   
Loy Cloninger stood just before several streetcars positioned as barricades to the 
Dilworth car barn.  Policemen had taken cover inside the streetcars, whose windows were 
lowered to permit firing.  Cloninger half-jokingly described the strike sympathizers as 
forming their own “Hindenburg Line” across the street, meant to block outgoing 
streetcars.  Picketers taunted and challenged the strikebreakers to send out a car to be 
vandalized – actions that the streetcar men would never have condoned.  As a motorman, 
Loy Cloninger‟s perspective is perhaps the most unbiased, although one must allow for 
passage of time.  When Cloninger reported his version of the events to a Southern Power 
claims agent, the company official promptly buried his account.61 
Chief Orr, after speaking briefly to John Wilson, later claimed a swarm of rioters 
followed in Wilson‟s wake.  “Get back, every damn one of you,” Orr called out to the 
crowd before taking cover.  Chief Orr‟s sidearm had already cleared his holster at this 
point.  The next few moments remain perhaps the most mysterious in Charlotte history.  
                                                 
     60 Charlotte Observer, 5 September 1919, 1-2; 19 October 1919, 7; 18 November 
1919, 9; 20 November 1919, 4; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1920, Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina. 
      61 Cloninger interview, 2-3. 
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Suddenly a firearm discharged in the darkness, followed by over 100 more shots from 
Charlotte police and perhaps several strikebreakers.  Loy Cloninger averred that the 
strikebreakers were all quartered in the paint shop and took no part in the violence.  Most 
of the streetcar workers laid the burden of guilt on Chief Orr and the police.  However, 
since later court testimony corroborated strikebreakers shooting into the fleeing crowd, 
perhaps Cloninger could not account for all strikebreaker movements.62   
Regardless of who opened fire on the crowd, flying bullets soon took effect 
among several demonstrators.  Three Charlotte citizens were slain outright, with two 
victims more to follow.  Neither Cloninger nor Ashe knew any of the shooting victims.  
Moreover, the newspapers differed as to some victims‟ names.  Caldwell Houston, a 
Southern Railway engineer, crawled away to expire near the Dilworth laundry, where 
several witnesses found his body next morning.  Claude Hinson, a teenage grocery clerk, 
fell instantly dead to the pavement.  Walter (or William) Pope, newly arrived to 
Charlotte, had only been employed at one of the region‟s mills for three weeks.  
Machinist J.D. Aldrich (or Aldred) suffered five buckshot wounds to his abdomen; he 
would die the next morning after surgery.  William R. Hammond of Fidelity Cotton Mill 
suffered a fatal shot through the throat, severing his spinal chord.  Hammond died at age 
36 on the following morning, leaving a widow and a four-year-old son.63   
Shortly after the shooting incident, John W. Bridwell left the New Central Hotel 
to confer with the streetcar union.  Several spokesmen told Bridwell their divisions had 
no role whatsoever in the Dilworth battle.  Bridwell later reported thirty or so “armed 
                                                 
     62 Cloninger interview, 2-3.  
     63 Raleigh News & Observer, 26 August 1919, 1-3; Charlotte Observer, 26 August 




professional strike breakers” staying at the car barn, “inviting trouble.”  One witness, 
combing the scene for injured people, later said a strikebreaker showed him “a hand full 
of new bullets,” warning him there would be “more killing done.”  Witnesses also told 
the federal conciliator that the first gunshot came not from the protesters, as Chief Orr 
stated in the press, but from “some one in the car barn.”  Moreover, some of the gunshot 
victims had called out for aid, but only Sheriff Wallace and Deputy Fesperman offered 
them succor.  Bridwell concluded this entire tragedy could have been avoided if Taylor 
had followed the position proposed by Mayor Frank McNinch. 64 
Meanwhile, Mayor McNinch hurriedly summoned six state National Guard units 
to restore order to his city.  The first North Carolina guardsmen arrived from nearby 
Lexington at approximately 8 a.m. on August 26.  That same Tuesday morning, hundreds 
of enraged citizens mobbed the Southern Public Utilities streetcars during their morning 
runs.  Numerous arrests were made for obstruction and vandalism of property.  John 
Temples, responsible for firing a slingshot through several streetcar windows, received a 
fine of $158.15.  Charlie Goodwin later served thirty days at hard labor for hurling a 
brick toward Assistant Superintendent T.H. Drum, dealing him a serious head injury.  
Drum also suffered rough treatment when sympathizers threw him off a streetcar.\65 
                                                 
     64 National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division 
of Mediation and Conciliation, Box 111, John W. Bridwell to Hugh L. Kerwin (26 August 
1919); John W. Bridwell to Hugh L. Kerwin, telegram, 26 August 1919; John W. Bridwell 
to Hugh L. Kerwin (27 August 1919); Charlotte Observer, 19 October 1919, 7.  
     65 One curious incident involved a U.S. Army assistant recruiter, Private Frey (or 
Fred) Yoe, caught wrecking a streetcar alongside strike sympathizers.  Pvt. Yoe later 
faced court martial charges in Greensboro.  (Raleigh News and Observer, 26 August 
1919, 1-3; Charlotte Observer, 26 August 1919, 1-2; 29 August 1919, 4; 13 November 
1919, 18; Charlotte News, 26 August 1919, 1, 13).  
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In total, fourteen injured strike victims were taken to Charlotte hospitals.  Thomas 
Head made an astounding recovery from two chest wounds, despite grim expectations.  
A.T. Baker and H.N. Seaman received abdominal wounds, while Lewis Wilson and 
George Smith‟s backs had been pierced by buckshot.  Wilson‟s presence is noteworthy 
because he was listed as a North Charlotte weaver.  Several other citizens, including 
Everett Wrenn and Walter Yandell, took bullets in their arms and legs.  Clem Wilson, 
however, simply received first aid for his concussion wounds and left for home.66   
     To maintain “law and order,” Chief Walter B. Orr circulated a warning through the 
Charlotte Observer and Charlotte News, concerning “the danger of rushing to the scene 
of any disturbance during the present street car strike.”  Orr‟s position became quite 
clear: “it is difficult for the police… to distinguish between active participants…and 
innocent spectators.”  Chief Orr‟s intimations of possible force worked to stifle further 
demonstrations in North Charlotte.67 Meanwhile, 600 National Guardsmen and 
militiamen patrolled central Charlotte for one week.  One “Special Officer,” David 
Ovens, later became a notable Queen City philanthropist and local politician.  Before the 
strike, the Canadian-born Ovens had supported the right of workingmen to organize, but 
he felt these demonstrators had gone too far.  Given a sidearm at the Charlotte Police 
armory, Ovens “hardly [knew] which end [of the gun] you fired from.”  His squad 
patrolled Dilworth, considered to be “the most vulnerable spot in town.”
68 
                                                 
     66  Whether Lewis Wilson bore any kinship to Clem or John Wilson remains unclear.  
(Charlotte Observer, 27 August 1919, 1-2; Charlotte News, 26 August 1919, 1).  
     67  Raleigh News and Observer, 26 August 1919, 1-3; Charlotte Observer, 27 August 
1919, 1-2; Charlotte News, 26 August 1919, 1. 
     68 David Ovens, If This Be Treason (Charlotte: Heritage House, 1957), 130-2; Pease 
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Throughout the Queen City‟s crisis, the president of Southern Public Utilities 
remained buoyant.  “I have carried my case to the people,” Zebulon Taylor boasted on 
August 27.  “They have placed their faith in the Power Company… [The people are] 
tonight patrolling the streets, waiting a possible riot call.  There is no sympathy for the 
strikers.”
  Taylor derided cooperative efforts by “Outside Instigators” to restore order 
following the strike.  He blamed the “Amalgamated” for stirring up sympathizers, and 
asked “Citizens of Charlotte” if they would like to “welcome its permanent citizenship.”   
Echoing Taylor‟s thoughts, ex-Governor Joseph “Little Joe” Brown of Georgia also 
wrote his own vicious diatribe against the AASERE, accusing them of conspiracy and 
murder across America.  Taylor ensured Brown‟s telegram appeared in several regional 
newspapers after the violence to discourage sympathy.69   
Mayor Frank McNinch also sought to punish Albert Jones, urging the Citizen‟s 
Committee to publicly retract its previous endorsement of AASERE Division 901.  While 
McNinch later re-established friendly ties with the Charlotte Central Labor Union, he 
could not afford to seem in league with perceived agitators.  On August 27, McNinch 
further approved laws permitting Southern Public Utilities‟ employees to carry firearms, 
citing an obscure Jim Crow statute reserved for race riots.  This decision, in no small 
way, allowed the strikebreakers to persist in their intimidation of Charlotte townspeople.  
Despite his wartime popularity, the Democratic mayor now stood vulnerable to political 
opponents, who prepared petitions for his recall within hours of the Dilworth shootings.70 
                                                 
     69 Joseph M. Brown to Z.V. Taylor, telegram, 26 August 1919, reprinted in Charlotte 
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     70 Raleigh News and Observer, 28 August 1919, 1; Charlotte Observer, 27 August 
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In contrast, Southern Public Utilities Magazine took a less combative approach 
toward the strike.  Estimating the costs at close to $500,000, John Paul Lucas asked his 
readers:  “What of the loss and inconvenience to the public?”  He openly regretted the 
bloodshed, which he blamed on the “criminal bent of troublemakers on the outside of the 
local car men‟s organization.”  Without specific references to the company‟s gun-
wielding strikebreakers or the riotous textile workers, Lucas roundly decreed these 
shadowy “troublemakers” as neither representative of the striking car men, nor “the best 
element” of Charlotte‟s organized labor.  These conciliatory gestures aside, Lucas also 
warned that unless organized labor is “purged” and controlled by the “fair-minded 
conservative element,” the AFL would soon face rigid regulation by the federal 
government in order to restore “normal equilibrium.”
71   
Predictably, the Charlotte Observer took on a tone smacking of “I told you so.”  
Blaming “false leadership” and “foreign influences,” the Observer extended condolences 
to aggrieved families, while portraying the fallen as victims of “misrepresentation” and 
“class feeling.”  Charlotte Observer editors charged the city‟s Central Labor Union with 
the responsibility of policing their ranks of radicals.  Charlotte News columnists decried 
“Red Terrorism” in the Queen City, accusing the AASERE of interference with Southern 
Public Utilities‟ peaceful “operatives of the cars.”  Essentially, both newspapers rendered 
lip service to theoretical rights of organized labor while condemning actual unions for 
attempting to practice these freedoms.  In contrast, both newspapers also praised the 
“courageous” actions of Charlotte policemen under Walter B. Orr‟s command.
72          
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News of Charlotte‟s short, bloody insurgence traveled across the nation, even 
appearing briefly in the New York Times.  Most regional newspapers remained curiously 
detached from Charlotte‟s affairs.  Raleigh‟s News & Observer and Columbia‟s The State 
covered the immediate events, but neither state capital newspaper offered much opinion. 
Charles O. Hearon‟s Spartanburg Herald focused more on national strikes.  Calvin 
Hemphill‟s Journal & Carolina Spartan noted one of the Charlotte National Guard 
officers, Army Lieutenant M.G. Caldwell, had led a South Carolina infantry unit in 
France.  The Greenville Daily News merely reprinted Charlotte editorials and Zebulon 
Taylor‟s company diatribes.
73        
Not every news editor throughout the region accepted the national streetcar union 
as a convenient scapegoat.  From the northern end of the Carolina Piedmont, the 
Greensboro News proclaimed drily that “the law in Charlotte… is still supreme.”  Citing 
a recent Charlotte lynching in which Walter Orr‟s officers failed to protect a single 
“wretched Negro,” the Greensboro editor derided the Charlotte police for their 
willingness to kill its own citizens in order to protect Southern Public Utilities streetcars.   
He concluded that the Charlotte strike had been “a sorry exhibition all round,” blaming 
Zebulon Taylor for his “contemptuous” rejection of compromise.74    
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169 
 
Columbia‟s Labor Advocate also covered the Charlotte strike from Marvin 
Ritch‟s courthouse speech onward.  Editor Charles Henry held Taylor liable for 
engineering the whole incident, having ignored pleas from the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Rotary Club of Charlotte.  However, Henry concerned himself more with the 
strike‟s localized effects in Greenville, South Carolina, where conciliator John W. 
Bridwell described an “acute” situation developing since August 26.  Taylor later 
admitted he had contemplated sending replacement workers to operate his cars in 
Greenville.  However, no Southern Public Utilities cars ran there for one week, nor did 
they operate in Winston-Salem.75 
One reason why Taylor may have reconsidered his strategy became apparent soon 
after the Dilworth incident.  Taylor‟s professional strikebreakers demonstrated a 
disturbing penchant for hair-trigger violence, even while National Guardsmen lingered in 
the city.  On Saturday, August 30, one streetcar ran through the wealthy residential sector 
of Myers Park, Taylor‟s one-time neighborhood.  Its operators were allegedly “trainers,” 
lacking the experience to handle the brakes.  When the Southern Public vehicle went off 
track, a nearby group of carpenters interrupted their work long enough to jeer at the 
crewmen.  In reply, these strikebreakers opened fire with their handguns.  Bullet holes 
were plainly evident at one private residence.  Taylor fired the offending streetcar men, 
but condemned the carpenters for their “very provoking” behavior.  While the Charlotte 
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Observer dutifully reported this Myer Park incident, their journalists and editors 
downplayed its darker ramifications.76  
Greenville‟s platform men were the first to surrender their strike on September 2, 
after meeting with H.E. “Smoke” Thompson of the South Carolina Arbitration Board.  
Charlotte streetcar workers settled with Southern Public Utilities on September 5, while 
Winston-Salem followed on September 6.  Zebulon Taylor honored the strikers‟ central 
requests for overtime hours and a graduated pay scale to 43 cents per hour.  Taylor also 
promised no discrimination toward former strikers, providing they were not involved in 
the Dilworth riot.  Jesse B. Ashe later recalled that Superintendent Wommack discharged 
a few troublemakers, but the company permitted the remainder, like prodigal children, to 
return to its fold.  Despite such magnanimity, Taylor also underscored the benefits of 
loyalty and servility when he subsequently rewarded Anderson‟s steadfast men 
preferential assignments and markedly higher wages, at 46 1/2 cents.77 
Federal Conciliator John Bridwell had temporarily vacated Charlotte on August 
30 when the news of Greenville‟s capitulation reached him in Atlanta.  Returning just in 
time, Bridwell played a leading role in the settlements offered Charlotte and Winston-
Salem‟s workers, who received slightly better arrangements than their compatriots in 
Greenville.  Total raises averaged about 9 cents hourly.  Bridwell consequently believed 
his role in the Carolinas almost complete, having “went further” than previous labor 
hearings to secure a favorable compromise.  Forty Southern Public electricians under D. 
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L. Goble still remained on strike, hoping for full union recognition, but Bridwell 
predicted they would fare no better than had the company‟s 163 streetcar employees.
78   
In late August, Solicitor John W. Abercrombie of the Labor Department also 
received a telephone call from U.S. Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina.  Overman 
also sent a formal request to investigate the Charlotte situation, hoping for a mutually 
beneficial adjustment.  Taylor certainly did not desire greater federal scrutiny, so this 
might also explain his expedited labor resolutions, as well as his decision in early 
September to discharge his remaining strikebreakers in anticipation of a settlement.79 
Albert E. Jones played no further role in the strike negotiations with Southern 
Public Utilities Incorporated.  John Bridwell confirmed Southern Public streetcar workers 
in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Greenville had reached their agreements in exchange 
for yielding national recognition.  Nevertheless, Jones reported a complete union victory 
in all three instances, gestures that researcher Carol Shaw describes as “face-saving cries 
in the wind.”  One also senses a policy of damage control at work.  Motorman and 
Conductor‟s first inkling of Charlotte‟s trouble arose during the AASERE‟s Seventeenth 
Convention.  On 11 September, President William Mahon briefly announced that Jones 
had just reported from Charlotte, where a “very serious situation existed.”  Mahon also 
demonstrated his near-complete detachment from the whole affair, characterizing the 
strike as being against three separate companies instead of one major corporation.       
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This would suggest Jones, as a Special Organizer, enjoyed broad authority and very little 
supervision throughout these proceedings.  In fact, Jones benefited from involvement in 
the Carolinas, receiving his promotion to 11th Vice President that same year.80        
North Carolina Lieutenant Governor O. Max Gardner supervised the restoration 
of order in Governor Bickett‟s absence.  North Carolina troops soon demobilized, 
departing Charlotte on the first of September.  Zebulon Taylor agreed to release Southern 
Public‟s “trainers” from their contracts, in anticipation of settlements with his workers.  
Yet, despite these tentative steps toward normality, Charlotte did not recover immediately 
from its summer of mistrust and class conflict.  When the streetcars resumed their 
accustomed runs, the North Charlotte lines were pointedly left without service for weeks 
to come. 81            
During these watchful days, state and county officials launched their inquest 
concerning the Dilworth shootings.  Meanwhile, the Central Labor Union engaged Jake 
Newell to represent their cause in the courts.  However, these legal procedures proved to 
be fraught with controversy.  Even a cursory investigation would reveal the Charlotte 
police‟s excessive use of force.  Newspaper accounts indicated no policemen or 
strikebreakers reported injuries sustained during the “Battle of the Barn.”  This fact John 
Bridwell also confirmed to his supervisor in Washington.  Moreover, Dr. J.R. Alexander 
of Presbyterian Hospital would swear that only one of the five dead men had suffered 
from frontal gunshot injuries.  This would suggest the police fired at fleeing protestors, 
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and not the angry, charging mob that Chief Walter Orr described on the night of August 
25.  However, no one drew much attention to this fact in subsequent courtroom 
testimony, nor did the major newspapers interview surviving gunshot victims.82 
Initially, the Mecklenburg County Coroner, Z. A. Hovis, dragged his feet, 
rescheduling the official inquest from August 28 to September 2, one week after the 
slayings.  Jake Newell grew impatient when this date fell through, and he expressed his 
personal doubts to Governor Thomas Bickett.  Evidently, Hovis had fallen ill on the 
inquest date, as had the clerk of court responsible for naming a deputy.  Moreover, 
another deputy coroner had been disqualified on a technicality.  Newell professed his 
desire to “discover the truth,” whether it exonerated or implicated his clients.  He also 
attested to “two hundred or more witnesses” who could speak of strikebreaker 
involvement at Dilworth.  He also alleged Chief Walter Orr fired his sidearm first.  
Newell concluded his letter with a plea for full state investigation.  However, little 
evidence exists to suggest Governor Bickett wanted to interfere in what was widely 
perceived as local politics.83       
Moreover, Raleigh‟s access to evidence appears to have been greatly limited.  
Days after North Charlotte‟s uprising, the Raleigh News-Observer still reported John 
Wilson as the chief culprit.  However, by this point, Charlotte police reports indicated 
Wilson carried no weapons.   Nevertheless, many conservatives were anxious to make an 
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example of unruly North Charlotte.  Carol Shaw‟s research hints that Southern Public 
Utilities had sought to “press the textile workers into submission.”  Before a grand jury, 
John Wilson received a lesser charge of inciting a riot, and subsequently left jail on a 
$2000 bond.  Mecklenburg County, stung by Wilson‟s release, approached the North 
Carolina Attorney General to prosecute John Wilson‟s impending trial in late September.  
However, in keeping with Raleigh policy, the state‟s attorney, John Hall Manning, 
believed local courts would find the truth “when the public is less excited.”
84   
So, if John Wilson did not carry a gun, then who fired the shot that triggered the 
“Battle of the Barn?”  During Wilson‟s preliminary hearing, Chief Orr would describe 
someone close to the defendant raising a handgun.  The chief‟s own sidearm 
subsequently got caught on his thumb, “discharging into the air.”85  Sheriff Newt W. 
Wallace believed the mystery shot came from Chief Orr‟s left -- perhaps toward the shop, 
where strikebreaking crewmen had taken cover.  Plummer Stewart, John Wilson‟s 
defender, keenly scrutinized the role of Taylor‟s men.  However, only one patrolman, 
Officer McKnight, corroborated the strikebreakers‟ involvement during the firefight.
86           
After John Wilson‟s arraignment and bail, a legal impasse in Mecklenburg 
County Superior Court threatened to ensue.  Charlotte‟s Labor Council, representing each 
trade union, made formal charges of murder and conspiracy against Chief Orr‟s staff and 
twenty-seven of Taylor‟s strikebreakers. However, the Charlotte police force refused to 
                                                 
     84 National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Division 
of Mediation and Conciliation, Box 111, Jake Newell to Gov. Thomas H. Bickett, letter, 3 
September 1919; Raleigh News and Observer, 30 August 1919, 1-2; Charlotte Observer, 
5 September 1919, 1-2;; Charlotte Observer, 5 September 1919, 1-2.   
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serve these subpoenas, obviously out of concern they could be implicated in the courts.87  
Jake F. Newell, representing the chief plaintiff, Clem Wilson, fought to have these 
subpoenas released in order to force the strikebreakers into court.  On September 1, chief 
strikebreaker T.J. Fitzgibbons had earlier faced charges for the shooting of Caldwell 
Houston, but five witnesses were unable to conclusively identify Fitzgibbons during his 
preliminary hearing.88  Unquestionably, the resultant Charlotte Police Trial diverted press 
attention from John Wilson, whose own defense against conspiracy charges encountered 
“woefully slow progress” in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.   
North Carolina Attorney General Manning soon held a conference with Charlotte 
officials and labor unions, and supported Jake Newell‟s case for a lawsuit.  Newell vowed 
to personally swear the warrants over any police objections, but he held back the warrants 
until the mayoral recall election, to avoid political complications.  Ultimately, fifteen 
strikebreakers and 31 police officers, including Chief Walter Orr, stood accused of 
murder by Charlotte‟s Labor Executive Board.  Newell had won his request for a full 
courtroom enquiry, but Orr welcomed such an investigation, maintaining his story.89 
The outcome of the Charlotte Police Trial hinged upon the political fortunes of 
their incumbent mayor.  During an October 21 recall vote, Mayor Frank R. McNinch won 
a sweeping victory, with a margin of 1,433 votes against J. Frank Flowers out of a total of 
5,273.90  During their single public debate on October 11, McNinch sparred with his 
Republican opponent.  Ridiculing the fact Frank Flowers had not been present during the 
                                                 
     87 Charlotte Observer, 24 October 1919, 4. 
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crisis of August 26; McNinch mocked the lawyer for missing his chance to be a 
“terrifying-looking policeman.”91  McNinch also publicly deprecated “the mobocracy” of 
organized labor in order to stay in office, but behind the scenes, the mayor consistently 
strove for a course of moderation.  McNinch‟s speech to the State Federation of Labor on 
9 August 1920 stated his opposition to “class government,” either by employers or 
workers.  His tough stance in 1919 had been primarily directed at “dangerous… radical 
leadership,” although McNinch did not directly implicate individuals.  Mayor McNinch 
not only supported rights of organized labor, but felt such worker‟s organizations, under 
“thoughtful and conservative leadership” would serve the “general good.”
92 
Despite McNinch‟s political victory, his opponents sought to make him squirm.  
On October 22, fifty-eight warrants were served to Chief Walter B. Orr‟s men and those 
strikebreakers not already discharged by Southern Public Utilities.  Republicans forced 
these summonses to overshadow McNinch‟s triumph.  However, these subpoenas proved 
difficult to serve, for many of Zebulon V. Taylor‟s hirelings had fled to other parts of 
North Carolina, or down toward Georgia and South Carolina.  Eventually, twenty former 
strikebreakers, including T. J. Fitzgibbons, stood in the docks once more in Charlotte.93 
Meanwhile, a war of words ensued in Charlotte, threatening to fan the flames 
once more.  Shortly before his defeat on October 21, J. Frank Flowers had denounced 
Police Chief Walter B. Orr for the five “unlawful deaths” at Dilworth.  In return, the 
Observer accused Flowers of cowardice.  Thereafter, a brief editorial battle sparked 
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between Charlotte Observer and the local worker‟s paper, Charlotte Labor Herald.94  
Chief Orr‟s court statement (endorsed by thirty-three policemen) made print in the 
Observer beside twelve „anonymous‟ Labor Herald reports. 95  If Flowers‟s witnesses 
withheld their identities, then perhaps they had good reasons to do so.  Chief Walter B. 
Orr had many powerful supporters in Charlotte.  During this era of renewed Ku Klux 
Klan, witness intimidation, even death threats were common occurrences, especially if 
one questioned the established order.  One did not need to be African-American to risk 
this new Klan‟s hatred of organized labor.  Because the Charlotte Observer sought to 
make straw men of labor witnesses, official summaries often discounted their testimony.   
Two witnesses said Chief Orr allowed the crowd‟s taunts to provoke his temper.  
Just after John Wilson accosted the chief, someone in the crowd mocked Orr for being 
such a “nice chief.”  Orr allegedly said “I‟ll show you what kind of a chief I am,” before 
firing his rifle -- most reports describe Orr firing his sidearm in the air.  But it is possible 
that Orr may have carried both rifle and pistol; Officer Thomas Merritt, Clem Wilson‟s 
actual assailant, certainly did.  This would also suggest Chief Orr had come looking for a 
quarrel.  Orr‟s former superior, Sheriff Newt Wallace, also had the difficult position of 
defending his former protégé‟s actions.  He acknowledged “considerable cursing” among 
the demonstrators, and that one had pronounced the chief a “son of a bitch” who had 
struck Clem Wilson.  But despite his earlier testimony that the demonstrators had been 
unarmed, Wallace now agreed that someone had fired to his left.96          
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As the rhetoric against Chief Walter Orr escalated, the Mecklenburg County 
Superior Court threatened to transform John Wilson into a scapegoat.  On the first of 
October, Solicitor George Wilson (no relation) shackled the hapless prisoner with two 
conspiracy charges.  Another magistrate, John Shaw, turned the court proceeding into a 
bully pulpit against labor movements, heedless of the fact John Wilson had carried no 
weapon on August 26, nor held any known union memberships.97  All the while, 
attorneys Edward T. Cansler and J.D. McCall coordinated Chief Walter Orr‟s defense set 
for November.   
Edward Cansler, a notable orator, had recently prosecuted Marvin L. Ritch in 
Albemarle, North Carolina.  Following the Dilworth incident, Ritch received several 
threats promising violence if he did not leave Charlotte.  Yet, Ritch persevered in his 
advocacy for textile workers.  On September 15, Ritch had organized two thousand 
textile workers in a strike against Wiscasset Mills.  Stanly County policemen suppressed 
the picketers, one of whom received a mortal gunshot wound.  Wiscasset strikebreakers 
joined in the fray, wielding axe-handles, while their opponents fought back with rotten 
eggs.  Ritch faced scorn in Charlotte, but later paid a fine.  Ann R. Brantley, Ritch‟s 
daughter, recalls that a prominent Stanly County citizen actually paid Ritch‟s bail.98 
Now it was Ed Cansler‟s turn to feel the squeeze.  Prosecutor Jake Newell fenced 
with Cansler for several days, providing Charlotte with a colorful clash of legal minds.  
Even Charlotte Observer reporters had grudging praise for the “wily” Newell‟s cross-
examination.  Several eyewitnesses testified that Chief Orr‟s unrestrained use of his 
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police revolver precipitated the “Battle of the Barn.”  R.C. Frazier stated the chief pushed 
a man away, brandishing his handgun.  “Get back or I‟ll kill you,” were Orr‟s alleged 
words, C.K. Coleman recalled when the shots began, strikebreakers poured out of the 
powerhouse to join the gunfight.  Other reports indicated the crowd fought with mere 
stones, liquor bottles and baseball bats.  All but two victims had been shot in the back. 99         
On November 21, Assistant Prosecutor John J. Parker forced Chief Orr to concede 
discharging the first shot.  Several officers verified their leader fired upward and away.  
Orr justified his conduct, stating thirty police officers could not have arrested the 
demonstrators yet still preserve order.  The chief thought he saw a gun in the crowd, 
maintaining he raised his own weapon to protect his face -- accidentally pulling the 
trigger.100  This statement remains at variance with Orr‟s first statement denying that he 
fired, yet no charge of perjury would ever be leveled against the Charlotte police chief. 
Reviewing the case from hindsight, one also should raise questions about Orr‟s 
reckless endangerment of Dilworth‟s citizens.  Although they were both children at the 
time, Myrtle B. Teague, and her sister, Frankie B. Graves, recalled the nighttime events 
of August 25.  Their father, Taylor Baker, had been a Southern Public Utilities motorman 
for many years.  On the night in question, fifteen-year-old Myrtle Teague and six-year-
old Frankie “heard the bullets hitting the screens,” outside their bedroom window.  Frank 
Lethco also reported bullets “coming right toward [his] house,” located across the street 
from the streetcar barn.  One of the slain men actually fell before Lethco‟s dining room 
window.  Finally, an unsubstantiated account from one of J.F. Flowers‟s eyewitnesses 
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claimed that a Mrs. Smith of Louise Avenue was indeed injured by a stray bullet, and 
taken to an undisclosed hospital by her husband.101   
Between Chief Orr‟s contradictory statements and the real possibility of further 
lawsuits against the police force, Mecklenburg County faced a serious dilemma.  Should 
Chief Orr incriminate himself further, the city of Charlotte might be held accountable for 
five deaths.  On November 23, Superior Court justices F.B. Alexander and J. Lee Sloan 
moved to exercise damage control.  The two justices summarily dismissed the 
prosecution‟s charges against Chief Orr.  “Whatever verdict we might render… would 
subject us to an immense amount of criticism,” Alexander ruled.  “That a very 
unfortunate tragedy has happened in Charlotte cannot be denied,” he added.  “There must 
be some latitude… left to the parties, else we may as well put a dummy on the bench.”
102 
Moreover, the courts refused to charge Clem Wilson for court costs.  “We cannot 
adjudge the [legal] action was frivolous and malicious… [The plaintiff] had a right to 
come into the courts.”  Yet Judge Alexander also believed “those five mounds in the 
cemetery… do not have to be marked by gravestones to refer to this for ages to come… 
we have to take into consideration [those] responsible for the misfortunes.”
 Rather than 
blame the living, the Mecklenburg Courts placed culpability on the five dead men, to 
prevent them from becoming martyrs.103  The sensational Charlotte Police Trial was over.   
Apparently, the Queen City wished to put this unpleasant occurrence behind 
them.  Even the Charlotte Observer made no further mention of the strike, following the 
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courtroom verdict of November 23.  John Wilson‟s fate remains unclear, given the 
absence of complete trial records.  According to Carol Shaw, Wilson faced trial in 
criminal court in September, yet no mention is made of such a trial.  At worst, one can 
hope Wilson may have received hard labor or fines, if not outright acquittal.104   
According to Fritz Lang‟s Metropolis, “the mediator between head and hands 
must be the heart!"  If so, why did this “very unfortunate tragedy” occur in North 
Carolina‟s own metropolis?  Zebulon Vance Taylor, the head of Southern Public Utilities 
Company, undermined hope for compromise.  The executive had no qualms about 
employing big-city strikebreaking tactics, circulating defamatory propaganda, while 
recruiting a private army to crack down on his rebellious workers.  Beyond question, 
these heavy-handed methods got big-city results.  In so doing, Taylor demonstrated a lack 
of compassion toward his workers, despite his outward professions of generosity. 
Furthermore, Zebulon Taylor showed disrespect and contempt toward his 
progressive colleagues, who had all but hammered out a trial contract recognizing the 
streetcar union for one year.  In so doing, Mayor Frank McNinch and Public Works 
Commissioner Arthur H. Wearn affirmed the right of local workers to unionize, even as 
they gestured to regional mistrust by excluding organizer Albert Jones from the 
discussions.  Taylor not only slighted Mayor McNinch, but other commission members, 
such as W.S. Alexander, C. A. Williams, and Clarence O. Kuester – respected city 
leaders.  Seventy-five years later, Clarence Kuester, Jr. remembered his father‟s horror 
when he came back from the scene on South Boulevard and Bland Street.  “Booster” 
Kuester had earned his reputation as “a great diplomat,” preferring to “smooth matters 
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over and for people to get along.”  Thereafter, the Charlotte leader recalled the strike with 
bitter disappointment. 105   
One could liken Taylor‟s refutation of the August 23 commission decision to an 
absolutist monarch defying a parliamentary decree.  Obviously, Taylor did not recognize 
municipal or state authority when it contradicted his business policy.   Perhaps Taylor‟s 
own past as Greensboro mayor gave him the impression he knew what was best for the 
Queen City.  If not for Taylor, Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Greenville might well have 
followed the successful union model of Columbia, South Carolina.  As one Charlotte 
historian, David Goldfield, remarked in 1994, “Civility, not conflict, characterizes the 
decision-making in the corporate culture of Charlotte.”  Most historians, from Carol 
Shaw to Dan Morrill, tend to agree the local union men and city officials acted with 
civility, leading up to Taylor‟s deployment of strikebreakers on August 24.106  
While David Goldfield‟s assessment of Charlotte business may ring true in 
modern times, this research into Charlotte‟s history does not substantiate any such claim 
during the first part of the twentieth century.  One could hardly describe Edward Latta‟s 
high-handed actions in 1903 as an example of cordiality and gentlemanly conduct toward 
his workers.  Unless “civility” is defined by Wade Harris‟s vicious newspaper attacks, 
Zebulon V. Taylor‟s browbeating tactics, or Chief Walter Orr‟s excessive violence, then 
one should look elsewhere.  While Mayor Frank McNinch and Clarence Kuester acted in 
good faith, they unfortunately lacked the clout to make a crucial difference in preventing 
the Charlotte tragedy.    
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Without local support, Charlotte‟s AASERE Division 901 gradually withered on 
the vine.  In March 1922, the Charlotte streetcar union formally disbanded due to low 
membership.  Ultimately, the defeat of streetcar workers in Charlotte meant a major 
setback to regional forces of labor – particularly streetcar unions.  Within scant weeks of 
Charlotte‟s debacle, Knoxville, Tennessee, experienced its own streetcar strike, leading to 
another defeat.  Reverses in South Carolina and Georgia also occurred.  Readers should 
also keep in mind the simultaneous struggle for textile mill workers in the Carolina 
Piedmont.  Even while Charlotte‟s public transportation lay paralyzed in that summer of 
1919, Palmetto textile mills in Rock Hill and Aragon struck for higher wages.  Then, 
Marvin Ritch led the disastrous strike at Wiscasset Mills, in Albemarle County, North 
Carolina, in September.  Over 6,000 textile workers participated in autumn strikes as 
widespread as Macon, Georgia, and High Point, North Carolina.  Quelled by Georgia 
state police, Macon strike leaders faced jail sentences, while North Carolina Governor 
T.W. Bickett personally resolved the High Point strike.107   
Almost a decade would pass before unionism recovered sufficiently for future 
recruitment drives in the Upper Carolinas.  By then, electric streetcars were in decline, 
and the AASERE presence in the Carolinas a mere shade of its former self.  The next 
chapter will chiefly examine the subsequent reversals of streetcar unionism in 
Spartanburg and Columbia, South Carolina.  In the latter case, Division 590 experienced 
two strikes, a brief contractual argument in February 1920 and a more serious lockout, 
beginning in January 1922.   But Charlotte‟s immediate effects may well have affected 
the outcome of October 1919‟s streetcar strike in Knoxville, Tennessee – a major 
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reversals in early 1920 require further assessment in light of the outcome of Charlotte‟s 
“Battle of the Barn.”       
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Chapter 7:  All Covered With Rust 
 
Columbia, a city of 40,000 during the 1920s, today serves as a gateway to the 
Upcountry textile mill region.  Once a major labor stronghold in the South, Columbia 
ultimately proved to be the last major battleground for streetcar labor.  Under new 
postwar leadership in 1920, the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company 
(CRG&E) sought to eliminate their streetcar union, Division 590, ostensibly as a cost-
cutting measure.  Meanwhile, a strengthening anti-labor climate in Columbia revealed a 
deeper peril for unionism.   It would be too simplistic to view this chapter merely as a 
Gotterdammerung for the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway 
Employees.  Instead, Columbia‟s episodic strikes in 1920 and 1922 should be interpreted 
as a symptom of general decline in South Carolina‟s urban labor culture.   
Throughout the Charlotte regional strike, Columbia‟s labor community kept 
abreast of developments.  Charles Henry of the Labor Advocate continued his support for 
conservative labor politicians.  His newspaper endorsed Democrat John Hughes Cooper 
during an off-year Congressional election in 1919.  Long a supporter of unionism, John 
Hughes Cooper also won favor among Greenville textile workers for his opposition to 
immigration.  Two other Upcountry pro-labor candidates, Colin Monteith and George B. 
Timmerman, also relied on mill supporters in the 1920 state elections.  In 1918, AASERE 
Division 590 president Ambrose A. Gerald and his lieutenant, William D. Hampton, had 
each won seats in 1918 as South Carolina legislators, representing Richland County.1        
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Initially, Division 590 of Columbia, like most of its local counterparts, remained 
distantly sympathetic toward the Charlotte strikers.  There were no demonstrations in 
Columbia, nor were there specific editorials concerning the major strike occurring to their 
north.  However, the tense events of August 1919 were still on the minds of labor leaders.  
On Labor Day, Columbia‟s workingmen chose to observe the holiday without any 
demonstrations or parades, ostensibly to enjoy a peaceful holiday with their families.  
One week after Labor Day, Charles Henry saluted “Lucky Columbia” for escaping 
“strikes, riots, dissentions (sic), and chaos.”  Henry likely meant the Labor Day violence 
of Centralia, Washington, but once more, Charlotte loomed in the regional backdrop.  
Charles Henry also reminded his readers that “Employer and Employee have learned that 
it is more profitable to grasp the hand than the throat of each other.” 
2 
In October 1919, Charles Henry, the self-styled “Conservative Labor Leader,” 
assailed the “carnival of strife” fomented by Bolshevik radicalism across the nation.  In 
this spirit, Henry renamed the Labor Advocate of Columbia, perhaps as a gesture toward 
the country‟s gathering anti-labor atmosphere.  Until January 1920, Henry published the 
Trade Review, a rather bland, non-confrontational masthead if ever there was one.  
Despite this shift in attitudes, Henry still supported the local streetcar union of Columbia.  
That same month, the Trade Review boasted the benefits of organization, citing Division 
590‟s decade-long record of 9-hour workdays, competitive wages peaking at 44.5 cents, 
seniority benefits, and arbitration guarantees.  Henry also commented on high worker 
morale, with very few accidents and low turnover rates.3 
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On October 7, the very same day Charles Henry extolled Columbia‟s streetcar 
service, AASERE Division 767 struck after Knoxville Railway and Light Company 
(KRL) refused to renew a favorable contract brokered in August 1918 by the National 
War Labor Board.  KRL manager Charles H. Harvey, in a feat of legal legerdemain, 
reasoned that his workers would have to take their contractual grievances up with the 
NWLB, an organization that no longer existed by October 1919.  Like Charlotte‟s recent 
upheaval, the Knoxville strike erupted into violent demonstrations after Harvey, sent 
armed strikebreakers – including ex-WWI soldiers -- to man his streetcars.  Strike 
sympathizers, aided by the local policeman‟s union, clashed in late October with vigilante 
groups led by the local Tennessee Law and Order League.  Historian James A. Burran 
also underscores the complications of Knoxville‟s recent race riot, plus an ongoing coal 
mine strike in Kentucky and East Tennessee.  Hostilities did not cease until Tennessee 
Governor Albert Roberts mobilized troops from Camp Gordon, Georgia.4    
Burran‟s research does not correlate to similar events in the Carolina Piedmont, 
but one may assume Knoxville did not exist in a vacuum in 1919.  Henry‟s Trade Review 
noted a meeting of the Tennessee Labor Convention just before the Knoxville strike, 
which Burran speculates may have inspired Division 767 toward militancy.  Moreover, 
Columbia‟s labor paper covered the strike‟s particulars, including the city‟s decision to 
ban public displays or parades in an effort to quell labor sympathizers.5   
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By 1920, Knoxville‟s Division 767, established in September 1917, had ceased to 
exist in all but name.  Most of its membership had already sought other employment.  
Shortly after the Knoxville strike, the city railway company fell into receivership. 
Knoxville‟s defeat of streetcar labor in some ways mirrors the outcome in Columbia, 
South Carolina‟s 1922 strike.  However, this labor defeat still lay ahead when Charles 
Henry blithely forecasted “the wave of industrial unrest [had] reached its crest, and is 
now on the wane.”  Endorsing Woodrow Wilson‟s measures to investigate labor 
grievances, Henry blamed the U.S. Congress for inactivity and “war-profiteering” 
capitalists for its intolerance of responsible labor unions.6 
Soon after, Charles Henry‟s influence in Columbia ended when the Trade Review 
of Columbia passed into different hands in 1920.  Reasons for this transition have been 
lost with passage of time.  Given the forthcoming changes in the weekly paper‟s format, 
one might guess finances might have been a major factor.  Throughout the paper‟s short 
existence, Henry consistently exhorted his readers to advertise their business in his 
newspaper.  But, following the holiday issue of 26 December 1919, C.H. Parks took over 
as editor, and T.A. Wilson became Trade Review‟s publisher.  By April 1920, T.A. 
Wilson took over permanently as both editor and publisher of a reduced bimonthly labor 
newspaper, numbering only four pages. Reductions could not save the paper; Columbia 
Trade Review seems to have vanished by the end of 1920.7   
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In late January 1920, Columbia witnessed a brief walkout of AASERE Division 
590 over the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company‟s renewal of their annual 
contract.  Interestingly, in January 1920, Franklin H. Knox had assumed the presidency 
of CRG&E, replacing Edward Robertson, who had respected the union‟s request for a 
contractual guarantee for “closed shop” preference.  Whether Knox‟s takeover of 
Columbia‟s utility services had connections to Southern Power remains unclear, but his 
subsequent actions in Columbia and Spartanburg expose Knox‟s redoubled determination 
to completely destroy the streetcar union across the South Carolina Upcountry.8 
The first inkling of trouble surfaced in the Trade Review, which reported: “Street 
Railway Employees Want Renewed Contract.”  No renewal of Division 590‟s exclusive 
contract had been forthcoming after its expiry on December 31, 1919.  John B. Lawson, a 
special organizer for the Amalgamated Association, sought negotiations with the new 
company management, only to be rebuffed.  Lawson soon discovered “company 
officials” had drawn up “yellow dog” contracts to break the streetcar union‟s influence.  
Furthermore, Knox turned away a local delegation from the Columbia Federation of 
Trades requesting a modest raise for the streetcar workers.  However, Governor Robert 
A. Cooper and Senator Pearce both urged the new president of Columbia Railway to 
bargain with the unions.  According to union spokesmen, a trolley strike was “by no 
means improbable.”  In a show of solidarity, car barn workers and electricians also went 
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on stand-by until an agreement could be reached.  After nearly a month of patience, 
Division 590 finally staged a peaceful walk-out on 28 January 1920.9 
Predicting a long “tie-up,” Columbia Record journalists initially sought to remain 
balanced in their interviews with strike principals.  CRG&E president Knox outlined his 
refusal to accept any new contract proposal retaining Section 15, stipulating a closed shop 
policy.  Knox even agreed to the sought-for wage increases, if only streetcar workers 
omitted the union clause, which he claimed no longer applied in peacetime.  Without a 
National War Labor Board to enforce original contracts, Knox reserved his right as 
CRG&E‟s chief executive to nullify prior agreements made by his predecessor.
10  
Toward this end, Knox placed a full-page advertisement in the 29 January 
Columbia Record.  Taking a page from Zebulon V. Taylor, Knox rhetorically asked: 
“Why Did the Men Quit Their Jobs?”  He blamed their purported act of “bad faith” on 
questionable advice from their leaders.  Claiming the “closed shop” provision had been a 
mistake, Knox cited possible abuses, should the union demand that the company collect 
their unpaid dues.  As proof of his professed fairness toward labor unions, Knox upheld 
his willingness to grant the Electrician‟s Union a raise.
11   
To rebut Knox‟s arguments, Ambrose Gerald of Division 590 stressed to reporters 
that CRG&E‟s closed shop guarantee had been observed for eight years by Edward 
Robertson.  Gerald alleged that Knox only made an issue of union membership to “divert 
the public eye” from the real issue, Division 590‟s relatively low wage scale.  With 
Columbia‟s recent fare increase from 5 to 7 cents, Gerald believed Knox could easily 
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afford a living wage for his men, especially since Columbia streetcar men were paid 
somewhat less than Knox‟s employees in the smaller town of Spartanburg.12  
By the first week of February 1920, the transportation strike in South Carolina‟s 
capital city threatened to embroil both Governor Cooper and the South Carolina General 
Assembly.  Headlines reported “No End in Sight for Car Strike,” as Governor Cooper 
supervised two fruitless conferences between union representatives and company 
president Knox.  South Carolina‟s road engineer, D.G. McAlister, acted as mediator, 
perhaps because Governor Cooper may have been too deeply involved.  Under political 
pressure from the South Carolina House of Representatives, Governor Cooper soon 
referred the strike negotiators to the State Conciliation Board, helmed by two familiar 
figures with streetcar strike experience -- Benette E. Geer of Greenville, and H.E. 
“Smoke” Thompson of Batesburg.  Geer and Thompson were joined by W.H. McNairy 
of Chester.  Streetcar workers expressed their desire for hourly wages peaking at 54 
cents, plus union recognition by CRG&E.  Knox offered 52 cents per hour in exchange 
for dropping the issue.  Both sides refused to budge on the sticking point of recognition.13 
How did the Columbia public respond to this episode?  Fears of major railway 
strikes spiked, as major railroads reverted to private service at the end of February.  
Revealing their corporate biases, Columbia Record editors Charlton Wright and Walter 
Duncan openly accused the street railway men of making “ill-timed demands” and 
promoting “class interests” in their support for government control.  When conservative 
anti-labor assemblymen proposed to ban the closed shop in South Carolina, the Columbia 
                                                 
     12 Columbia Record, 28 January 1920, 1.   
     13 Columbia Record, 1 February 1920, 2; 4 February 1920, 3; 13 February 1920, 4; 
Trade Review of Columbia, 27 February 1920, 1-2.  
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Record upheld such legislation, stating that a given employer “should be free to follow 
his purpose without the intervention of the law.” 
14 
In the final week of February 1920, the McDonald Anti-Closed Shop Bill went up 
for votes.  This state proposal aimed to restrict collective bargaining and ban public labor 
demonstrations.   Over two hundred workingmen were present during the session to 
demonstrate their solidarity.  Most Upcountry representatives opposed this proposal.  
Only Congressman Gray of Spartanburg sided with the anti-labor delegates, who 
mounted an unsuccessful filibuster.  Reporting from Columbia, C.H. Parks of the Trade 
Review hailed the McDonald Bill‟s defeat as South Carolina labor‟s “greatest victory.”15   
South Carolina‟s McDonald Bill coincided with similar anti-union proposals at 
every level.  During 1919, no fewer than seventy sedition bills were introduced in 
Congress.  C.H. Parks singled out the proposed Graham-Rice Sedition Bill in Trade 
Review, warning this legislation could imperil the national labor movement, as it called 
for censorship of all labor newspapers, with restrictions over the use of postal services.  
Striking workers could be tried on conspiracy charges, facing imprisonment for twenty 
years.  Under this code, even landlords who privately rented to labor unions could be held 
liable.  Given Columbia‟s well-established union leadership, the McDonald Anti-Closed 
Shop Bill, and its many federal counterparts, would have done great injury to the 
workingmen of South Carolina.16 
                                                 
     14 Columbia Record, 7 February 1920, 4; 10 February 1920, 1; 13 February 1920, 1. 
     15 Trade Review of Columbia, 27 February 1920, 1-2; 12 March 1920, 1. 
     16 In 1921, the Graham-Sterling Bill passed into the U.S. Senate as the more stringent 
Graham Peacetime Sedition Bill.  However, this bill ultimately failed to become federal 
law.  (Trade Review of Columbia, 27 February 1920, 1-2; 12 March 1920, 1; Eliot 
Asinof, 1919: America’s Loss of Innocence (Donald Fine, Inc.:  New York City, NY, 
1990), 174-75).  
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Meanwhile, the first Columbia streetcar strike entered its second week with little 
hope for resolution.  With little fanfare and no newspaper coverage, Albert E. Jones 
arrived from Ohio. Now the AASERE‟s Eleventh Vice-President, Jones met with South 
Carolina‟s Conciliation Board to settle a dispute that threatened to eclipse Charlotte.  On 
February 6, Jones garnered some company concessions for Ambrose Gerald‟s striking 
motormen.  In exchange for Knox‟s 52-cent hourly wage offer, Columbia‟s Division 590 
regretfully sacrificed their “closed shop” status.  However, Gerald‟s streetcar crewmen 
retained their union recognition and bargaining rights with Columbia Railway.  
Significantly, this new contract for 1920 did not include Knox‟s signature.  Witnessed by 
“Smoke” Thompson and Ambrose Gerald, CRG&E General Manager V. S. Wright 
signed for the company president, who had other problems brewing.17   
Division 590‟s strike coincided with similar disgruntlement for Spartanburg‟s 
Division 897.  In April 1920, Columbia Trade Review reported further “car trouble” at 
South Carolina Light, Power, and Railway.  Workers complained that, since the 
resolution of their strike in July 1919, one of their streetcars still operated on city streets 
with replacement crewmen.  They also alleged President Knox had failed to abide by his 
earlier promise not to discriminate against union employees, resorting to discriminatory 
practices designed to force union members to quit their jobs.  New recruits signed 
“yellow-dog” contracts with Spartanburg Power and Light, promising not to join the 
now-depleted ranks of Division 897.  These actions mirror Knox‟s strategy in Columbia, 
where his new broom sought to sweep clean at CRG&E.18   
                                                 
     17 Motorman and Conductor. Vol. 28, No. 3 (February 1920), 12; Vol. 28. No. 4 
(April 1920), 11-12, 32-34. 
     18 Trade Review of Columbia, 9 April 1920, 1-2; Fetters, 91. 
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Offenses toward streetcar union members continued to accumulate.  Spartanburg 
Division president H.E. Sitton requested a wage increase in late 1919.  But Knox had 
refused to even look at a new 1920 contract proposal from union representatives.  The 
contract mirrored the original bargain struck in 1919 by the Spartanburg arbitration 
process, except for a modest wage increase up to fifty cents per hour for the senior men.  
Knox‟s actions might be seen as cost-cutting measures, considering that SCLP&R had 
steadily lost money since 1916.  But the company president‟s pettiness knew no bounds.  
Knox also broke his July 1919 guarantee of monthly vacation days, leading T.A. Wilson 
of the Spartanburg Central Labor Union to sympathize with the strikers.  He defined the 
“unrest fermenting in Spartanburg” as the results of a “plain case of discrimination” 
against the labor union that had caused Knox so much recent grief.19 
H.E. Sitton appealed to South Carolina‟s Labor Department, whose 
representative, William C. Liller interceded unsuccessfully on behalf of the Spartanburg 
chapter.  Columbia‟s Local 590 planned a rally on 15 April, to demonstrate support for 
their neighboring local union in distress.  However, a second streetcar strike did not take 
place in Spartanburg.  In forcing the streetcar union to knuckle under in Spartanburg, 
Knox may have taken some grim satisfaction for his previous defeat in 1919.  If so, Knox 
did not savor his victory in Spartanburg for very long. South Carolina Light, Power and 
Railway owed several debts to various corporations, including $13, 358 to General 
Electric.  During February 1921, Spartanburg‟s street railway system fell into state 
receivership.  This development could not have pleased Zebulon Taylor, as Southern 
                                                 
     19 Trade Review of Columbia, 9 April 1920, 1-2. 
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Public Utilities still owned stock in the Spartanburg-based utility enterprise.  Knox, 
however, still retained control of Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company. 20 
During the watchful year of 1921, Columbia Railway also began to lose revenues, 
as even fewer people rode the trolleys in Columbia.  Inexorably, private automobiles and 
jitney buses had begun to eclipse the electric streetcar across the region.  Transportation 
historian Thomas Fetters -- slightly biased toward the business side -- blamed CRG&E‟s 
decline on town ordinances designed to keep one-man cars out of Columbia.  Fetters also 
cited the company‟s recent fare hikes to seven cents (ten cents for transfers) as another 
factor.  Yet, Franklin Knox‟s ensuing actions in early 1922 reveal his underlying motive 
to purge the local streetcar union. 21 
In January 1922, Knox submitted a new contract deemed unacceptable by the 
union, chiefly because its terms no longer guaranteed arbitration.  Knox further cut his 
workers‟ pay scale by a full 10 percent, and announced his plan to introduce one-man 
cars.  Division 590‟s president, Ambrose A. Gerald, told Columbia reporters that his men 
decided to “stomach wage reductions,” but felt union arbitration rights were “inviolable.”  
Gerald, recently elected to a third term as Richland County‟s representative, also served 
as the South Carolina House Chairman on Railroads.  Gerald‟s platform also boasted a 
plan for textile mill reforms.  While the South Carolina Senate defeated Gerald‟s proposal 
for eight-hour workdays, Gerald sponsored a successful bill enforcing statewide 
                                                 
     20 South Carolina Gas and Electric Company purchased South Carolina Light, Power, 
and Railway‟s assets for $1,000,000 on July 31, 1922.  After several years of sporadic 
streetcar service, Southern Public Utilities re-purchased the property in December 1928, 
and Spartanburg‟s streetcar services limped along until Duke Power phased out all its 
trolley systems in favor of motor-bus transportation lines in 1936.  (Trade Review of 
Columbia, 9 April 1920, 1-2; Fetters, 91-94). 
     21 Fetters, 46-47. 
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maximums of 55 hours per week.  He also authored the Discharged Laborers Act, 
requiring corporations to pay employees immediately upon dismissal.22  Holding a 
distinguished state office, as well as union leadership, A.A. Gerald proved a formidable 
adversary for Franklin Knox throughout the coming months.        
After a tense month, with Knox refusing to renegotiate with Gerald‟s union, 
matters came to a serious head.  On Valentine‟s Day of 1922, Knox discharged 21 
streetcar men, citing his company‟s rising overhead.  Nearly all these employees 
belonged to the Columbia streetcar union.  On February 15, President Knox publicly 
aired his business concerns, explaining his street railway had deficits totaling 
$119,758.46.  Furthermore, CRG&E‟s state property taxes were unpaid as of February, 
raising the company‟s total debt to $209,758.46.  Knox argued that his decision to 
discharge its employees was solely based on January losses of $11,886.32.23   
That same day, Ambrose Gerald led his workers on strike.  Gerald accused Knox 
of seeking to destroy the Columbia streetcar union, claiming that his 21 discharged 
compatriots were all local members in good standing.  Nearly all Columbia Railway‟s108 
conductors and motormen belonged to Division 590, so Knox‟s mass firing reduced the 
union‟s strength by one-fifth.  Gerald informed the AASERE General Executive Board 
that Knox displayed an “attitude threatening to dismiss more,” with the “apparent 
purpose of destroying the organization.”   Undisputedly, President Knox of the Columbia 
Railway had taken a calculated risk in triggering this second streetcar strike in two years.  
Under Columbia city law, his company had 90 days to resume service or lose its 
                                                 
     22 Columbia Record, 15 February 1922, 1, 10; Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 30, No. 
3 (February 1922), 13-14, 24; Vol. 30, No. 10 (September 1922), 8-9. 
     23 Columbia Record, 15 February 1922, 1, 10; Fetters, 46-47. 
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exclusive contract.  Once more emulating actions of Zebulon V. Taylor, Knox purchased 
a full-page advertisement in the sympathetic Columbia Record to submit his case.  
Moreover, Knox decided to confront Gerald in the public forum.24    
First, Knox replied to Gerald‟s imputations of hostility to unions, emphasizing his 
policy aimed to “give every man a square deal.”  However, the wily president refused to 
allow Gerald any leverage for argument.  “Just what [constitutes] a square deal cannot be 
defined in any agreement, as it is a very broad term,” Knox hedged.  Then, Knox warned 
his striking workers, as well as the general public, that CRG&E might soon “find it 
necessary to discontinue operations.”  On the subject of state arbitration, Knox felt his 
company “could not agree to submit to arbitration the question of whom we shall employ 
or discharge.”  Claiming his right to decide CRG&E‟s best course, Knox instructed 
Ambrose Gerald and his supporters to “consider the position of this company final.”  In 
the company president‟s view, the 108 strikers brought the resulting lockout on 
themselves.  Knox washed his hands of all blame.25 
Within a few days, A.A. Gerald made a press statement, albeit without front-page 
coverage.  In Gerald‟s estimation, Knox may have desired to cut costs, but felt his union 
compatriots had been unjustly fired “without a clear purpose.”  Gerald suggested the 
reduction of older streetcars in CRG&E‟s service might cut operation costs.  Gerald 
reassured Columbians that his union did not seek to control the company through closed 
shop doctrines.  As a state legislator, Gerald believed state laws providing for worker 
arbitration would justify their cause.  He proposed an arbitration plan, wherein labor and 
                                                 
     24 Columbia Record, 15 February 1922, 1, 10; Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 30, No. 
3 (February 1922), 13-14. 
     25 Columbia Record, 15 February 1922, 1, 10.  
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capital each would have one representative.  Since Division 590 and Knox would likely 
not agree on a mediator, Gerald suggested the Columbia mayor, R. Johnson Blalock.26 
Mayor Blalock held a town meeting during the strike‟s first week, endorsing the 
arbitration process.  However, the mayor could not compel Knox to cooperate with the 
State Board of Conciliation.  Moreover, as Columbia served as the state capital, Blalock 
most likely deferred this serious labor matter to Robert A. Cooper, still in office as a 
lame-duck governor.  Throughout the month of February, both the mayor and governor 
kept their own counsel, coordinating with the State Board of Conciliation.  Meanwhile, 
John B. Lawson from the Amalgamated Association‟s General Executive Board came to 
assist the local union.27 
Columbia Record editors predicted the city‟s streetcars would remain “idle for 
many days,” observing the city‟s “traveling public” used streetcars less frequently.  
However, there were still “many who depend on street railways.” Though streetcar tracks 
were “covered with rust,” the strike at least kept the company “out of more losses.” 
28 
Meanwhile, Ambrose Gerald, true to his word, went to the state legislature with his 
special arbitration proposal, which quickly passed both houses of South Carolina‟s 
General Assembly.  This narrowly-stipulated legislation applied specifically to Columbia, 
requiring CRG&E‟s management to fully explain its firing of employees.  Moreover, it 
re-affirmed the city‟s 1917 wartime measure, requiring streetcars to run with experienced 
crewmen, or substitutes with two weeks of training under such motormen.  Violators 
                                                 
     26 Columbia Record, 16 February 1922, 1; 17 February 1922, 1; 18 February 1922, 1; 
19 February 1922, 1, 3. 
     27 Columbia Record, 17 February 1922, 1; 18 February 1922, 1; 19 February 1922, 3. 
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could face maximum fines of $100 or jail sentences of up to one month for each day of 
operation.  Such measures were designed to prevent Knox from hiring strikebreakers. 29  
By February 22, Governor Cooper had signed the Gerald Arbitration Act into law, 
naming Former Richland County Sheriff John McCain as the mediator.  However, 
Columbia Railway attorney J. B. Lyles questioned the constitutionality of Gerald‟s 
measure, especially the clause re-affirming the streetcar regulations.  When the State 
Attorney General‟s office indicated the existing ordinance was indeed constitutional, J. B. 
Lyles promised to challenge the state‟s ruling in the South Carolina Appeals Court.
30   
On February 27, Lyles went before Associate Justice T.P. Cothran to secure an 
injunction against lower courts and labor representatives to prevent them from enacting 
either the Gerald Act or the 1917 statute.  Invoking that well-used ploy of businessmen, 
the 14th Amendment, Lyles claimed the Gerald Act hurt his company‟s profits because it 
prevented them from hiring new motormen.  He also alleged that no other utility 
company in South Carolina had to deal with such discriminatory regulations. 31 
As Justice Cothran weighed the Gerald Arbitration Act‟s legality, CRG&E 
president Knox appealed once more to public opinion, demanding the right to select his 
company‟s own motormen and conductors, specifying their work conditions, and 
reserving the power to discharge them without arbitration.  Knox certainly had supporters 
among the business community of Columbia.  Charlton Wright and Walter Duncan 
editorialized in the Columbia Record after the strike‟s second week had passed. 
Addressing the “Car Strike,” Wright and Duncan summarily dismissed the local streetcar 
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union, a respected part of Columbia‟s labor movement for ten years, as a mere 
organization “banded together for their private purposes… without the least responsibility 
towards the public.”  The editors also considered the 1917 ordinance too powerful for the 
likes of such an “unimportant group to bludgeon the company into submission.”  While 
claiming to support only the public‟s interest, Columbia Record‟s editors openly sided 
with the company‟s desire for “some freedom of action.” 32  
By the end of February, the Columbia streetcar strike of 1922 developed into a 
stalemate.  William A. Coleman told reporters that the City Council alone could not bring 
a ready solution, although its members continued to work as private citizens to bring an 
end to the impasse.  City Council members proposed to refer the strike to the state courts, 
which agreed to review the case on March 7.  In the meantime, South Carolina 
representatives adopted their own measure to investigate Knox‟s claims of financial 
hardship.  Under W.D. Barnett‟s resolution, state tax commissioners would investigate 
Columbia Gas, Railway, and Electric‟s tax claims.  Barnett‟s resolution passed amid 
doubts whether it would affect the state‟s forthcoming judicial review. 
33   
Meanwhile, the city of Columbia dealt with the transportation shortage through 
means of a legitimate jitney service.  On March 1, the Chamber of Commerce approved 
two local organizations of volunteer drivers, calling themselves the “Jump in and Ride” 
and “Ride with Me” movements.  William Lykes served as city transportation chairman, 
funding signs and placards to inform suburbanites of the city‟s assembly points.  
Needless to say, “Jump in and Ride” and “Ride with Me” programs were well-received 
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     33 William Coleman shortly thereafter succeeded R. J. Blalock as mayor of Columbia. 
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by auto owners, because participation allowed them to make spare change.  Several 
hundred townsfolk assisted in this initiative to relieve the streetcar strike during the rainy 
season.  Coincidentally, state lawmakers took a courtesy ride on a newly paved Richland 
County road on March 3, promoting a budget for improved South Carolina roads.34  
Division 590 seems to have tolerated these voluntary driving programs, if only 
because they discouraged would-be passengers from riding non-union streetcars.  
Whereas streetcar unions often saw jitneys as unfair competition under normal 
circumstances, such measures could prove beneficial during a strike.  Such had been the 
case in Charlotte almost three years earlier.  For now, the Columbia streetcar union 
concentrated on the March 7 court proceedings, which would determine the final 
authority over the streetcar situation.   On the night prior to their court date, John Lawson 
and A.A. Gerald rallied their supporters at the courthouse.  Censuring the Columbia 
Railway‟s obduracy, Gerald nevertheless promised his men would “go to work in the 
morning” if their company offered contracts similar to Charleston‟s recent agreement, 
guaranteeing overtime benefits and city arbitration, among other rights.35 
Columbia Record thereafter dismissed the union‟s courthouse demonstration as 
“staged gestures,” because its audience consisted solely of union members, or those with 
political grudges against the Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company.  “Public 
utilities in Columbia have long been the football of small politicians and small 
candidates,” the editorial opined, taking a subtle swipe at Ambrose Gerald‟s political 
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career.  Columbia Record openly sided with “vitally interested” businessmen who “work 
for a living,” with implications that Gerald and his supporters were not industrious.36 
After a week‟s deliberation, the Columbia court ruled on the strike.  As state 
capital, Columbia‟s street railway system came under “direct scrutiny” of the South 
Carolina Board of Railroad Commissioners.  This governmental body had just been 
expanded by the state legislature from three to seven panelists.  Immediately, the 
Railroad Commission ordered Columbia Railway to get their streetcar lines running 
within one week, or they would assume control.  Franklin Knox now faced a serious 
deadline, complicated by the fact Augusta, Georgia‟s streetcar lines commenced with a 
strike of their own.37   
Shortly after the court‟s ultimatum, Knox delivered one of his own:  Columbia 
Railway streetcar men had until noon, March 17, to cross the picket line, or risk being 
replaced by new workers.  Knox promised nine-hour shifts, recognizing seniority 
wherever possible, but claimed the right to dismiss employees without union arbitration.  
A.A. Gerald read the company‟s proffered contract, and promptly rejected Knox‟s 
demands, on grounds that his terms would return Division 590 workers to the exact 
obligations they had endured prior to the strike.38   
However, Knox‟s appeals met with some success.  Some prior streetcar crewmen 
defected from the union, while others applied for vacant positions.  Columbia Railway 
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Superintendent J.W. Spence later told reporters that 35 men in total had answered 
CRG&E‟s first calls for employment.  Some recruits came from Georgia, North Carolina, 
and Virginia.    With a small workforce prepared to resume car service within the week, 
Knox felt confident enough to decline Gerald‟s contract proposal, under supervision of 
the state Railroad Commission.  While Governor Cooper had expanded the commission‟s 
powers to act in the public interest, it lacked the power to compel Knox into City Hall. 39 
Columbia‟s city councilors, in the meantime, agreed that South Carolina‟s 
Railroad Commission, with its broad authority, obviated the need for the city‟s wartime 
ordinance restricting streetcar crewmen from operating cars without training.  This 
decision dashed Gerald‟s hopes of testing the 1917 law against Knox‟s new employees.  
This sent a clear sign to Division 590 that their days in Columbia were numbered.40 
On March 20, Columbia Railway activated three streetcars for limited service in 
downtown Columbia.  That afternoon, one of Knox‟s streetcars passed the Union Hall on 
the 1500 block of Main Street.  Two crewmen were allegedly dragged from their posts by 
a small crowd.  Police could find no injured parties on Main Street, but discovered 
broken windows toward the streetcar‟s rear.  One operator, Brooks, later claimed to have 
been blackjacked.  Three men were arrested.  Meanwhile, a second report brought two 
carloads of policemen to Colonial Heights, where a crewman and one passenger had been 
taken to Columbia Hospital for treatment.41 
Mayor Blalock and the city magistrates heard both cases on the next day.  
Conductor H.T. Shannon accused three defendants, J.L. Jennings, D.K. Spiers, and S.P. 
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     40 Columbia Record, 20 March 1922, 1. 
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Snelgrove, of participation in the Main Street incident.  However, owing to a lack of 
corroborative witnesses, Jennings, Spiers, and Snelgrove were released on peace bonds, 
free to go as long as no further problems arose.  In the meantime, Columbia police had 
apprehended two men in connection with the Colonial Heights incident.  B.S. Ward, J.O. 
Williams, and three others were seen following the Colonial Heights streetcar in an 
automobile prior to the assault.  Ward and Williams were both charged with multiple 
counts of assault and battery, while the other suspects were held on lesser charges.42   
Indubitably, such incidents significantly damaged the union‟s standing in 
Columbia.  Columbia Railway took their cars off-line to prevent further damage, and 
Knox appealed to Governor Robert Cooper for protection.  Cooper vowed to protect the 
streetcar service, even promising to deploy the National Guard if necessary.  His 
justification for such a drastic step hinged upon the company‟s compliance under the 
state Railroad Commission.  Meanwhile, the city of Columbia charged the men of 
Division 590 to refrain from further hostility.  Gerald pledged to exert discipline among 
his ranks, even as Columbia Railway‟s streetcars resumed service on March 22. 
43  
Throughout the tense days of late March, Gerald persisted in seeking lawful 
means to end the company lock-out.  On March 23, Associate State Justice Cothran 
finally upheld the Gerald Act‟s provisions for state arbitration.  However, CRG&E‟s 
attorney, J.B. Lyles, insisted his company did not require arbitration, as it had already 
complied with the state Railroad Commission‟s order to resume street railway services.  
Moreover, Lyles argued that Judge Cothran‟s ruling could not alter the company‟s 
ongoing process of employing and training new workers.  Unfortunately for Division 
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590, Lyles had built a persuasive case against the 1917 law.  Under its wartime 
provisions, new streetcar workers were required to train for fifteen days under 
experienced motormen.  Since some veteran workers had already crossed the picket line, 
Knox‟s strikebreakers now had qualified trainers.  But the question now remained 
whether these new men were trained for the requisite period before assuming duty.44 
This legal point quickly became moot.  Ambrose Gerald brought his test case to 
the Richland County courthouse, where County Judge C.J. Kimball dismissed the 
streetcar union‟s case against T.C. Chalker, a replacement motorman accused of violating 
the wartime code.  In rebuttal, Chalker testified to several years of streetcar experience in 
Jacksonville, North Carolina, corroborated by CRG&E superintendent J.W. Spence.45   
Furthermore, Kimball sided with Columbia‟s city councilors, believing the state 
Railroad Commission overrode city law, effectively repealing the wartime condition on 
street railways.  One might question whether due legal process had actually repealed the 
ordinance in question, or if these decisions simply reflected widespread opposition 
toward the law‟s original intent – to protect Division 590 from downsizing and 
strikebreakers.  Gerald promised to appeal Kimball‟s ruling to higher courts.  Shortly 
after Kimball‟s decision, the union representatives appealed to the District Court to name 
a state arbiter who would force Franklin Knox to listen to grievances.  Knox, however, 
maintained that arbitration would put his company out of business.46   
By Monday, March 26, ten Columbia Railway streetcars were running under 
police guards, with an eleventh car joining them on the next day.  By March 29, twelve 
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streetcars plied their routes across Columbia.  That week, Mayor Blalock ordered six 
policemen to convoy each streetcar, with five officers in automobiles and one astride a 
motorcycle.  Rural police and sheriff‟s departments were to escort streetcars over 
CRG&E‟s three suburban lines.  Citing public safety, Blalock asserted his regard for the 
streetcar union, refusing to blame Gerald‟s men for the recent violence.  Blalock blamed 
“other elements” for taking advantage of the Columbia strike to commit crimes.
47  
Only one arrest took place under these vigilant circumstances, which lasted until 
March 30.  Will Etters, rumored to have been involved in the Colonial Heights incident, 
openly criticized police escorting the streetcars.  More serious charges awaited J.O. Ward 
and B.S. Williams, the two men charged with leading the Colonial Heights attack on 
March 20.  Already booked on charges of assault and battery, with murderous intent, 
these two men also faced possible federal prosecution, as two Columbia streetcars had 
been carrying U.S. mail on the date in question.48 
Even after Mayor Blalock‟s removal of police escorts on March 30, some officers 
were kept on station at suburban lines to deter vandals.  Franklin Knox welcomed the 
normalization, even going so far as to accept A.A. Gerald‟s word that his union chapter 
did not authorize the violence on March 20.  But Knox‟s magnanimity had its limits.  
Even as he reassured Gerald that his policy did not mean a war against organized labor, 
the general manager of Columbia Railway still refused to meet with state arbitrators.49 
With the Columbia street railway system in full service under replacement labor, 
South Carolina‟s capital city went back to normal.  But the streetcar union held on until 
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the bitter end.  J.B. Lawson kept in contact with A.A. Gerald and his loyal band of 
streetcar workers.  Throughout the remaining months of 1922, union correspondents 
informed Motorman and Conductor that CRG&E operated its streetcars at a loss.  Low 
patronage had taken its toll on the company, even while strikebreakers received full pay.  
Meanwhile, some of the streetcar workers began operating “auto-buses” to “care for the 
people.”  Such tactics were also practiced in Richmond, Virginia, where another lock-out 
had endangered two AASERE chapters since January 1922.  In Columbia, independent 
jitneys now competed with the streetcars their drivers had once operated with pride and 
purpose.  Transportation historian Thomas Fetters confirms that these buses had a 
palpable effect on CRG&E‟s economic decline over the next few years.50 
By June 1922, Division 590 recognized their fight with Knox as being “one to the 
finish.”  At James B. Lawson‟s urging, the AASERE General Executive Board granted 
Division 590 full relief from its membership dues as they struggled for survival.  
Columbia Railway increased its operational cars to twenty-two vehicles by July.  
Division 590‟s correspondent also noted the company‟s losses had continued to deepen, 
owing to decreased patronage.  Union men attributed low patronage to popular opposition 
toward “scabs.”  Such men, in the words of one union member writing to Motorman and 
Conductor, were “undermining the shaft that will fall upon their own heads.” 
51                       
By November 1922, most of the Division 590 members had sought other 
professions, or became bus drivers in competition with their former company.  Rumors 
                                                 
     50 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 30, No. 5 (April 1922), 1; Vol. 30, No. 6 (May 
1922), 12-13; Vol. 30, No. 7, (June 1922), 15; Fetters, 49.  
     51 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 30, No. 7, (June 1922), 15; Vol. 30, No. 8, (July 
1922), 15; Vol. 30, No. 9 (August 1922), 15; Vol. 30, No. 11 (October 1922), 14-15, 25, 
31; Vol. 30, No. 12 (November 1922), 12.    
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circulated that Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company teetered on the edge of 
receivership under Stone & Webster that fall.  However, the union members reported the 
same “self-seeking” company management remained in charge of Columbia Railway that 
December.  Following the holidays, fortunes did not improve for A.A. Gerald‟s union 
chapter.  Motorman and Conductor‟s last contact with Division 590, April 1923, stated 
“it is problematical as to how long this condition will survive.”52        
Knox‟s successful strategy against the streetcar union yielded a pyrrhic victory at 
best.  In this goal, Knox had the willing aid of many influential state and local authorities, 
which outmaneuvered the forces of labor in the courts and public opinion.  But Thomas 
Fetters indicates Columbia‟s defeat of unionism did not solve CRG&E‟s problems.  
Operating streetcars at a loss, competition from former personnel, and rising passenger 
fares all took their toll on the Columbia utility corporation.  But Fetters also brought up 
another major catalyst in streetcar decline, borne out by the newspapers of the era.  Even 
while the streetcar strike had been but a month old, Columbia townsfolk were already 
preparing for the second of three Palmetto State Festivals, known colloquially as 
Palmafesta.  Sponsored by South Carolina‟s Chamber of Commerce, these auto festivals 
encouraged local dealerships and promoted state roads.53       
Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric Company declined after the strike.  In 1922, 
South Carolina tried to seize an unfinished canal from CRG&E, citing the state‟s original 
possession of the property.  Since 1917, the utility company had failed to complete a 
                                                 
     52 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 30, No. 12 (November 1922), 12, 24; Vol. 31, No. 
1 (December 1922), 12-13; Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1923), 14-15; Vol. 31, No. 3 
(February 1923), 13; Vol. 31, No. 4 (March 1923), 13; Vol. 31, No. 5 (April 1923), 13.   
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hydro-electric dam, yielding 500 horsepower to the city of Columbia.  Expensive lawsuits 
and countersuits accumulated, until the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the company‟s 
property rights in January 1923.  By 1925, Franklin Knox had been replaced by F. K. 
Woodring.  Patronage on Columbia Railway trolleys had fallen quite dramatically, a one-
third reduction from the previous year‟s figures.  Columbia‟s Chamber of Commerce, 
likely noting the success of competing motor-buses on the city streets, suggested CRG&E 
should replace their trolleys.  Columbia Railway ceased to exist in 1934.  Columbia, 
however, retained a few electric streetcars for interurban lines until they were retired in 
1936.  That same January, Franklin H. Knox passed away at age 71.54 
With the proliferation of automobiles, as well as Columbia‟s lobby for better 
roads, public opinion ultimately found the streetcar union question of marginal relevance.   
Despite operating at a loss, Columbia Railway, Gas, and Electric still managed to starve 
the local streetcar union out of existence.  Ambrose Gerald had built a successful local 
streetcar union, lasting barely a decade.  Like those of Charlotte, Winston-Salem, 
Greenville, and Spartanburg, Columbia‟s streetcar men were victims of the “open-shop” 
movement, later known as the “American Plan.”  But, unlike Zebulon V. Taylor, Franklin 
H. Knox had won his personal war against industrial democracy.  Although his campaign 
to break AASERE Division 590 proved a Pyrrhic victory, Knox emerged victorious 
without firing a single shot.
                                                 
     54 Franklin Knox died on January 16, 1936, and was interred in Spartanburg County.  
(Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric Co. v. State of South Carolina, U.S. Supreme Court, 
261 U.S. 236 (1923);  South Carolina Genealogical Society, Pinckney Chapter, South 
Carolina Cemetery Survey, Spartanburg County, Volume 3 (Magnolia Church of the 
Advent:  Oakwood, South Carolina, undated), 261; Fetters, 49-50).  
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Chapter Eight: Epilogue and Conclusions 
 
Wheels of progress ground across the Piedmont‟s millstone, even as the streetcar 
strikes of Spartanburg, Charlotte, and Columbia receded into unhappy memory, and then, 
near-obscurity.  While the previous chapter addressed the fate of Franklin Knox‟s 
enterprises in South Carolina, this chapter will summarize the successful evolution of 
Southern Public Utilities into Duke Power, focusing upon its transition from electric 
street railways to bus lines.  Furthermore, principal figures involved in the Carolina 
Piedmont streetcar strikes will receive final analysis.   
Streetcar labor organization in the Carolina Piedmont withered on the vine after 
the events of 1919-22.  Neither Columbia‟s nor Spartanburg‟s unions survived Franklin 
Knox‟s waiting game.  Motorization soon obviated the demand, if not the need, for 
trolley systems in South Carolina‟s major towns.  By the mid-1920s, Charleston remained 
the only South Carolina town with unionized street railways.  In North Carolina, 
Charlotte‟s union had disbanded in the spring of 1922, while embryonic organizations in 
Salisbury and Durham, North Carolina (Divisions 920 and 923) also came to naught.  
Winston-Salem‟s movement lingered on for a brief time, but soon, Division 893 followed 
Charlotte‟s union into oblivion.  Both Asheville and the coast city of Wilmington 
experienced strikes that jeopardized their streetcar unions, but in both cases, new 
contracts preserved old agreements.  By 1925, Asheville Division 128 sent the Western 
Carolinas‟ sole union delegate, William B. Plemmons, to the AASERE‟s annual 
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convention.  Between Asheville, Wilmington, and Charleston, no signs of the streetcar 
union remained in the Carolina heartlands throughout the next two decades.1  
Southern Public Utilities quickly regained its economic momentum after the 
Charlotte strike.  Company sources estimated over $100,000 in lost revenues and 
property damage, plus at least $400,000 in lost business.  Returning streetcar men were 
said to have lost $40,000 in wages and expenses.  John Paul Lucas of the Southern Public 
Utilities Magazine speculated the total loss approached “three-quarters of a million 
dollars,” with some estimates closer to a full million.  “Crippled companies do not 
expand and provide work… and service for more people,” Lucas observed.  Yet, 
Southern Public Utilities – and Southern Power – were far from crippled.  By 1922, 
James B. Duke had built ten hydroelectric and four steam plants, providing 93 percent of 
the Carolina Piedmont‟s utility needs.  Seventy-five percent went to textile mills, while 
15 percent went to manufacturing and agricultural interests.  The remaining thirteen 
percent went to towns and select households – Duke was much slower to embrace rural 
electrification.2   
Duke‟s growth accelerated the modernization of North and South Carolina‟s 
Piedmont regions, but it also alarmed other businessmen, as well as the governments.      
Even while the Charlotte Regional Strike took place, the Salisbury & Spencer Railway 
Company built an anti-monopoly case against Southern Power, which went to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in December 1919.  Later in 1920, James B. Duke and Zebulon 
                                                 
     1 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 27, No. 10 (September 1919), 11; Vol. 30, No. 1 
(December 1921), 32-33; Vol. 31, No. 4 (March 1922), 8; Vol. 33, No. 3 (February 
1925), 14; Vol. 33. No. 11 (October 1925), 10.  




Taylor also faced state hearings before the North Carolina Corporation Commission.  
Since 1913, state Democrats had sought to limit Southern Power‟s utility rates.  In 1920, 
the Corporation Commission in Raleigh sponsored a rate-control bill.  Duke listened from 
the gallery as Zebulon Taylor and William States Lee argued on the corporation‟s behalf.  
One should note Duke‟s rare personal appearance.  Herman Wolf, an engineer employed 
by Southern Power at that point, later recalled that Duke did not “take kindly to 
interference with his electric rates.”  Despite strong popular support, North Carolina‟s 
regulatory measure failed to pass General Assembly by a single vote in March 1921.3   
Soon after his victory, Zebulon V. Taylor passed away on 18 April 1921.  
Taylor‟s death occurred en route to New York aboard James B. Duke‟s personal train.  
Taylor‟s official cause of death appears to have been “acute indigestion,” but the 
company president had also lost his wife and suffered from appendicitis in 1920.  Others 
speculated Taylor‟s personal exertions during Southern Power‟s “Rate War” may have 
also taken their toll.  In Habits of Industry, Allen Tullos described a similar fate for D.A. 
Tompkins in 1914, because “strenuous” devotion to his North Carolina business empire 
left little room for “exercise and recreation.”  It would seem both Tompkins and Taylor 
had fallen prey to their own Protestant work ethic, taken to its most extreme conclusions.  
Numerous tributes poured out to Taylor from regional newspapers, as company treasurer 
E.C. Marshall quickly assumed control of Southern Public Utilities.4   
                                                 
     3 Henry C. Spurr, Public Utilities Reports Annotated (Rochester, New York:  Public  
Utilities Reports, Inc., 1920), 688-713. 
Charlotte News, 1 August 1920, 3; Durden, 160-163; Wolf interview.  
     4 Southern Public Utilities Magazine, (Vol. 6, Nos. 11-12), April-May 1921, 1-11; 
Irving Scales-Taylor, death certificate, November 18, 1920, North Carolina State Board 
of Health; Turner; Coleman and Humphreys; Randolph County Courier Tribune, 21 
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James B. Duke‟s legacy has been well-documented by Robert Durden and other 
historians.  In December 1924, Duke set aside $40 million for the Duke Endowment, 
funding several colleges across the Carolinas.  One-third went to Trinity College in 
Durham, North Carolina, renamed Duke University in its benefactor‟s honor.  Two 
Charlotte colleges also benefited from Duke‟s generosity; the traditionally black Johnson 
C. Smith University and the Presbyterian Davidson College.  Duke‟s friend and trustee, 
Ben E. Geer, also received support for Furman College in Greenville, South Carolina.  
Yet, James B. Duke did not live long enough to see his vast endowment come to fruition.  
In the fall of 1925, the entrepreneur developed pneumonia, dying in his New York City 
mansion on October 10, at age 68.5       
In 1927, Southern Power changed its name to reflect its creator, a man who 
undoubtedly fulfilled the New South ideal, whether or not he believed in it.  That year, 
Southern Public Utilities continued to appropriate streetcar lines, gaining 30 cars and 19 
track miles in Greensboro and High Point.  Duke Power retained Southern Public Utilities 
until its absorption in 1935.  Duke Power went on to become the most significant utility 
company in the South, a leader of the so-called “Piedmont Carolinas Movement,” a 
consortium of industrialists and “go-getters” who followed in James B. Duke‟s wake.  
Low wages continued to prevail through the region, although Duke Power did not lay off 
                                                                                                                                                 
April 1921, available from http://www.asheboro.com/ons/obits/1920-1929(S-T).html; 
Internet; accessed 22 April 2003. 
     5 Benjamin Duke, who encouraged his younger brother to accelerate his endowment 
program before time ran out, died on January 8, 1929.  (Durden, 153-92; Tullos, 164-66)  
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its workers during the Great Depression.  Herman Wolf recalled how Southern Public 
Utilities and its parent company “stuck together like a family” during the ongoing crisis.
6   
Transportation historian Walter Turner indicated that even during the 1920s, the 
North Carolina Corporation Commission had been discouraging toward electric 
streetcars.  Competition with modern highways, auto-bus traffic, and a three-fold growth 
in car ownership, plus the costs of road maintenance, had rendered streetcars an 
endangered species.  Smaller towns, such as Concord and Goldsboro, adopted buses just 
before the Great Depression.  Other towns made the transition more slowly.  Asheville, 
Raleigh, and Greensboro each reported high levels of ridership until the late 1920s.  But, 
when these cities ended their street railway franchises in 1934, others began to follow 
suit.  High Point and Winston-Salem ended streetcar service in 1935 and 1936.  Trolleys 
remained one of Wilmington‟s popular beachside attractions, but in 1939, their bells 
clanged for the last time.7 
On 15 November 1937, the North Carolina Utility Commission approved Duke 
Power‟s proposal to replace its aging streetcar lines with bus service throughout the 
company‟s sphere of influence.  Over the years, Southern Public Utilities had 
experimented with trackless trolleys and motor-buses.  Finally, the company settled on 
motorized buses, because they were perceived as “nearly noiseless” and more flexible 
than street railways.  With 15 buses already in service, Duke Power estimated 45 more 
vehicles would be required over a six-month period.  Within one year, most of the old 
                                                 
     6 Duke Power‟s consolidation of Southern Public Utilities in 1935 may have been a 
measure to absorb the debts accumulated from its failing street railway systems.  
(Durden, 136; Tullos, 166-70; Wolf interview; Coleman and Humphreys).   
     7 Walter Turner, “Development of Streetcar Systems in North Carolina,” available 




streetcar terminals were remodeled and modernized for Duke‟s bus-lines.  Although 
“dime taxis” still competed for passengers in 1938, the new Charlotte bus system now 
served approximately fifty percent more citizens than had the street railway system.  
Duke‟s highly publicized bus campaign, with comfortable seats (in comparison with 
streetcars at least) and well-appointed bus terminals, met with public approval throughout 
the Carolina Piedmont.8 
Over the course of several decades, Duke Power (now Duke Energy) engineers 
followed the traditions of William States Lee and Herman Wolf, providing electricity for 
residential districts and corporate sectors.  Today, Charlotte has become a metropolis, 
dominating much of South Carolina‟s Upcountry, despite state boundaries.  Parallel 
developments in Arkansas have allowed Bentonville to dominate the Ozarks.  Bethany 
Moreton‟s To Serve God and Wal-Mart examines the evolution of Sam Walton‟s 
business empire, which not unlike Southern Power derived its original work-force from 
rural people steeped in Protestant work ethic, patriotic virtues, and hostility toward 
organized labor.  Even in the midst of the Great Recession, Wal-Mart has proven resistant 
to labor reform, and consistently purges union sympathizers from its outlets.9  
To borrow an apt political adjective, entrepreneurs such as Zebulon Taylor and 
Franklin Knox were “irreconcilables” toward organized labor.  They usually employed 
lawful means to exert their will, but were capable of legal chicanery to outmaneuver 
unions.  To these civilizers of the Piedmont, organized labor represented a barbaric 
“foreign” power seeking to stir up their otherwise content employees with false promises.  
                                                 
     8 Duke Power Magazine, Vol. 22, No. 5, (November 1937), 1-2. 
     9 Thomas T. Fetters, Palmetto Traction (Forty Fort, PA:  Harold E. Cox, 1978), 46-9; 
Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart (Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 103-4.   
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While this work duly acknowledges James Duke‟s philanthropy, Southern Power‟s 
language belies the benevolent image constructed by Robert Durden and others.  Zebulon 
Taylor, in particular, comes across as paternalistic toward workers and yet inflammatory 
toward labor reformers, who were consistently – some would say unjustly -- portrayed as 
“aliens” or “outsiders.”  But Duke and Taylor were not unusual cases of corporate 
paternalism, nor were they the worst.  Historian Allen Tullos describes the role of 
conservative Protestantism in determining the long “stretch-outs” and “speed-ups” for 
textile mill hands and streetcar workers.  Enlightened fathers of Piedmont industry knew 
best what their employees needed:  more work.  Free time, some employers argued, 
would permit black and white workers more opportunity for the Devil‟s work.  Some 
probably viewed joining a labor union in one‟s spare time an even worse sin than 
rampant alcoholism.  After all, labor organizers were portrayed as urban liberals wishing 
to force their alien views on the pure, American South.  Whipping up prejudices, New 
South industrialists effectively blocked workers from unionizing.10   
The events detailed in Between the Wheels also wrought significant changes on 
regional North and South Carolina politics.  Mayor Frank R. McNinch became one 
casualty of the 1919 strike, at least in the short term.  One of McNinch‟s Charlotte rivals, 
F.M. Shannonhouse, characterized Charlotte‟s 1919 recall election as a public 
condemnation for the progressive mayor‟s initial reluctance to use force against the 
“rapidly growing spirit of Bolshevism.”  For his part, McNinch regretted the violent 
outcome, and he seemed to quickly lose enthusiasm for Charlotte politics.  On a rainy 
August evening one year after the strike, he addressed the State Federation of Labor at a 
                                                 
     10 Tullos, 134-71.  
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local high school.  The mayor felt Charlotte had “misinterpreted and misjudged” 
organized labor‟s motives during a period of high passions.  McNinch voiced his 
philosophical opposition to “class government,” whether by powerful industrialists or 
labor agitators.  Instead, he exhorted Charlotte‟s workingmen to use “constructive… 
lawful methods” to effect positive changes, avoiding the influence of “gold-diggers” with 
“selfish purposes.”  Shortly after this revealing speech, Frank R. McNinch resigned as 
Charlotte‟s mayor to accept a regional position with the National Recreation Association 
of America, the forerunner of our present-day National Recreation and Parks Association.  
In this capacity, McNinch spent nearly a decade in the political wilderness.11   
Over the ensuing two decades, Frank McNinch‟s later career reflected the difficult 
path of Southern Progressivism.  In 1928, McNinch styled himself an “independent 
Democrat,” convincing many North Carolinians to reject Alfred Smith, a Catholic who 
opposed Prohibition.  Frank McNinch also stumped in favor of the conservative National 
Origins Act of 1924, invoking the wrath of W. J. Cash, managing editor of the Cleveland 
Press in Shelby, North Carolina.  Deriding the concept of “Nordic Superiority,” Cash 
also accused McNinch of extending the nation‟s “anti-Catholic pogrom” for his own 
political ambitions.12      
                                                 
     11 F.M. Shannonhouse, “How the Recall Worked in Charlotte,” from the National 
Municipal Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1920); Thames Ross Williamson, Readings in 
American Democracy (Boston:  D.C. Heath and Company, 1922), 512-14; Charlotte 
Observer, 9 August 1920, 1. 
     12 Cash argued for a principled immigration control, instead of a selectively 
discriminatory policy.  W.J. Cash might well be Wilbur J. Cash, author of The Mind of 
the South.  Cleveland County, North Carolina, is a western Piedmont county adjacent to 
Mecklenburg.  (William S. Powell, editor, Dictionary of North Carolina Biography, Vol. 
4 (Chapel Hill & London: University of Chapel Hill Press, 1991), 184-85; Cleveland 
Press. 28 September 1928, 4).   
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Like the arch-conservative North Carolina Senator Furnifold M. Simmons, Frank 
McNinch defected to the “Hoovercrats,” reaping great political rewards.  Under the 
Federal Power Commission‟s statute, Hoover had to name one member from the 
opposition party, so McNinch seemed a safe bet.  In December 1930, the Senate 
confirmed McNinch (47 to 11) as a member of the regulatory commission, governing 
public utility programs and energy resources.  Despite Hoover‟s expectations, the short, 
unflappable North Carolinian soon boasted a progressive anti-monopoly record heralding 
the New Deal.  Under Franklin Roosevelt, McNinch became the Federal Power 
Commission president, visiting the Netherlands in 1935 for the World Power Conference.  
McNinch also supported the New Deal‟s rural electrification programs, using Federal 
authority to escalate processes once begun through private industry. 13  James B. Duke 
and Zebulon V. Taylor would likely have balked at such comprehensive changes.     
In 1937, McNinch became the first director of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), once appearing on the front cover of Time.  McNinch opposed the 
manipulation of communications by political interests, stressing equal time for 
oppositional viewpoints.  McNinch‟s biographical entry asserts his steadfast opposition to 
censorship.  However, McNinch‟s defense of free speech reached its limit after actress 
Mae West irked the religious Southerner with one of her ribald witticisms on the air.  
During World War II, McNinch went back to his lawyerly roots, serving as special 
                                                 
     13 “National Affairs:  When is a Democrat?” from Time, 29 December 1930, available 
from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752716,00.html; Internet; 
accessed 9 August 2009; Powell, 184-85.  
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assistant to the Attorney General until his retirement under the Truman administration.  
Frank Ramsay McNinch died on April 20, 1950.14   
Chief Walter Baxter Orr, the man most responsible for escalating the crisis in 
Charlotte, suffered little adversity for his conduct on August 25, 1919.  Nor did Orr ever 
face perjury charges for contradicting his first testimony shortly after the “Battle of the 
Barn.”  Unlike his mentor, Sheriff Newt Wallace, Orr lacked the patience to control large 
crowds.  Relatively young for his newly-appointed rank, Walter Orr nonetheless faced a 
thankless situation.  But one is judged by their actions under duress, and Orr‟s 
mishandling of the Dilworth situation speaks volumes.  Chief Orr retained his position 
until March 26, 1926, when he retired after twenty years.  Thereafter, Orr served as 
director of Charlotte‟s Sanitary Department, where he once more courted controversy 
over his zealous enforcement of sanitation across Charlotte.  Walter Baxter Orr passed 
away on April 24, 1957, mourned as a lost part of “old Charlotte.” 
15      
Attorney Marvin Lee Ritch continued to reside in Charlotte, coaching Charlotte 
High School‟s football team and maintaining his legal practice.  However, Ritch suffered 
for his efforts on behalf of Piedmont workers.  For his leadership during the Wiscasset 
Mills strike, Ritch paid over $500 in fines and court costs, and he subsequently lost a 
1920 bid for U.S. Congress as a “Square Deal” Democrat, largely due to an editorial 
smear campaign.  Ann R. Brantley confirms that her father‟s continual endorsement of 
                                                 
     14  “Power Men Scrutinized,” from Time, 22 December 1930, available from 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,740824,00.html; Internet; accessed 
26 February 2007; “QRX,” from Time, 16 May 1938, available from 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,759694,00.html; Internet; accessed 
26 February 2007; Powell, 184-85; McNinch interview. 
     15 Donna Johnson, Descendants of James “Whistling” Orr, 2008, available from 
http://www.geocities.com/pawcreek.geo/orr/nti00120.htm; Internet; accessed 9 August 2009. 
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liberal causes hurt his political career.  But there were happier moments for Ritch.  In 
April 1922, the widower married his wife‟s first cousin, Lois Wilson, an emancipated 
college graduate from a prominent Gaston County family.  Within ten years, the Ritch 
family had grown to include two more daughters.16     
Throughout the next two decades, Ritch represented a coterie of legal clients, 
including disabled mill workers, high-profile murder suspects, even a former Ku Klux 
Klan member.  Ritch‟s expanding legal practice enabled him to build a house for 
$17,000, which he ultimately lost during the Depression.  During the Second World War, 
Ritch won two non-consecutive terms (1939-42) as a New Deal Democrat in the General 
Assembly, but lost to Clyde Hoey in a bid to succeed U.S. Senator Robert Reynolds.  
Thereafter, Ritch switched to divorce law, even while still coaching high school athletics.  
During the 1950s, Ritch supported integration of black athletes in North Carolina schools.  
Helped by state voting district reforms in 1966, Marvin Lee Ritch returned once more to 
the North Carolina General Assembly, at a venerable age of 77.  But plagued by diabetes, 
Ritch suffered a stroke in 1971, and died in Charlotte at age 82.17 
Concerning the South Carolina personalities, far less information is currently 
available.  Franklin H. Knox, as mentioned previously, died in 1936, the same year much 
of the Piedmont‟s electric streetcar service converted to motorization.  Benette Geer 
continued to act as a trustee to the Duke Endowment for the remainder of his life.  During 
                                                 
     16 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1930, Mecklenburg County, Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Charlotte Observer, 21 November 1919, 1; Gastonia Daily Gazette, 19 May 1920, 1-2; 
Lumberton Robesonian, 24 November 1919, 4-6; Brantley interview. 
     17 Gastonia Daily Gazette, 9 July 1925;  13 November 1926, 6; 26 October 1927, 6; 
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World War II, Geer came out of business retirement to serve as a Roosevelt appointee on 
the National Labor Relations Board, representing the textile industry‟s interests during 
arbitration.  Venerated by Furman University for his philanthropic efforts, Benette E. 
Geer passed away in 1957.  Ben Geer‟s service to South Carolina eventually resulted in 
the state‟s dedication of Geer Highway, a 25 mile stretch of U.S. Highway 276, 
connecting Greenville to Brevard, North Carolina.18  
Despite the Columbia streetcar union‟s defeat, Ambrose A. Gerald continued his 
political career in South Carolina for a time.  Gerald had represented Richland County, 
the state capital‟s home, at the Seventy-Third (1919-20) and Seventy-Fourth (1921-22) 
General Assemblies.  Even as Columbia‟s strike entered its last throes, Gerald won a 
third term with the Seventy-Fifth General Assembly in November 1922.  Gerald lost two 
bids for re-election in 1924 and 1926, but returned for his final term as Richland County 
representative in the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly (1929-30).  Thereafter, Ambrose 
Gerald‟s paper trail appears to run out.
19         
Albert Essex Jones, the union organizer who sought to overturn the Piedmont 
establishment, has been less difficult to trace.  His own streetcar union in Cincinnati 
foundered in March 1922, contemporaneous with similar setbacks in Charlotte and 
Knoxville, Tennessee.  However, Jones‟s union standing improved shortly after his 
departure from Charlotte.  His official report made no mention of his treatment by 
Zebulon Taylor, or his summary dismissal by Mayor McNinch.  But evidently, AASERE 
President William D. Mahon did not hold Jones responsible for events in Charlotte.  In 
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October 1919, he became Eleventh Vice-President.  As mentioned in Chapter Seven, 
Jones took part in the Columbia negotiations of 1920, without incurring the wrath of its 
city fathers.  Jones later visited other imperiled union chapters across Ohio, Kentucky, 
and Tennessee.  By August 1923, Jones had risen to Seventh Vice-President.  But 
afterward, Jones‟s union activity seems to have tapered off.  Cincinnati‟s 1930 census 
reports reveal Jones at age 55, still laboring as a streetcar conductor.  Jones remained in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, until his death in 1962, at age 87.20       
During the 1920s, unionism became a taboo subject in the region.  Almost a 
decade after the Charlotte strike, major textile strikes erupted across the Piedmont over 
unionization.  In 1927, the United Textile Workers began a recruitment drive in 
Henderson, North Carolina, where “stretch-outs” and wage cuts had angered workers.  
More drastic events took place in 1929, when the North Carolina mill towns of Marion 
and Gastonia witnessed strikes over union recognition.  Both incidents, like the Charlotte 
Regional Streetcar Strike, ended with bloodshed and legal recriminations.  Southern 
Public Utilities streetcar workers played no visible role during these textile strikes, owing 
largely to the fact they had no union organization to galvanize their support.  By 1929, 
only Division 128 in Asheville remained extant.  Moreover, labor efforts in Gastonia 
drew true radicals to the Piedmont, notably Communist Party leader William Z. Foster.  
Even if streetcar men held sympathies for the Loray Mill strikers, they were unlikely to 
become involved with actual labor radicalism, given their experiences ten years before.21 
 
                                                 
     20 Motorman and Conductor, Vol. 27, No. 11 (October 1919), 140; Vol. 29, No. 11 
(October 1921), 117; Vol. 31, No. 4 (March 1922), 8; Vol. 32, No. 9 (August 1923), 1; 
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The campaign for union representation was not, however, a total failure for the 
streetcar men. Charlotte‟s strike actually improved Southern Power‟s treatment of its 
transportation workers, especially after Taylor‟s death.  Southern Public Utilities pay 
raises turned out to be permanent, and Loy Cloninger saved enough by late 1920 to 
purchase a home for his wife on South Tryon Street.  Cloninger also sported a Harley-
Davidson motorcycle, which he and his spouse rode every year to the Charlotte 
Fairgrounds.  Cloninger‟s four children finished high school and his two sons later 
worked for Duke Power.  Like many former conductors and motormen, L.C. Cloninger 
retrained for the city‟s new bus service.  After years as a mechanic and part-time driver, 
Loy Cloninger retired in 1955 with a pension from City Coach, the contractor operating 
Duke Power‟s bus lines.  Cloninger‟s later memories of City Coach seem to have been 
happier than his earlier recollections of working for Southern Public Utilities.22   
Jesse B. Ashe‟s career at Southern Power also flourished in the years following 
the strike.  Ashe often drove a streetcar through the Queens College district, where he 
became something of a favorite with the co-eds.  But unlike Loy Cloninger, Ashe did not 
meet his future wife until shortly before he turned forty.  In 1926, Ashe began a family 
and helped raise three sons.  Soon after, Ashe became inspector of streetcars, at $150 
monthly.  By the time Ashe retired from City Coach in 1955, a bus supervisor earned 
$358 monthly.  With this income, Jesse Ashe could afford to put one son through the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, one of his own unrealized dreams.23   
                                                 
     22 SPU workers received periodic raises every six months in 1920-21.  (Motorman and 
Conductor, Vol. 29, No. 3 (February 1921), 2; Cloninger interview, 9-12). 




But one wonders if the material improvements enjoyed by Southern Power‟s 
streetcar men were adequate compensation for their defeated effort to achieve true 
collective bargaining. We have already touched upon the suppression of Loy Cloninger‟s 
eyewitness account, and Jesse B. Ashe‟s selective memory of the strike.  In 1933, Russell 
Campbell came to work as a streetcar conductor during Southern Public‟s final days.  
When interviewed in 1994, Campbell had been retired from Duke Power since 1974.  As 
nephew to Assistant Superintendent T.R. Drum -- among those injured in the riot – 
Campbell remembered well the chief lesson of the Charlotte Streetcar Strike.  Former 
participants were “advised not to say too much about it,” in order to prevent younger 
employees from “getting ideas” about unionism.  Charlotte historian Dan Morrill also 
blamed newspaper publisher Wade Harris for obscuring the actual truth behind the strike, 
labeling the Observer as “a mouthpiece for corporate Charlotte.” 24    
Following World War II, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
once more sought to unionize Duke Power.  Much as their Southern Power counterparts 
had done in 1919, Duke Power electricians assembled for a union vote in 1948.  Herman 
Wolf recalled convincing his junior electricians that union organizers were untrustworthy 
agents.  He further reasoned that “Mr. Adair,” the union organizer, “stood to gain 
financially” from collecting union dues.  Citing the company‟s welfare programs for 
retirees, Wolf warned his colleagues that union rules would require the company to end 
these services.  Herman Wolf expressed his belief to Allen Tullos that his arguments 
convinced nearly all Duke‟s electrical workers to defeat the 1948 union vote.  Harkening 
back to the Charlotte strike, Wolf concluded that AFL union organizers did not win any 
                                                 
     24 Maschal, 1E-2E. 
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converts in 1919.  This erroneous statement encapsulates the degree to which Duke 
Power‟s management discouraged – and distorted -- memories of the streetcar and 
electricians‟ strikes.  Certainly, hundreds of pro-union transportation and utility workers 
once existed in Columbia, Spartanburg, and Charlotte, or historians and journalists would 
not consider today their wider significance to the Piedmont, the New South, or the post-
war United States.25    
*      *      * 
So what should scholars and other readers learn from the preceding examples of 
Spartanburg, Charlotte, and Columbia?  Spartanburg and Charlotte‟s 1919 transportation 
strikes inaugurated a regional anti-labor backlash in the Piedmont Carolinas, comparable 
to such events as Centralia, Washington‟s Armistice Day Massacre, or the 1920 Denver 
Tramway strike in Colorado.26  But in a larger sense, the Red Scare exerted a profound 
effect upon the Carolina Piedmont, especially in Charlotte, where industrial unions did 
not gain headway until the 1960s.  Anti-labor arguments prevalent in 1919 still hold sway 
in conservative towns across the Piedmont, even as textile mills and fabric plants closed 
their gates and redeployed on foreign shores in the final quarter of the twentieth century.  
                                                 
     25 Herman Wolf admitted he had been in Concord, North Carolina, during the entire 
strike proceeding in 1919.  Moreover, Wolf, as a company loyalist and operations 
manager, would not have supported union activity within his ranks.  His creative 
interpretations of the IBEW Union Constitution almost brought about a lawsuit for 
misrepresentation.  (Wolf interview).  
     26 In early August 1920, Denver, Colorado witnessed a violent strike bearing 
similarities to the Charlotte tragedy.  As strikebreakers escalated tensions, about two 
thousand sympathizers staged six demonstrations across Denver.  Six were killed and 
fifty wounded before U.S. Army troops under General Leonard Wood restored order to 
the city.  Hardly a friend to organized labor, General Wood nonetheless conceded the 
strikebreakers had provoked the townsfolk.  (Ronald H. Cole and Clayton D. Laurie, The 
Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945 (insert publication 
information here), 271-72; Asinof, 197-202).   
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Even today, the two Carolinas still compete for the lowest concentration of labor unions 
across the United States. 27 
Between the Wheels also addressed the ideals of Southern Progressivism at every 
level of Carolina Piedmont society.  Governor Robert Cooper of South Carolina and 
Mayor Frank McNinch represent the elite political leaders who brokered labor 
compromises and promoted regulatory reforms, in keeping with the goals of President 
Wilson‟s “New Freedom.”  Ambrose Gerald and Marvin Ritch both hailed from middle-
class Carolina yeomanry, but they suffered frustrations in their respective efforts to 
combine labor reforms with state legislature.  Finally, we observe working men such as 
Loy Cloninger and Jesse Ashe, whose hopes for better pay and improved futures 
translated into their support for a streetcar union.      
Outside the Carolina Piedmont, some streetcar unions managed to weather the 
anti-union reaction during the 1920s, most notably Wheeling, West Virginia‟s Division 
103.  Unlike Columbia‟s isolated Division 590, Wheeling‟s streetcar union benefited 
from a truly regional labor network, the Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly.  
Division 103 even sent organizers into Southern West Virginia, hoping in vain to 
unionize streetcar workers in coal towns, such as Princeton and Bluefield.  Division 103, 
however, managed to rescue their company from receivership during the Great 
Depression, transforming Wheeling Traction Company into the employee-owned 
Cooperative Transit System, which served the city for three more decades.  Whether 
                                                 
     27 Edward Martin, “N.C. Labor Efforts Written in Blood,” from the Charlotte News,  
(5 September 1983), 1A-3A.  For more on labor resistance in the post-World War II 
Carolinas, see Julian B. Roebuck and Mark Hickson III, The Southern Redneck (New 
York City: Praeger Publishers, 1982). 
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Ambrose Gerald‟s South Carolina labor alliance could have mobilized a similar drive to 
purchase Columbia Railway after its 1925 decline is a matter for speculation.28    
Division 590‟s defeat certainly did not extirpate the Palmetto capital‟s union 
presence, but judging from the city‟s overall decline in labor activism, and the 
Upcountry‟s relative quietude throughout the 1920s, the streetcar strike of 1922 reversed 
an entire decade‟s worth of progress.  Embattled after the Charlotte strike of 1919, the 
Columbia Federation of Trades watched in trepidation as Franklin Knox engineered the 
downfall of streetcar unionism in two South Carolina cities.  While Knox‟s two streetcar 
lines quickly fell into receivership, his victory against unionism discouraged further 
efforts to expand into the South Carolina Upcountry.  Columbia‟s protracted 
transportation strike in 1922 affected the Piedmont region much in the same fashion that 
the National Railroad Shopmen‟s Strike halted labor progress across the country.  Both 
cases reveal a dramatic rollback of union gains during World War I, weakening their state 
and federal support until the New Deal ushered in a new period of activism.29      
Unfortunately, Piedmont streetcar workers did not figure prominently in these 
later struggles for industrial democracy.  Their torch subsequently passed to oppressed 
textile workers who organized across the Carolinas during the Depression.  Like the 
                                                 
     28 Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees, Division 103, 
Wheeling, West Virginia (WVU West Virginia Collection, Box 3); Motorman and 
Conductor, Vol. 19, No. 4 (March 1911), 18; Vol. 24, No. 3 (February 1916), 25; Phil 
Conley, West Virginia, Yesterday and Today (Charleston, West Virginia: West Virginia 
Publishing Company, 1937), 267-71; Tom Dunham, Wheeling in the 20th Century 
(Bloomington University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 2003), 7; Doug Fethering, 
Wheeling: an Illustrated History (Wheeling, West Virginia: Windsor Publications, 1983), 
54-65.  
     29 Colin J. Davis, Power at Odds: the 1922 National Railroad Shopmen’s Strike 
(Urbana & Chicago:  University of Illinois Press, 1997), 166-72.  
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participants in Charlotte‟s labor protest movement, these textile workers paid for their 
courage with blood and defamation.   
Duke Power‟s trolleys are no more.  However, like old trolley tracks beneath 
Charlotte‟s asphalt streets, the Queen City‟s historical tradition has emerged into public 
consciousness since the late 1970s.  Owing to journalists and public historians, 
Charlotte‟s collective amnesia toward its strike has dissipated, helping to rekindle interest 
in trolleys as modern agents of local tourism and public transit.  To a lesser extent, South 
Carolina cities, such as Columbia and Spartanburg have also revisited their New South 
roots as streetcar towns in recent decades.30 
Charlotte‟s trolley debate seems to have accelerated in the 1980s, during the 
tenure of Mayor Harvey Gantt, the city‟s first African-American mayor.  Part of Gantt‟s 
interest in the project lay in his concerns over rising traffic congestion in his ever-
widening city.  However, the projected costs for surveys and construction deterred the 
city council from endorsing Gantt‟s plan.  Eventually, Mayor Gantt abandoned this 
project to expand public transportation in Charlotte. 31   
                                                 
     30 Joe Goodpasture, “Streetcar Riot,” Charlotte Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 
2001, 11; Richard Maschal, “Forgotten Night of Fear,” Charlotte Observer, 23 August 
1994, 1E-2E; Steve Snow, “Trolley Holds Deep Memories,” Charlotte Observer, 14 
January 1987, 10C; Ed Martin, “North Carolina Labor Efforts Written in Blood,” 
Charlotte News, 5 September 1983, 1A-3A; Bill Beck, “Five Deaths Marred 1919 
Charlotte Streetcar Strike,” Charlotte News, 20 January 1979, 10A. 
     31 Jack Claiborne, “Trolley Conscious,” from Charlotte Observer, 12 August 1989, 
12A; Eileen Curry, “Mayor Delays Vote on Trolley Study,” from Charlotte Observer, 29 
January 1985, 1B; Ted DeAdwyler, “Visitor Extols Virtues of Trolleys,” from Charlotte 
News, 29 March 1984, 1C; “Gantt to Discuss U.S. Aid for Trolley Idea,” from Charlotte 
Observer.  16 December 1983, 10B; Dan Morrill, “The Trolley Car,” from Charlotte 
Observer, 24 April 1983, 4E; Jim Morrill, “Council Members Weigh the Need for 
Trolley System,” from Charlotte Observer, 25 September 1984, 1B; Jim Morrill, 
“Trolley Clang Stifled as Council Delays Action,” from Charlotte News, 25 September 
1984, 1C; Lew Powell, “Close, But No Trolley,” from Charlotte Observer, 24 April 
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Enthusiasts such as Steve Snow and Dan Morrill kept trolley interests simmering 
until the next decade.  In 1996, streetcars finally returned to Charlotte, using volunteer 
conductors instead of low-wage employees.  A private group began efforts to restore the 
original Dilworth building for a new transportation museum.  In late 2001, the Levine 
Museum of the New South also reevaluated the Dilworth barn‟s historical importance.32   
In 2003, Dan Morrill and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Historic Landmarks 
Commission appeared before the Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners.  Two 
potential sites were assessed for a new transportation museum, with Atherton Mill 
estimated at $3.4 million, and the Dilworth Barn had been projected at $5.2 million.  On 
May 21, 2003, Mecklenburg County‟s board members voted 6 to 3 to preserve both sites.  
However, Dilworth‟s preservation bond fell through in 2007, and the site is under 
development.  Retired Charlotte Observer reporter Jack Claiborne explained this tragedy 
as a case where preservation could not make a persuasive argument for profitability.33           
                                                                                                                                                 
1984, 3E; Lew Powell, “Tracking Trolleys,” from Charlotte Observer, 17 April 1984, 
3E; “Relics,” from Charlotte Observer, 18 January 1984, 1B-2B; “Reviving Trolleys,” 
from Charlotte Observer, 27 December 1983, 18A; Gretchen C.F.  Shappert, “The 
Trolley Folly,” from Charlotte News, 15 January 1985, 1B; Steven Snow, “Trolley Holds 
Deep Memories,” from Charlotte Observer, 14 January 1987, 10C; Steven Snow, 
“Trolleys Work – Let‟s Get Them On Line Here,” from Mecklenburg Neighbors, 15 
April 1987, 14; Steven Snow,  “Include Trolleys in Street Plans,” from Mecklenburg 
Neighbors, 26 April 1987, 14; “Trolley Link,” from Charlotte Observer, 3 September 
1983, 18A; “Trolley Song,” from Charlotte Observer, 22 November 1975, 18A; “Trolley 
Talk,” from Charlotte Observer, 31 January 1985, 16A; “Trolleys Left Charlotte Tracks 
in 1938,” from Charlotte News, 16 February 1978, 3. 
     32 Ryan L. Sumner, Historical Background Statement, available from  
http://www.cmhpf.org/Surveys&rstreetcarbarn.htm; Internet; accessed 22 April 2003. 
     33 http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/news/columnists/dr_traffic/5310034.htm; 
Internet; accessed 22 April 2003; 
http://www.athomecharlotte.com/charlottenews/01/aug01/worthy%20investment.htm; 





Unfortunately, no marker exists to commemorate the five slain men who fell on 
August 25, 1919.  Few people recognize that these unarmed men, drawn from different 
walks of life, were mercilessly gunned down by Chief Walter B. Orr‟s police officers, 
augmented by strikebreakers.  After Orr‟s trial, Judge F.B. Alexander predicted 
gravestones were not necessary to remember the strike for ages to come.  Caldwell 
Houston, Walter Pope, J. D. Aldrich, William R. Hammond, and Claude Hinson deserved 
better remembrance.  Though these five men were undeniably native Piedmont yeomen, 
the state and local authorities have yet to erect a marker to acknowledge their unjust 
deaths at the city‟s hands.  It is almost as though these five men were foreign invaders, 
instead of workers voicing their opposition to strikebreakers in their city.   
Across the post-war United States in 1919, terms such as “foreigner” and 
“outsider” were subject to elastic interpretations.  Wartime hatreds toward Germany 
quickly translated into Red Scares against Bolshevik Russia, with American labor unions 
caught in a political no-man‟s land after the decline of Wilson‟s presidency.  While the 
South experienced these same impulses, Piedmont Carolina employers and workers 
expressed a notable antipathy toward labor unions.   
Yet, overstated myths of cultural independence and Protestant industry have 
obscured the wider view of North and South Carolina‟s mountain and upcountry folk.  
They did not need “foreign” agitators to feel anger and resentment toward low wages, 
long hours, and no benefits.  However, while labor unions were not widely welcomed, 
neither were they unsupported in the Piedmont or the Blue Ridge Mountains, as 
evidenced by the AASERE campaign to connect Columbia and Asheville‟s streetcar 
unions through Spartanburg, Greenville, and ultimately, Charlotte.  Historians should 
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now reassess these brave men who challenged the powerful industrialists of yesterday.  
Despite the Carolina Piedmont‟s gradual losses of textile mill industry and culture, labor 
unions are still relevant to the region‟s future. We still need native-born labor advocates 
in the molds of Ambrose Gerald and Marvin Ritch, who can embrace progressive goals 
and work on behalf of today‟s Southern workers.  Nearly a century after their efforts 
failed valiantly, American workers still languish between the wheels, even in this new era 
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